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VOICES IN A SILENCE: AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT WORKED FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1979

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VOICES IN A SILENCE: AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS THAT WORKED FOR DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1979

A DISSERTATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

SUBMITTED BY

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FEBRUARY 1981

approved
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INTRODUCTION

Ronald Reagan, in his 1980 campaign for the presidency, said that, if elected, he would restore official relations with the Nationalist government in Taiwan.[1] The leaders of the People's Republic of China condemned this statement as a violation of the agreement underlying U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations. President Jimmy Carter, Vice President Walter Mondale, Ambassador to China Leonard Woodcock, and Reagan's own running mate, George Bush, in effect told Reagan to retract his statement since good relations with the People's Republic of China were in America's best interests, and any talk of reinstating official relations with Taiwan would jeopardize those interests.[2] Reagan soon extricated himself from his pledge to Taiwan.

American politicians have only recently realized that good relations with China are valuable. From 1949 to 1979 they were just as certain that nonrecognition was vital to

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[1] New York Times, August 24, 1980, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., August 25, 1980, p. 1 and August 26, 1980, p. 1.

[3] Ibid.

American interests.

However, as I hope this dissertation shows, some American citizens had a clearer perception of U.S. interests, and were far ahead of political leaders on this issue. Thousands joined organizations that worked diligently to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic, often struggling against great odds. They knew nonrecognition was a mistake, and spent years trying to convince policy-makers of this. Policy toward China eventually changed, and these organizations helped make this happen.

A nation's foreign policy involves the lives and futures of its citizens. It defines a nation's outlooks on questions of war, peace, and human needs. Citizens should not abdicate their responsibility to participate in foreign policy, nor assume that elected officials will make the correct decision. Sometimes, some citizens' judgments are better than the leaders', as this study will show.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL VIEWS ON THE ROLE GROUPS PLAY IN FOREIGN POLICY

Explanations of how foreign policy is made in America usually emphasize the role of the executive branch and its component agencies since they are charged with the most responsibility in foreign affairs. To give one example, Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State, has written: "...any discussion of the making of U.S. foreign policy must begin with the President. It is the President to whom the Constitution assigns the task of conducting foreign affairs. It is the President who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces."[1] Advisers, appointees, or agency heads may offer opinions and information to the executive, but the President is the "ultimate decider."[2]

Other writers, while acknowledging the primacy of the President, elaborate on the contributions made by the bureau-

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[1]Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 17.

[2]Ibid., p. 18.

cracies surrounding the chief executive. Morton Halperin, for one, sees foreign policy emerging from the interplay of personalities, ambitions, wishes, conflicts, restraints, victories, losses, or compromises struck among the actors in the executive, legislative, and agency structures.[3] Burton Sapin links the two views. He feels the executive may set national priorities or foreign policy goals but "rather well-established organizational channels and normal bureaucratic routines" govern most non-critical decisions.[4]

Such interpretations relegate Congress and other actors to secondary importance. John Spanier and Eric Ulaner depict foreign policy-making processes in terms of circles rippling around the President.[5] Those closest to him have the greatest impact on decision-making. This circle includes the president's chosen advisors or those deemed appropriate

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[3]Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1974). Similar interpretations are offered by D. H. Davis in How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), and I. M. Destler's Presidents, Bureaucracies and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

[4]Burton Sapin, The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1966), p. 27.

[5]John Spanier and Eric Ulaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made (N.Y.: Praeger, 1974).

for consultation, e.g., Congressional chairmen of policy committees. Lower ranking staff have less influence on the executive. Interest groups and the public have the least significant input.

Perceptions of Congressional input have varied over time. The Constitution grants Congress powers in foreign affairs, most notably the power to declare war and raise armies. These powers can be seen to overlap those of the chief executive. However, contemporary observers have portrayed Congress as subordinate to the executive. James Robinson is one political scientist who sees Congress merely supporting the president, offering bipartisan agreement to his plans, modifying or amending executive initiatives while refusing to offer competitive suggestions.[6] In his book, The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger details how ambitious executives steadily annexed powers from such near-passive legislatures.[7] These trends have forced recent Congresses to reassert their constitutional and legislative roles for instance, by passing the 1973 War Powers Act, which limits the president's power to deploy armed forces abroad without consulting Congress; ter-

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[6] James Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy (Ill: Dorsey Press, 1962).

[7] Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton-Miflin, 1973).

minating funds for the Indochina War; and conducting vigorous debates on the Panama Canal Treaty and SALT II. All these activities demonstrate Congressional eagerness to forge a more substantial, more equal partnership in foreign policy.

If then, the president and the Congress, plus their associated bureaus and staffs, are the key actors in foreign policy, what role do the numerous public organizations outside government play? Certainly, they are active. Whenever a crisis in America's relations with another nation arises, groups mobilize, present their positions, voice their demands, hoping to influence national leaders and the general public. The organizations may be transient, single-issue groups, like those calling for relief for the "boat people" of Indochina. Or they may endure for years, as have the groups espousing worldwide nuclear disarmament. If they have little impact or importance, why are they active at all? Why do their members make the effort?

Observers perceive the roles played by interest groups in different ways. Some observers see them as minor players in foreign policy decisions. Spanier and Ulaner think they are the least powerful actors because they do not have and cannot have the information readily available to officials.[8] Other

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[8]Spanier and Ulaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made.

observers believe such groups tend to be so ideologically biased, partisan, or parochial that their members cannot objectively assess the many alternatives and consequences to decisions. The American Legion, for example, clung to a rigidly militaristic, anti-communist stance long after such a position was geopolitically germane.[9] When bias is evident, the views of these are discredited or mistrusted.

The manner in which decision-makers respond to groups has been the focus of some studies. Donald Stokes and Warren Miller believe domestic interest groups fare better than those active in foreign policy. They found that legislators are more likely to heed the demands of civil rights and social welfare groups than those concerned with foreign policy.[10] Lester Milbrath asserts that groups may enhance their power by acting responsibly and offering credible positions, but he assigns little actual weight to groups involved in policy-making.[11] It may be that groups are deliberately disregarded

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[9]Roscoe Barker, The American Legion and Foreign Policy (N.Y.:Bookman, 1954).

[10]Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "The Impact of Constituency Demands on Legislative Voting," American Political Science Review, (March 1966): 45-56.

[11]Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

by decision-makers; Bernard Cohen and William Chittick found that the Department of State either excluded outside groups from participating in foreign policy deliberations,[12] or spent most time trying to convince the groups of the State Department's wisdom after decisions had been made, rather than consulting the groups before policy was set.[13]

Other studies seem to prove that these public groups cannot be easily dismissed. Organized Jewish groups certainly have had a strong impact on U.S. policy toward Israel and the Arab nations.[14] Ross Koen's The China Lobby in American Politics,[15] and Stanley Bachrach's The Committee of One

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[12]Bernard Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1973).

[13]William Chittick, The State Department, The Press and Pressure Groups (N.Y.: Wiley-Interscience, 1970).

[14]S. F. Windmueller, "American Jewish Interest Groups: Their Role in Shaping U.S. Foreign Policy (1945-1948) and (1955-1958)," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1973), and M. S. Hershberg's "A Case Study of the Activities of the Organized Jewish Community in Regard to the 1968 Decision to Sell Phantom Jets to Israel," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973) are two examples of reports on this.

[15]Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1974), is the seminal work on the Lobby. Koen divided the Lobby into two sections: a core group of Nationalist officials and ministers who coordinated their lobbying work with Congress and Administration figures with Chiang Kai-shek; and a larger, loosely joined group of American supporters from various fields but with degrees of influence within policy-making circles.

Million[16] document the mighty power over U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) that the pro-Nationalist Chinese support groups wielded for years. Russell Howe and Sarah Trott's The Power Peddlers: How Foreign Groups Mold America's Foreign Policy describes hundreds of benefits lobbyists for foreign nations have extracted from the U.S. government for their clients.[17]

Gabriel Almond and James Rosenau do not believe foreign policy groups are impotent. Rather, both argue that these groups are vital to the correct functioning of a democratic society. Democracy requires public participation in policy-making, an open discussion among the citizens of positions and impacts, and free competition of ideas. Foreign policy groups link officials to the public by encouraging the dissemination and deliberation of information and options.

Almond divides the public into an "attentive" public, of citizens who are well-informed about foreign policy matters, and the general public.[18] The attentive public is estimated

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[16]Stanley Bachrach, The Committee of One Million (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1976).

[17]Russell Howe and Sarah Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Foreign Groups Mold America's Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977).

[18]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1950).

at less than fifteen percent of the populace. The remaining citizens are less informed, less interested but malleable, given instruction or mobilization. Foreign policy decisions are not made solely by those authorized to make them. Instead, the issues are debated by elites within the attentive public who compete for acceptance by the general public and by decision-makers. The elites comprise political officials, communications specialists, bureaucratic staffers, and representatives of policy-oriented associations from the ethnic, religious, and ideological factions in the society. Once the general public has listened to the debates, it approves or vetoes policy options. To Almond, the American public shares a "general ideological consensus" on foreign policy with the leadership and sets the limits of proposable options.[19]

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[19]Ibid. Almond's views share some similarity with those of V. O. Key and E. S. Schattschneider. Key held that group demands were the "animating forces" in the political process, with leaders and decision-makers required to balance legitimate demands in making policy democratically. See his Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (N.Y.: Thomas Crowell, 1952). Schattschneider's The Semi-Sovereign People (Ill.: Dryden, 1960) reflects his views that only a small percentage of the public organize themselves into groups to make demands. Manfred Landecker's The President and Public Opinion: Leadership in Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968) is a discussion of the interdependence between organized groups and leaders in policy formation. All of these authors are, like Almond, concerned with policy-making in a democratic society.

Using Almond as a guide, James Rosenau suggests that organized groups and informed individuals mediate foreign policy questions between officials who have the authority to make decisions and the public, the matrix from which acceptable options are drawn.[20] Rosenau believes that opportunities to affect policy outcomes are possible once a group organizes, or attains resources sufficient to become "opinion-makers," his term for persons or groups who occupy positions or institutions which enable them to "regularly transmit, either locally or nationally, opinions about any policy issue to unknown persons."[21] These opinion-makers arise, circulate opinions, try to impress decision-makers with their positions, debate alternatives, and propose consensus, as part of the total foreign policy-making process. They serve four functions: they veto or support policy alternatives; articulate choices to the general public; consult and advise officials on issues and impacts; and call attention to policy questions or issues by bringing them up for other opinion-makers or the public to consider. Rosenau supposes groups to move in a

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[20]James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Random House, 1961). See too his National Leadership and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially Chapters I and II.

[21]Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 45.

rational, purposeful manner. The environment in which they move is ultimately benign since no profound cleavages exist, and the public wants to reach consensus that will enable policy to be implemented. He also implies that groups agree on the rules of the game and will treat one another fairly.

Following Rosenau's reasoning, a group that is, or aspires to be an opinion-maker in foreign policy could be studied to determine if it performs the functions he outlines. One should be able to find specific actions, campaigns, or other methods a group used in fulfilling the function of educating or mobilizing the public or other opinion-makers about foreign policy questions. By consulting officers, activists, published statements, and historical records, it should be possible to ascertain the group's analyses and proposals regarding foreign policy issues as well as the rationale underlying its approval or rejection of options. Similar sources, plus public records and official accounts, could provide data about consultations group members had with elected representatives or other authorities empowered to make decisions on foreign policy. With this information, one should be able to infer something about the interrelationships among such groups and actions taken by official decision-makers.

In this dissertation, I contend that foreign policy

groups can be important to the policy-making process. Rosenau's functional approach will be tested by examining its applicability to the history of the United States' diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China from 1945 to 1979. I shall examine the U.S.-China policy-related objectives and activities of five organizations that worked to obtain diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China to determine if they performed the functions Rosenau proposes.

The groups selected for this study are, in general, voluntary, non-profit associations, which recruit members from the American public. They carry out regular activities according to agreed-upon purposes or regulations. None is attached to or sponsored by any political party. None is part of or sponsored by any official structure or government agency. According to budget reports for the time under study, none of the activities related to U.S. policy toward the People's Republic was funded by any government agency.

The selected groups are different in purpose, but their China-related activities are similar. The first, the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, was a progressive organization concerned with America's policies in Asia. It was active from 1945-1952. Two other groups in the study,

the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, founded in 1966, and the U.S.-China Peoples Friendship Association, founded in 1971, have concentrated on China policy exclusively. The remaining two, the National Council of Churches and the Religious Society of Friends (the Quakers) are religious organizations that sponsor numerous endeavors and projects all over the world. For this study, I have looked at the activities and programs associated with U.S. policy toward the PRC. In the National Council of Churches, this work was done by the China Committee of the Far East Asia Desk of the Division of Foreign Ministries. The Friends Committee on National Legislation and the American Friends Service Committee were the responsible divisions in the Society of Friends.

Although different in some essentials, all the organizations shared a common dissatisfaction with existing U.S. policy toward the PRC and sought to change it.

The issue of U.S. policy toward the PRC involves some special circumstances, since the relationship between the two nations has been irregular. First, the issue itself--diplomatic recognition of one government by another--is not often a common political problem. The extension of diplomatic recognition by one government is necessary for international intercourse; it generally occurs when the government seeking

recognition proves itself capable of governing its national territory and its citizens for the present and presumably for the foreseeable future. Yet, the United States refused to recognize the People's Republic of China until January 1, 1979, nearly thirty years after the People's Republic was established on October 1, 1949. Instead, the United States recognized the remnants of the previous Chinese Nationalist regime, which had been ousted from China in 1949 and forced to flee to Taiwan. This is an unusual historical situation and may mean that the findings of this study have limited applicability to other, more normal events. However, America refused to recognize the Bolshevik revolution in the U.S.S.R. from 1917 to 1933,[22] and currently has no diplomatic relations with Cuba, Vietnam, Iran, and Iraq. Thus, this study may be helpful in understanding some of the factors associated with domestic pressures for diplomatic relations with those states.

For the organizations involved, it may mean that the work that they did was also unusual, or at least different from tasks done by other interest groups involved in foreign policy. Normally, interest groups are concerned with the fruits of diplomatic intercourse--trade agreements, favorable tariffs, arms sales, business contracts, treaties, and similar matters.

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[22] Peter Filene, America and the Soviet Experiment: 1917-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967).

Here, the groups had to struggle to get the first relationship between the two nations started. It is easier to assay the material and tangible rewards accruing in the more conventional milieu. In this study, the organizations selected here worked for rewards that were more potential than real. Also, advocates of recognition had to labor for thirty years through changing environmental circumstances, and these conditions may have affected their work.

Secondly, the U.S.' policy of not recognizing the PRC was favored by an apparent consensus of official American decision-makers in the executive branch, in Congress, in the bureaucracy, and in segments of the general public for more than twenty years.[23] The seemingly monolithic stance of officials presented the groups in this study with formidable challenges. Resistance to recognition held from 1950, the advent of the Korean War, until July, 1971, when then-President Richard Nixon broke with the past by announcing that he had accepted a solicited invitation to visit the People's Republic of China to discuss a new diplomatic relationship.

Third, official resistance was augmented by two additional factors. Pro-Chinese Nationalists had their own strong,

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[23] A. T. Steele, The American People and China (N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1966).

highly regarded lobby operating at all levels of American society--government, media, church, business, and academe.[24] This "China Lobby" opposed all attempts to recognize the PRC, and its actions will be discussed in Chapters II and III. Also, advocates of recognition were subjected to government investigations of their loyalty and their political affiliations during the late 1940's and the early 1950's. They were branded communists or communist-sympathizers for proposing that the PRC be recognized. The intimidation engendered by loyalty inquiries and the Korean War was so pervasive that anti-communist anti-PRC sentiment prevailed for years. Individuals who favored recognition acted at great personal risk.

These factors create special questions for our study. How did the groups organize or recruit members, given the risks involved? How did they battle entrenched attitudes and relentless opposition? How did they obtain resources to sustain themselves, to present their views? Did they continue to believe that organizing would lead to change? Why did they speak out when economic and political pressures should have rendered them mute? Did these circumstances affect their strategies and tactics?

In this dissertation, I assume that Rosenau's premises

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[24]Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics.

apply to the question of U.S.-PRC policy as to any other foreign policy matter.

The following hypotheses guide this study:

1) The groups in this study carried out the functions described by Rosenau in advocating American recognition of the PRC. Although group members were aware of the obstacles they faced, and the controversial nature of the question they addressed, they were confident that they could become effective opinion-makers, and that their actions would facilitate changes in American policy toward the PRC. The strategies and campaigns chosen to achieve this goal were designed to reach other opinion-makers and elected officials primarily. These include actions that presented positions favoring diplomatic recognition of he People's Republic of China, encouraged full discussion of the pros and cons of existing policy, and urged officials to re-think and re-assess the policy of nonrecognition. The groups also developed various means to educate and inform the general public about American policy toward the People's Republic.

2) Rosenau claims that groups or individuals who want to be opinion-makers have to obtain resources which enable them to circulate opinions effectively. In this case, individuals, while organizing and carrying out activities about the

issue of recognizing the PRC, developed contacts with citizens of the PRC. These direct contacts--people-to-people exchanges, friendships, official and unofficial communiques--were resources the groups in this study used to enlist support for their position, to sustain their commitment to their goal, and to work for their cause. I do not, however, imply in any way that the PRC sponsored, funded, manipulated, hired, or directed the work of any group in this study; I do suggest that the groups considered contacts with citizens of the PRC useful and helpful assets.

To test these propositions, a combination of techniques were used to examine each group's China-related activities. Wherever possible, I interviewed or obtained oral histories from founders, officers, organizers, and activists in the five groups. I also consulted correspondence, annual reports, pamphlets, publications, press releases, news accounts, archives, conference reports and similar sources. Since interviews and oral statements may not be totally reliable, corroboration was sought from records, supporting testimony, or other accounts. Records of public hearings, speeches, memoirs, files and other available data were examined to see if any nexus between the groups and decision-makers occurred that might suggest or document the groups' relationships with authorities. Both Richard

Nixon[25] and Henry Kissinger[26] have written accounts of events during their tenure, but President Jimmy Carter, who recognized the PRC, has not published his, making inferences regarding the final decision necessarily sketchy.

The chapters in this paper are arranged chronologically. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, active during the crucial years after World War II and the McCarthy period, is the subject of Chapter II. Chapter III covers the years 1954-1969, when the Quakers, the National Council of Churches and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations were most instrumental. Chapter IV focuses mainly on the work the U.S.-China Peoples Friendship Association did from 1971 to 1979. Chapter V presents conclusions.

In discussing events after 1949, the People's Republic of China is referred to as China, the PRC, or the People's Republic. The terms Taiwan and the Republic of China refer to the government of the Nationalists on Taiwan.

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[25] Richard Nixon, RN (N.Y.: Grosset Dunlap, 1978).

[26] Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979).

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST VOICE IS STILLED

Introduction

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (CDFEP) was a progressive organization that was founded at the end of World War II. Its organizers hoped to influence America's policies in Asia. CDFEP members wanted the U.S. to support post-War anti-colonialist struggles in Asian nations, and to help democratic groups and parties obtain political power once the colonial forces were ousted. In regard to China, CDFEP members believed the coalition organized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised a better life for the Chinese people than did the Nationalist government, which was ruling China then. CDFEP supported recognition of the People's Republic of China after 1949 and worked for that goal. Like other progressive organizations of its time, CDFEP was composed of liberals, humanitarians, communists and other individuals concerned with China and post-War politics in the Far East. CDFEP's composition, its pro-recognition stance, and its anti-cold war philosophy made it an easy target for

powerful anti-communists. In this chapter, I will discuss CDFEP, its membership and activities, its analysis of China policy and the cold war, and the attacks it sustained.

Beginning at the End

In April 1953, United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell and the Subversives Activities Control Board sued Maud Russell, CDFEP's Executive Director from 1946 to 1952, to force her to register CDFEP as a "communist-front" organization. The citation followed provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 which required organizations so designated to acknowledge their status by publicly registering with the government.

The Attorney General's charges described the CDFEP as an organization "dominated and controlled by the Communist Party in the United States...formed at the initiative of the Communist Party, U.S.A. to give aid and support to the Communist Party." According to Brownell's petition, CDFEP's "board of directors and officers were Communists"; the Communist Party urged its members to join the Committee and aid its work"; and CDFEP's "activities were promoted by the Communist Party press". Far Eastern Spotlight, CDFEP's major publication, "supported Communist Party policies and positions, particularly its Far Eastern policy". The CDFEP "supported

Communist China" and "campaigned actively for diplomatic recognition of Communist China by the United States, for giving the Chinese Communists a seat in the United Nations, and by protesting United States involvement in Korea."[1]

By May, 1955, the Subversives Activities Control Board decided to drop its action against CDFEP because Ms. Russell had successfully proven that the Committee had been legally dissolved in the summer of 1952. Despite Brownell's urgings, the Board ultimately decided that it couldn't punish an organization that no longer existed.

Unfortunately, given the mania of those times, such bureaucratic overkill doesn't seem so strange. The action by the Attorney General and the Board was the last in a series of governmental attacks and charges regarding CDFEP's loyalty to America. In 1948, the California Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities branded the CDFEP a "communist-front organization."[2] In 1949, the CDFEP appeared on the Attorney General's list of "subversive" organizations and the Congres-

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[1]Quotations from Citation of the Subversive Activities Control Board against the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, Maud Russell, April 22, 1953, Subversive Activities Control Board, Docket #113-53, Washington, D.C., and interview with Maud Russell, February 29, 1980.

[2]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities. Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, 81 Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

sional Committee on Un-American Activities (often called HUAC) listed the CDFEP on the Committee's 1951 "Guide to Subversive Organizations."[3] During the years 1948-1953, many of CDFEP's founders, directors, and officers were either described as communists by informants at Congressional hearings, or they were called to testify about their political affiliations and activities.

From its birth in 1945 to 1952, the CDFEP was a small organization, whose membership never exceeded 3000. Its budget was low, it had a staff of seven at its peak, and its only real base was in New York City.[4] Why then did the CDFEP draw so much official wrath?

The Origins of the CDFEP

CDFEP was formed in 1945, at the end of World War II. At that time, the United States was starting to recover from the stresses and deprivations caused by a long, costly war preceded by a long, severe economic depression. Unlike other countries in the war, the United States had not been invaded so that its industrial plant was intact. Domestic concerns were major preoccupations: returning servicemen wanted jobs, education, homes and families; citizens who had spent years

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Interview with Maud Russell, December 13, 1979.

on rations now wanted goods; war-ravaged nations needed American products to rebuild. National development and world-wide reconstruction required a peaceful environment.

But the uneasy wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union had been breaking apart since the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945. Roosevelt had been willing to accommodate Soviet demands regarding post-war Europe as the Yalta settlements showed. He had also seen the Soviet Union as a stabilizing force in the Far East and had begun to propose arrangements that could create post-war U.S. and Soviet cooperation there.[5] However, his successor, Harry S Truman, had become increasingly suspicious of Soviet intentions in the world, and believed that the Soviets would try to bring Socialists to power wherever they could.

Truman was immediately confronted with difficult post-War negotiations with the Soviet Union about the future of Germany, Eastern Europe, Japan, and countries formerly colonized by Western European powers. As an anti-communist, Truman did not want to compromise with the U.S.S.R., nor surrender any advantages to them. Unlike Roosevelt, who was

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[5]John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 66.

willing to concede Soviet interests in parts of Europe, Truman balked at co-existence. He and some of his key advisers, like James Forrestal and George Kennan, saw the U.S.S.R. as expansionist as Nazi Germany had been, and a military power that threatened the U.S.[6] Top businessmen agreed with this perspective, fearing that Soviet moves would shut off markets from the U.S. firms. Senate Majority Leader Arthur Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles echoed these sentiments in Congress while prominent commentators, like Joseph Alsop, promoted this view in the press.[7] By 1946, most American citizens perceived the U.S.S.R. as "a dictatorship irrevocably committed to forcible imposition of communism wherever it did not exist."[8] The U.S. would not use its arms to directly stop Soviet advances; instead it would challenge the Soviets everywhere, extending American presence and American influence

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[6]Richard Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman and the Cold War (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1976), p. 43. There are two interpretations as to the rationale of the Cold War. One holds that it was an adequate response to Soviet provocations and advances; the other, that it was a convenient excuse to mask American imperialist designs on nations damaged by the war or vulnerable to American penetration. For a good review of the works published and the views proposed, see Cecil Crabb, Jr., Policy-makers and Critics (N.Y.: Praeger, 1976), pp. 81-127.

[7]John L. Gaddis, The U.S. and the Origins of the Cold War (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 320.

[8]Ibid., p. 321.

as widely as possible, and block socialists from winning governments, even if that meant supporting reactionary factions. By this method, the U.S. hoped to contain communism. Waging such a cold war would require massive amounts of aid and other forms of assistance, which the American public would have to approve and supply.

The cold war view was antithetical to others in the United States and abroad. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were terrifying events; many war-weary and farsighted individuals eschewed open conflict and confrontation in the new atomic age in favor of strengthening international organizations like the United Nations which could peacefully resolve tensions. International peace movements and organizations emerged, as less violent means to settle quarrels. Liberals and progressives in America wanted the U.S. to concentrate on its own domestic problems, to expand the New Deal social programs and to end poverty and racism completely.[9] Leftist activism in the 1930's Depression, and the U.S.-Soviet war-

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[9]Carey McWilliams, The Education of Carey McWilliams (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1979), Chapters 4 and 5. See also Lawrence Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement 1911-1960 (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1979), for a history of some of the many organizations involved in these causes.

time cooperation, showed many that socialism was not to be feared--indeed, for many poor nations it might be a good way to rebuild their economies. Fascism and imperialism were to be fought since the world had suffered so much destruction under those banners. Coexistence with the Soviet Union was possible and preferable to the inherent militarism of the cold war.

The intense debate about America's future role in the world was expressed in domestic politics from 1945 to 1948. Civic organizations joined the debate about foreign policy, and its impact on domestic programs. CDFEP was one of many groups who impressed their views on policy-makers of the day.

CDFEP's main interest was the Far East, where nations were in a state of social, political, and economic upheaval brought on by the wrenching events of World War II. Many nations had been occupied by the Japanese or had been battlegrounds between Japanese and Allied forces. In regions like Indochina and Indonesia, indigenous resistance armies had coalesced, fought the Japanese, and now sought independence from former colonial powers. The colonialists, particularly Great Britain under Winston Churchill,[10] strove to reassert

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[10] American Friends Service Committee, Anatomy of Anti-Communism (N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1969, pp. 6-9.

their rule. Independence movements were growing in India, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia. Korea was soon divided, a locus of tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Japan was occupied by Allied forces who were uncertain about its future strength and its role in the Far East.

The founders of CDFEP wanted to give factual information about the events in all the countries in the Far East to the American public, to those in government who could determine policy, and to individuals who were either generally interested in foreign affairs or in molding public opinion. As stated in its first by-laws, CDFEP's purposes were: "1) to develop a more discerning and active American public opinion on Far Eastern issues; 2) to expose the dangers to world peace inherent in our present American policy of supporting anti-democratic elements which in the past have proved incapable of supporting creativity, stability, and democracy in the Far East; 3) to work for a democratic Far Eastern policy; 4) to encourage peoples in the Far East who are struggling to free themselves from feudal oppression and foreign rule; and 5) to work for world peace."[11]

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[11]CDFEP By-Laws, adopted in 1946. Mimeo. From Ms. Russell's files. Most of the extant documents are in possession of Ms. Russell who has not released them publicly, but did share pertinent records with the author.

All of the developments in the Far East received CDFEP's attention but the situation in China is the central debate considered here.

Earlier U.S.-China Relations

The post-War debate on U.S.-China policy only continued a quarrel about American involvement in Chinese politics that had started in the 1930's. It had been sparked by the civil strife between the Nationalist Kuomintang Party, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Tse-tung, and was intensified by Japanese advances into China.

One side wanted the U.S. to pledge its support to the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist government. This side portrayed the Chinese Nationalists as valuable allies against the Japanese, as pro-Christian, and pro-capitalists who had struggled valiantly since the 1920's to destroy an internal communist threat. KMT supporters said that the survival of freedom in China depended upon U.S. aid to Chiang, even if billions in aid and materiel were needed. Chiang, his able wife, his bankers and his paid lobbyists relentlessly pressed this position on Congress, Roosevelt, Truman, and their staffs. The Nationalists were helped by conservative Americans in the media, in business, in churches, and in Congress; these

backers constituted the "China Lobby" who worked diligently for the Nationalist cause.[12]

The other side saw the KMT as a bad bet for the long term interests of the U.S.[13] To them, the KMT was a shaky coalition of warlords, corrupt officials, military officers, landlords and opportunists who lived off graft and the brutal exploitation of the Chinese masses. Unless the KMT enacted drastic reforms, broadened its political composition, and devoted monies to social programs it would lose the small base it had. World War II experience had shown that the KMT waffled before the Japanese army and would probably lose a renewed civil war with rugged communist troops who had been fighting well.[14]

To these observers, working out sound relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) looked like a better policy

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[12] Ross Koen's The China Lobby in American Politics.

[13] Good accounts are found in Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China (N.Y.: Random House, 1938); Michael Schaller's The U.S. Crusade in China: 1938-1945 (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1979); and John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers.

[14] See Agnes Smedley, China Fights Back (N.Y.: Vanguard Press, 1938); Harrison Forman, Report From Red China (N.Y.: Holt Co., 1945); and Evans F. Carlson, Twin Stars of China (N.Y.: Dodd, Mead Co., 1940).

for the U.S.[15] The CCP had earned the support of the peasants it had worked with in Yenan and North China; it had established a government in Yenan and had enacted positive reforms; its base was broad and its party cadres were known for their honesty. Given another civil conflict, the peasants would likely fight against the KMT. Instead of backing the KMT, the U.S. should keep a cordial relationship with the CCP, the potential governors of post-War China. An alliance with the KMT would tie the U.S. to the losing side, and alienate the Chinese people.

During the War, both sides fought to win Roosevelt's endorsement. Although he listened to both views, Roosevelt sent millions in arms, loans, and aid to the KMT to prevent China from falling to the Japanese. Roosevelt consulted with advocates of aid to the CCP, and sent a team of military advisers and diplomatic staff to Yenan--the Dixie Mission--but refused to grant substantial amounts of assistance even though the Red Army's fighting record was better than the KMT.[16] Hoping to prevent resumption of the Chinese civil war

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[15]Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, and John Service's The Amerasia Papers express this view. See E. J. Kahn's The China Hands (N.Y.: Viking, 1972) for accounts of the ideas of the other Foreign Service officers serving in China at this time.

[16]Agnes Smedley's China Fights Back offers good contrast of the two armies.

between the CCP and the KMT, Roosevelt sent mediator Patrick Hurley to China in 1944 to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Neither Roosevelt nor Hurley fully understood the profound ideological differences between the CCP and the KMT or the revolutionary dynamics in China. Hurley's mission failed. He could not understand why, and began to blame American opponents and critics of the KMT, including State Department Foreign Service officers, for sabotaging the Nationalists' efforts in China.[17]

Roosevelt died in April 1945. Truman, when Vice President, had not been privy to the confidential discussions about China policy so he was uninformed and unprepared to understand the complex nature of the situation. State Department officials were not much help, since Hurley had publicly discredited those Foreign Service officers stationed in China. Truman relied on Hurley, the Chiangs, and the pro-nationalists for advice. They portrayed the CCP as weak, the KMT as powerful, and predicted a short struggle once U.S. aid was supplied to the KMT. Truman's anti-communism inclined him to the KMT. Although no proof of Soviet aid to the CCP could be found, Truman sided with the KMT over the CCP.

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[17] Service, The Amerasia Papers, pp. 83-85.

After the Japanese surrendered, civil war in China loomed more certain. American involvement on the scale demanded by the pro-KMT lobbyists would mean another war for American troops. Many citizens and officials were wary about being drawn into a war in Asia, especially to assist someone like Chiang Kai-shek. CDFEP emerged in the midst of this debate.

Who Was in CDFEP?

To achieve its goals of educating policy-makers and the public, CDFEP drew upon a formidable array of talented, expert, and dedicated individuals who joined and supported its activities. Many had first-hand knowledge of the Far East gained from living, working, or serving there. Members of CDFEP knew many journalists, scholars, politicians, and religious figures in Far Eastern nations. These contacts supplied CDFEP with insights, resources, and information not easily available elsewhere. CDFEP received, translated, and published original documents from political groups in the Far East. CDFEP informed those segments of the American public interested in Asian affairs about the situations and aspirations of the peoples there. CDFEP's board, sponsors, and consultants reflected the spectrum of Americans involved in the Orient.

The first (and only) chairman of the board was Brigadier General Evans Carlson, the Marine commander who made the cry "Gung-Ho" part of American history. Roosevelt had sent Carlson to Yenan in 1937 to evaluate the CCP forces. Carlson received a letter of introduction to Mao Tse-tung from Edgar Snow, a writer whose Red Star Over China[18] was the first account of the socialist reforms in Yenan published in the West. Carlson went to Yenan and spent most of 1938 trekking with the red Eighth Route Army under the command of Chu Teh. Carlson was impressed with the high morale, efficiency and democratic organization of the Eighth Route Army and the depth of popular support for the CCP. He pleaded with Roosevelt to give aid and weapons to the Communists since it "would help defeat Japan and secure the friendship of the most dynamic and progressive political group in China."[19]

Conservative reaction in the Navy prevented Carlson from speaking freely on the subject so he resigned from the Marines, and began to lobby actively for aid to the CCP.

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[18] Snow, Red Star Over China.

[19] Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China: 1938-1945, p. 20. Michael Blankfort's The Big Yankee (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947) is good biography of Evans F. Carlson.

He returned to China in 1939, and toured the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Indusco) with Rewi Alley, an Australian political activist who had made his home in China. Alley and others, like Edgar Snow and his wife, Helen Foster Snow, had set up thousands of cooperatives in China to give employment to the Chinese, to aid anti-Japanese efforts, and to help war refugees and the Chinese poor. Indusco was financed by its own operations, by churches, and by donations received from abroad.

Returning to the U.S., Carlson wrote articles for Asia, Amerasia, and Pacific Affairs, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). He published two books about his observations: The Chinese Army,[20] issued in 1940 by IPR, and Twin Stars of China,[21] a journal of his travels. The marines asked him to return to active command in 1942, and he did, modeling his Raiders after the troops of Chu Teh. Carlson wanted an egalitarian band of soldiers who knew why they were fighting and who wanted to work together cooperatively--the true meaning of "gung-ho". Carlson and his

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[20] Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army (N.Y.: Institute of Pacific Relations: 1940).

[21] Carlson, Twin Stars of China.

Raiders became war heroes. He spent the post-War years working and speaking for democratic governments in the Far East, and trying to get the U.S. to stop its one-sided intervention in the Chinese civil war. He died in 1947.

Helen Foster Snow, the writer also known as Nym Wales, was a founder of CDFEP.[22] Her husband, Edgar Snow, served as a consultant to the Committee from its inception until 1948. Mrs. Snow also published articles and books about the figures she met in China. In addition, she was a leader with the American Committee to Aid Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, a large, broadly based group that donated money and supplies to the Indusco projects in China. Several members of the American Committee were persuaded by Mrs. Snow and their own convictions to join the fledgling CDFEP. They included theater critic Richard Watts, Jr.; Harvard Sinologist Charles Gardner; Rev. Stephen Frichtman, editor of a Unitarian Church publication; Maxwell Stewart, an associate editor of the Nation magazine; and Harold Fletcher, who became CDFEP's first executive director.[23] Gunther Stein, Ilona Ralph Sues, Harrison Forman, and Israel Epstein, writers who had traveled throughout China,

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[22] Interview with Helen Foster Snow, January 18, 1980.

[23] Ibid.

also became consultants to CDFEP. Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong, writers with extensive contact with the CCP, China, and the U.S.S.R., were frequent contributors to CDFEP's publications and speakers for its events.

CDFEP was also blessed with scholars whose expertise in Far Eastern matters was well known by 1945. Among the early consultants and directors were T. A. Bisson, former teacher and research associate with IPR, Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell of Amerasia magazine;[24] Laurence Salisbury, editor of Pacific Affairs, one of IPR's major publications; and Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who had been executive secretary of the American Council of IPR from 1934-1940, the co-editor of Amerasia, and an author of numerous articles and books on the Far East. Field later became one of the most controversial figures in the debates over policy in China.

The Christian churches and missionary-related services produced several Americans who were intensely interested in U.S. policies toward China. Two of CDFEP's founders, Rose

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[24] Amerasia was an important journal on Asian affairs and U.S. policy there. In 1945, Philip Jaffe, the editor of Amerasia, Kate Mitchell, and John Service were arrested for stealing and publishing U.S. classified documents. Service was cleared but Jaffe pleaded nolo contendere to a lesser charge. Evidence had been obtained by covert government raids on Amerasia's offices and files. See Service The Amerasia Papers, pp. 1-45, for a fuller account of events.

Terlin and Talitha Gerlach, had been secretaries with the YWCA in China during the 1920's and 1930's, and had worked with other organizations like Indusco.[25] CDFEP's second (and last) executive director, Maud Russell, went to China in 1917 as a YWCA secretary. She lived there until 1943 and saw the poverty and misery of the people as well as the political struggles aimed at changing things. She joined the Committee in 1946 because she wanted to tell Americans her truths about the internal situation in China. As Executive Director, she spent several months each year touring the U.S. and talking to groups about China and U.S. policies.[26] Other religious figures in CDFEP included former missionary Welthy Fisher, the Rev. J. Spencer Kennard, and the Rev. Jack McMichael of the Methodist Federation for Social Action, one of the most progressive church groups of those times.

American servicemen, veterans of campaigns in the Far East, formed their own groups under the aegis of CDFEP.[27] They arranged talks, seminars, and conferences on U.S. policy in the Far East, and shared their impressions with American

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[25]Helen Foster Snow to Hugh Deane, February 11, 1975.

[26]Interview with Maud Russell, December 13, 1979.

[27]Interviews with Jim Nesi, March 21, 1980, and Howard Hyman, December 13, 1979.

audiences. In tours of duty, they had seen appalling poverty, graft and corruption, particularly in China. Some of the China Veterans Action Group members had seen Yenan, either as unofficial visitors, as translators with Marshall's mission, or as airman flying in supplies. Like other observers in Yenan, they were impressed with the improved conditions of the people, and wanted to explain their impressions to the American public. Representatives from the veterans groups also served on the board of CDFEP.

Others on the first mastheads included Nation publisher Freda Kirchway, radio commentator J. Raymond Walsh, historian E. Franklin Frazier, and Martin Popper of the National Lawyers Guild.[28] During the Committee's history, its list of sponsors and directors included such prominent figures as Susan B. Anthony, grandniece of the suffragist; the black singer and actor Paul Robeson; historian W. E. B. du Bois; musician Leonard Bernstein; Congressman Hugh de Lacy; former Vice President Henry Wallace; writer Leo Huberman; Congressman Emanuel Celler; and many others, whose varied professions reflected the coalitional nature of CDFEP.[29]

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[28]Interview with Maud Russell, December 13, 1979, and review of files in her possession.

[29]Ibid.

CDFEP Activities and Positions

Evans Carlson wanted CDFEP to "...give voice to the truth concerning all matters pertaining to the peoples of the Far East with a view to creating a climate for the practical application of a foreign policy consonant with the democratic ideals and principles we Americans profess and which are a solid part of our American faith."[30]

Giving voice occupied a lot of CDFEP's energy. It organized national and local conferences, seminars, workshops, and fund-raisers to publicize the problems in Far East policy. Unions, pacifist groups, liberal political clubs, and others booked speakers from CDFEP; Carlson and Russell logged thousands of miles each year on speaking tours. Innumerable press conferences were called and press releases published to clarify CDFEP's positions on every major incident in the Far East.

The CDFEP also translated documents, letters and articles from Far Eastern sources, so that the American readers could understand other organizations abroad. One of the most important of these was the first English version of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny,[31] his so-called "Mein Kampf" for

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[30] Far East Spotlight, June, 1948.

[31] Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (N.Y.: Roy Publishers, 1947). Philip Jaffe wrote the introduction to the book.

China, which the Committee helped publish and distribute in 1947, to demonstrate the neo-fascist tendency of Chiang.

Major U.S. statements or documents were translated into Chinese, Japanese and Korean, and mailed or broadcast overseas to inform foreign contacts of pertinent developments here.

CDFEP's own publications were crucial to its efforts. Fact sheets, pamphlets, and handouts were printed on major topics, e.g., the 1947 Constitution in China and the kinds of aid sent to China's KMT. The most important publication was Far Eastern Spotlight, which started in June 1945 as a two-page Bulletin on China. Renamed, the Spotlight grew to a sizeable, almost monthly journal by 1946, and thrived until late 1950, when right-wing attacks forced it to suspend regular publication. Since all the internal documents of CDFEP are not yet public, a review of the Spotlight offers a good perspective on CDFEP's responses to developments in the Far East. Three major areas will be explored here: its criticisms of U.S. policies toward China; its proposals for dealing with post-KMT China; and its reactions to the China Lobby and McCarthyism.

Criticisms of U.S. Policy

From its first issue to the final regular one in

October 1950, CDFEP's Far Eastern Spotlight (FES) opposed U.S. aid to the Chinese Nationalists. CDFEP feared that involvement in the internal struggles of China would draw America into a protracted war. It directed its criticisms at American policy-makers who were supporting an unpopular, dictatorial regime. CDFEP argued that intervention on the wrong side of a foreign conflict jeopardized peace and worked against the best interests of the American people. According to CDFEP's logic, presenting the American people with facts about the causes of the Chinese revolution, and the manner of U.S. involvement there would generate demands for change. As Carlson said, "I believe it is urgent to stimulate as much pressure as possible from the people on the President and Congress to embargo support of Chiang Kai-shek....Chiang Kai-shek's troops cannot lick the Chinese Communists because they do not have a base in the people."[32] Mobilizing public opinion was perceived as a sound strategy.

Thus, each issue of Far Eastern Spotlight consistently reported the extent, amount, and scope of planned or delivered aid to the KMT government. For instance, between March 1947 and July 1947, the Spotlight carried articles regarding

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[32]Letter from Evans Carlson to Far East Spotlight, June, 1947.

a $500 million loan to Chiang, deployment of U.S. naval ships to Tsingtao, U.S. military advisors in China, donations of 35 ammunition dumps to the KMT, and an expose of Chiang's resale of $825 million in U.S. surplus property for weapons and ammunition.[33] To CDFEP, these actions were leading to open and widespread civil war. CDFEP published letters from the Democratic League in China (a coalition of democratic parties) asking that the U.S. withdraw from China to prevent renewed violence. It also published polls showing that "11 of 12 Chinese living in KMT areas don't want U.S. troops and 7 of 8 oppose U.S. policies."[34] By circulating this information, it hoped to convince readers that U.S. actions were leading the country into war even against the wishes of the Chinese people.

When military aid bills or other forms of legislation helpful to the Nationalists were introduced in Congress CDFEP lobbied to defeat them. Since CDFEP did not have tax-exempt status it was free to lobby and to urge its members and readers to write or visit Congressmen. The primary motivations were to prevent needless deaths in China and to stop the waste

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[33]Far East Spotlight, March 1947.

[34]Ibid., May 1947.

of American resources. CDFEP believed that Chiang would fall once American assistance was stopped; aiding Chiang only prolonged civil strife in China. CDFEP estimated that eight million Chinese civilians and 3.6 million Chinese soldiers were killed between 1945-1947.[35] Most died by American arms which were either sold to or captured by the fighting armies.

The United States maintained over sixty thousand soldiers in China after the Japanese were defeated. This aroused tremendous opposition in America since families wanted their men home once the war was won. The troops were not eager to fight an undeclared war in China either. Ostensibly, American troops were supposed to oversee the surrender of the Japanese; in reality, they were support troops for the KMT's advances against the CCP.[36] Stationing troops in China seemed a sure way to trigger a wholesale U.S. commitment of men, and CDFEP opposed it. The level of troops was so high as to discredit official explanations; one Spotlight editorial asked why 53,000 Marines and 6,000 Army men were still in China--a number higher than troop levels assigned there during the war. CDFEP believed stationing U.S. troops there violated China's sovereignty and asked by what legal right the U.S. assigned

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[35]Ibid., November 1945.

[36]Ibid., February 1947.

troops to a country with whom it was at peace? CDFEP saw U.S. military presence in China as a means to extract the political solution the U.S. wanted in China: a lever to threaten opponents of the KMT, and a sign of U.S. intervention on behalf of the Nationalists.[37]

Although massive amounts of help were going to Chiang from the United States, the official White House position was one of non-intervention and neutrality. In December 1945, Truman announced that the United States would not intervene in the situation in China. He then sent General George Marshall to China to attempt to resolve the conflict between the KMT and the CCP peacefully, and to create a united China under a parliamentary form of government.[38] Marshall was supposed to be a neutral figure, but the U.S. subverted neutrality by bolstering the KMT treasury and arsenals. The CCP had hoped the U.S. would not intervene but soon realized that

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[37] Ibid., November 1945.

[38] George Marshall, Marshall's Mission to China (Arlington: University Press, 1976) is the report of that mission. Marshall had been hopeful that the talks would succeed; this optimism lasted six months. After that, it was obvious that neither side would change their positions; the CCP refused completely to surrender its arms. Marshall was an anti-communist who preferred the KMT, but his report was critical of both sides. This report was incorporated into the "White Paper" on China issued by the State Department in 1949.

would not happen. Both the U.S. and the KMT wanted the CCP to subordinate itself to the KMT, and the Communists refused. Neither side budged, mobilization for civil war began in mid-1946, and Marshall gave up the mission in January 1947, conceding that civil war was inevitable.

CDFEP, like others, was quick to seize on the contradictions in U.S. official deeds. By December 1946, U.S. aid to Chiang had reached $4.6 billion.[39] Demands for U.S. withdrawal were clamorous in the press, in universities, unions, and in the public, who were not accustomed to such vast sums of aid going abroad in peacetime. CDFEP called its first major conference on China and Far Eastern Policy to build a coalition to work for U.S. withdrawal from China. The conference was chaired by General Carlson who decried American policy as "injurious and obnoxious to the Chinese people... arousing fear, suspicion and distrust in the Russian people... It violates the sense of justice and democracy of the great majority of the American people."[40] The 600 plus conferees from nearly 200 organizations voted to: demand immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops in China; terminate all aid of any kind to the KMT; call for a coalition government in China; deter-

[39] Far East Spotlight, February 1947.

[40] Ibid., January 1947.

mine if the U.S. and the Soviet Union would pledge not to intervene in China once U.S. aid were stopped; and to send a delegation from the conference to China as a fact-finding team. Copies of these resolutions were sent to Truman and to every member of Congress. Delegates were asked to follow up on contacts with representatives.

CDFEP's position was clearly spelled out in February 1947, in a Spotlight editorial letter to the new Secretary of State George Marshall:

> In the matter of the Chinese civil war, the responsibility of the U.S. cannot be taken lightly. As you are well aware, the U.S. has given $4 billion in military and financial aid to the KMT since V-J Day. Since that date it has trained and armed 40 KMT divisions in comparison with 20 divisions during the war against Japan and it has transported over 13 KMT divisions to North China where they are engaging in civil war...the main failure of mediation efforts was extensive financial and military aid given to the KMT reactionaries by the U.S.[41]

CDFEP asked Marshall to 1) help form a genuine democratic coalition government which neither the KMT not the CCP should dominate, one in which all political groups in China can join and work for conscientiously; 2) resist calls for an all-out intervention in China since that would mean protracted civil war in China and deep involvement of the U.S. (who would be blamed for the suffering of the Chinese); and 3) abandon all

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[41]Ibid., February 1947.

encouragement of Chiang, since he could not survive without U.S. help.

Throughout 1947, the situation in China deteriorated rapidly and the issues of Spotlight were filled with articles describing the outrageous inflation and devaluation of Chinese currency, food riots, repressions against demonstrators, and the increasing number of KMT battles with the CCP. Even General Albert Wedemeyer, the Allied Commander in China and one of Chiang's champions, criticized the "apathy, lethargy, lack of inspirational leadership, greed, incompetence, and defeatism" in KMT ranks that he had found on a tour of China he made at Truman's request.[42]

Anti-Imperialist Stance

CDFEP opposed the Truman Doctrine from its inception in March 1947, when Truman requested $400 million to aid rightist governments in Greece and Turkey who were fending off communist-led coalitions of opponents. Truman, fearing the challengers were sponsored by the Soviet Union and thus represented a Soviet attempt to take over these two nations, wanted American aid sent to insure the victory of the

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[42]Ibid., September 1947. FES was quoting from General Wedemeyer's report to President Truman, only part of which was made public at the time, since it was so devastating to KMT forces.

rightists.[43] In his request, Truman proclaimed American intentions to provide economic and other aid to "free peoples ...resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."[44] Since it was assumed that leftists everywhere were directed by the U.S.S.R., it was logical to expect that Truman would request American aid be used wherever nations were experiencing internal conflicts like that in Greece.

CDFEP wanted to know who would benefit from American assistance. If the U.S. equated all anti-colonial or independence movements with communism, then the Doctrine promised "an interventionist policy on behalf of all the little Hitlers and Mussolinis in the world."[45] Instead of building democracies in Far Eastern nations, the U.S. would probably assume the "disgraceful role of the defenders of kings and dictators,"[46] like Chiang Kai-shek. By this Doctrine, the the U.S. would guarantee that "if Chiang cannot secure the country, he will be helped to secure part of it."[47] The ra-

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[43] Cecil Crabb, Jr., Policy-makers and Critics, p. 86. Both governments had been propped up by the British who withdrew early in 1947. Critics have said that U.S. aid was a new form of neo-colonialism.

[44] Ibid., p. 308.

[45] Far East Spotlight, April 1947.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., September, 1947.

tionale of anti-communism would prevail over logic and common sense, if the Doctrine were a guide, and support would continue to go to Chiang simply because he was not a communist.

Election Campaigns

CDFEP was involved in national elections, particularly after the 1946 Congressional races. In 1946, liberals were hopeful that the winning coalition and progressive programs built under President Roosevelt would continue to triumph.[48] However, Truman was not Roosevelt. His mistakes and ineptitude were exploited by the Republicans, who mounted a conservative, well-financed campaign, based in part on charges that Truman was soft on communism. Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, and Karl Mundt were among the conservatives elected in 1946. Once in office, they became avid antagonists of the Chinese Communists and those who portrayed them favorably.[49] Conservatives aligned themselves with the pro-Chiang forces who launched a vast media and public relations effort for Chiang's anti-communist stance.

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[48] McWilliams, The Education of Carey McWilliams, pp. 124-127.

[49] Fred J. Cook, The Nightmare Decade (N.Y.: Random House, 1971), p. 57. The candidates were helped by a growing conservative mood in the country, abetted by the anti-communist speeches by leaders and press accounts.

By 1948, the battle between the pro and anti-Chiang lines was heated. To solidify the ranks of the anti-Chiang groups, CDFEP called a second national conference on China policy in January 1948. Some 480 delegates from 140 organizations voted to adopt an aggressive action campaign including: sending delegations to Truman, Marshall and Congress to present demands for U.S. withdrawal from Chinese affairs; demanding Congressional hearings on U.S. policy in China; lobbying Congressmen to veto aid for Chiang; militant action to prevent workers from loading ships bound for China; lobbying both major parties for no-aid planks in 1948 platforms; and a grass-roots letter writing barrage from members of the organizations at the conference. CDFEP was charged with carrying out all of these resolutions, and its first big educational effort was a national "China Week: Stop the Drift Toward War" speaking tour.[50]

China was a major issue in the 1948 campaign. Truman was becoming more and more dissatisfied with the KMT and wary of continued U.S. entanglement in China. He could not withdraw, however, since the China Lobby and Republican allies were steadily calling for more aid. As Chiang continued to lose ground in China, the Republicans and some conservative

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[50]Far East Spotlight, February 1948.

Democrats blamed the Truman administration for "appeasing the Communists" and "selling Chiang down the river."[51] Truman retaliated by keeping the Republicans out of foreign policy deliberations; this shattered bipartisanship and led to acrimonious attacks by Democrats and Republicans on one another.

CDFEP believed that both major parties were interventionist. The Democrats would probably continue their existing policy if they were re-elected in 1948, and the Republicans would undoubtedly escalate U.S. involvement into a large-scale war. CDFEP chose to endorse Henry Wallace, a former vice president under Roosevelt and Roosevelt's emissary to China, and the Progressive Party, formed by liberals who were disenchanted with the conservative cold war stands of both parties.[52]

The Progressive position on China called for an immediate end of aid to China and a withdrawal of all U.S. assistance to Chiang. Wallace had toured China in 1944, and had told Roosevelt to be cautious with Chiang since he was "at best a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run post-war

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[51]William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978), p. 632.

[52]McWilliams, The Education of Carey McWilliams, p. 130.

China."[53] Wallace later remarked:

> The Chinese Communists are triumphing because they offer land reform and other basic social changes needed by the Chinese people. They would be winning even if the Soviet Union did not exist...As long as the bi-partisan leaders identify all movements of social reform and change with Soviet foreign policy we will find ourselves being allied with forces of reaction all over the world and we will incur the enmity of people everywhere."[54]

CDFEP actively campaigned for the Progressives. Handbooks and fact sheets were printed and distributed to voters and Congressmen who were not supporting Chiang. Readers were told to vote for those candidates who promised to end U.S. involvement in China. CDFEP's Director, Maud Russell, presented the China position to the Progressive convention, and CDFEP staffers helped draft Wallace's China policy.[55]

Truman and the Democrats won, barely, and the embittered Republicans continued their attacks. The Progressive Party polled less than two million votes. The 1948 election has been called the last debate on cold war policy; the liberals and progressives who preferred detente and co-existence

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[53]Quoted in Far Eastern Spotlight, September 1949.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Interview with Maud Russell, February 29, 1980.

with the Soviet Union were soundly defeated.[56]

CDFEP's Views of the New Chinese Government

By late 1948, all political, military, and economic indicators made it obvious that Chiang would be routed by a popular revolt. The CCP, liberal elements, student and mass organizations began to join together in congresses dedicated to planning the future government in China.

CDFEP expected the new government in China to be a coalition of democratic groups and democratic organizations, excluding the KMT. Although it predicted that the CCP would play a dominant role in the new Chinese government CDFEP at no time called for a communist victory. Instead it presented information and articles about the chief political figures in the new coalition, giving space to guest columns or letters from the Democratic League, students' associations and unions as well as CCP leaders. The issues of Far Eastern Spotlight from December 1948 through the following spring carried documents and addresses outlining the plans for agricultural development, banking, and trade relations with Western countries. Translations of Mao Tse-tung's writings on socialist development, coalition government, and economic planning were pub-

[56]Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman and the Cold War, p. 356.

lished during these months. The issues educated and informed the public rather than endorsed CCP ideas.

However, CDFEP did endorse the idea that U.S. policy-makers should now take a new direction in China policy, one based on a realistic acknowledgement of China's future course. The lead editorial in the Spotlight of January 1949 urged the U.S. government to "stop all forms of intervention, recognizing the right of the Chinese to settle their own affairs. The United States should institute normal diplomatic and trade relations with the national government that will be set up after the KMT is defeated."[57]

The British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State were confronted with the necessity of discussing relations with the new government once Chiang's Nanking seat was lost in April 1949. Defeat of the KMT was clearly in the cards, and CDFEP's May Spotlight acknowledged this fact and carried several short articles on the benefits of normal trade and diplomatic relations.[58] Chiang fled to Formosa that month, and the CCP announced that normal relations with the United States would be possible if the Americans withdrew from all of China, including Formosa.

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[57] Far East Spotlight, January 1949.

[58] Ibid., May 1949.

In August 1949, the State Department issued its "White Paper" on China, a diplomatic compendium of reports, memoranda, and policy papers detailing U.S. relations with China.[59] Several startling conclusions were presented, along with disclosures that heretofore had been kept secret. For one, the United States admitted that the revolution in China "was the product of internal forces within China, forces which this country tried to influence but could not."[60] Perhaps United States aid could have propped up Chiang but the costs would have been too exorbitant, and the administration refused to pay them. The "White Paper" also seemed to be a way for the United States to publicly admit the change in Chinese governments, and was perhaps a way of extricating itself from past mistakes in order to take a new path in U.S.-Chinese relations. Publishing the "White Paper" was also an attempt to still those vociferous supporters of Chiang by labelling him a lost cause. However, even with such public admissions, contradictions were still evident in Secretary Acheson's pledge of U.S. support to those Chinese who tried

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[59]Department of State. United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Washington, D.C., 1949.

[60]Ibid., quoted in July-August 1949 Far East Spotlight.

to "throw off the yoke" of the new government. In short, it was an equivocal document.

CDFEP was quick to pick up on the contradictions and Frederic Field analyzed the "White Paper" in a special issue of the Spotlight. Field believed that the danger of U.S. intervention would continue after the KMT fell: "As long as the United States seeks to 'contain communism', it will act as an imperialist nation. Thus, Acheson's calls for the Chinese people to 'throw off the yoke' of a new government, and the promise that the United States would work for that goal mean further United States involvement in China."[61] If the United States continued to help Chiang by making Formosa a permanent protectorate, the civil war in China would be prolonged and normal relations prohibited.

The proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 presented Truman with more problems. Republicans and conservatives in both parties called the defeat of Chiang a "Democratic sell-out influenced by conspirators in the State Department."[62] The myth of "Who Lost

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[61] Ibid. The PRC did invite all nations, including the U.S. to recognize it, and did make overtures to the U.S. for this.

[62] H.L. Wallace, "The McCarthy Era," in Arthur Schlesinger's Congress Investigates (N.Y.: Chelsea House, 1975: 430-466), p. 443.

China?" was born, and the accusations rang throughout the government as everyone who had played some role became a suspect.

CDFEP's October Spotlight was a special issue on "The New China is Born."[63] It translated the proceedings, speeches, and platforms from the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council, the formal name of the congresses that had been meeting for several months to prepare for the change in government. Programs for trade, capitalization, financing, land reform, and international relations were published as were the texts of speeches by Mao Tse-tung, Madame Sun Yat-sen, and Liu Shao-qui. Again, the emphasis was on educating the American public, not endorsing the PRC. CDFEP members recalled feelings of joy at that time, happiness that the war in China was over, and hope that the threat of U.S. involvement in open warfare was gone.[64]

Owing to the domestic turmoil here, Truman had postponed recognizing the new Chinese government, although the delay was expected to be only temporary. Secretary of State Dean Acheson favored recognition of the PRC and good relations

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[63] Far East Spotlight, October 1949.

[64] Interview with Jim Nesi.

with it, and tried to persuade Truman of the value of recognition.[65] In January 1950, Truman announced that recognition was still under consideration, even though the China Lobby and the Republicans were pressing him to remain committed to the remnants of the Nationalist regime on Formosa. Recognition of the PRC would halt KMT access to Chinese assets and American aid. Truman backed away from a firm commitment, promising U.S. disengagement from Chinese affairs. He promised that America would not seek bases on Formosa or use military forces to interfere with the present situation.[66]

CDFEP urged Truman to recognize the People's Republic immediately. It embarked on a national campaign for "Friendship, Trade and Recognition of New China" since these policies "served the interests of both peoples and of peace. Trade would mean jobs for American workers; recognition would mean that China would not be ignored in international life; and immediate seating in the United Nations means China can

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65 Warren Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisors, and China: 1949-1950", The Uncertain Years, Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds. (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 13-53.

66 Lewis Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy (N.Y.: New Viewpoints, 1976), pp. 173-176.

take her rightful place there."[67]

Attorney Martin Popper, in an article in the January 1950 Spotlight, rebuked those China Lobbyists who wanted to withhold recognition of the PRC because the CCP was part of the government:

> Recognition is not a political question. It is an integral characteristic of the independence of States that social, economic and political changes are purely internal questions, with which foreign states have absolutely no right to interfere. Therefore the denial or granting of recognition because of agreement or disagreement with such internal changes is to question the independence of the States concerned. There is one test to be applied. Does the government have effective control within the national territory and does it have popular support? If the answer is in the affirmative, a denial of recognition violates international law and constitutes intervention in the internal affairs of another state...the United States cannot withhold recognition as a lever to change internal conditions in China.[68]

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[67] Far East Spotlight, January 1950. CDFEP's position was supported to some extent by popular opinion at that time. Ralph Levering found that many American's shared CDFEP's belief that the KMT "was corrupt and deserved to lose" if it could not rally the Chinese people. By November 1948, the public opposed further aid disbursements to the KMT, and by August 1949, only 21% had a favorable opinion of Chiang. See Levering's The Public and American Foreign Policy: 1918-1978 (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968) pp. 100-103. Also, the Council on Foreign Relations polled 720 leading citizens in 1949 and found that they objected to additional aid grants to Chiang, since the Nationalists were a lost cause in China. The majority of those polled thought the U.S. should explore some form of accommodation with the CCP. See Joseph Barber, American Policy Toward China (N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1950).

[68] Far East Spotlight, January 1950.

While CDFEP obtained 10,000 signatures on a scroll of "Trade, Friendship and Recognition" to show the American people's support for diplomatic relations with China, the China Lobby and Joseph McCarthy were trying to kill the possibility forever by branding the State Department a refuge for communist infiltrators. This attack by the right will be discussed more fully in the next section, but its emergence at this critical juncture in U.S.-China relations could not have been more devastating to pro-recognition forces.

Even after McCarthy made his first attacks on the State Department, Truman and Acheson did not completely surrender the notion of recognition of the new regime in China. They wavered indecisively, and both sides clamored for their respective positions. CDFEP organized a "Recognize China Month," sending speakers to groups across the country to discuss the benefits of recognition, and the China Lobby launched an attack on the loyalty and patriotism of everyone who favored recognition.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 nearly dashed all hopes of U.S. relations with the People's Republic, since troops from both sides were shortly battling one another. The War presented CDFEP with an extremely difficult situation, but it took a position in opposition to the conflict. The

Summer 1950 issue of Spotlight[69] contained a thoughtful discussion on Korea which called upon readers to think carefully about the reasons, causes, and the situation which existed in Korea before the war started. Spotlight editors raised the possibility that South Korea may have precipitated the conflict, and noted that North Korea's case to that effect had not been heard in the United Nations before the United States took action. Truman's deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits was of special concern, since it declared American intentions to patrol--and control--that area. Truman's actions heightened the possibility of a Third World War in the area, and CDFEP called for peaceful negotiations to settle the conflict.

The fear that the United States would keep China divided permanently by maintaining Chiang on Formosa was reflected in CDFEP's last regular Spotlight in October 1950.[70] In an article called "Facts on Formosa" Frederick Field explained that Truman's orders to the Seventh Fleet violated the treaties the United States had signed in Cairo and Potsdam before the end of World War II. In these agreements,

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[69]Ibid., June-August 1950.

[70]Ibid., October 1950.

Formosa and the off-shore islands were acknowledged part of China. The unilateral movement of U.S. forces into the Straits was an aggressive act against the People's Republic, and could lead to a larger war with China and the Soviet Union. For the sake of world peace, Field thought the United States should withdraw from Formosa and initiate normal relations with the PRC.

So, even in the most trying circumstances, CDFEP attempted to promote diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. It was a courageous political stand, but costly for the individuals involved.

Coping With The China Lobby and McCarthyism

In presenting its views on China, CDFEP was never blind to the power of the China Lobby and the reactionary anti-communist sentiments expressed in Congress and elsewhere. General Carlson made several speeches on the topic, beginning in 1946, when anti-communism was a prime theme in Congressional races:

> Red-baiting and hysteria are threats to the freedom of speech and democratic institutions. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy fills a major important need by speaking out formally and honestly on the issues in Far Eastern countries. It is imperative that rallying points such as this Committee, composed of men and women who cannot be swayed by such hysteria and who not only understand

> clearly the nature of democracy, but also its historic goal, continue to function.[71]

CDFEP was caught up in historical events that combined to make its existence tenuous at best. First, the Cold War ideology and the monolithic view of communism made any socialist or communist movement the "enemy" of the American government. By extension, anyone who spoke favorably of socialism, anti-colonialism, or national independence movements was suspected of sympathizing with the communist cause, and was therefore a potential danger to the United States. Since CDFEP actively supported nascent anti-colonial organizations in the Far East, it was perceived as sympathetic to communism.

Secondly, CDFEP opposed Chiang Kai-shek, and thus became a target for the China Lobby's machinations to eliminate its opponents. Chiang and the Lobby were adept at fanning the fears of Soviet or communist takeover and presented the KMT as democrats engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the hated socialists. As long as Chiang held on to some semblance of a government in China, he could demand all-out intervention by the United States to save his regime. Abetted by influential Americans, Chiang was quite successful in this campaign until 1948, when everything began to fall apart

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[71] Quoted in Far East Spotlight, January 1948.

in the Nationalist government.

Rising opposition to continued financing of Chiang forced him and the Lobby to change tactics. Instead of accepting the blame for his pending defeat in China, Chiang accused American officials of subverting his chances, of denying him enough aid to win, of harboring pro-communist sentiments, of favoring the CCP's eventual victory. The Lobby agreed with this analysis, and were joined by conservatives who saw communism as the motivating force behind every social program in existence. In this manner, the Lobby sought to discredit organizations like CDFEP because they opposed Chiang, and so interfered with the sources of financial and political sustenance to the KMT. All organizations and individuals seeking recognition of the PRC became targets for assaults on their integrity, patriotism, and loyalty to America. Those that opposed the KMT were branded communists.

Some Background on Anti-Communism

Although such anti-communist crusades are most often labelled "McCarthyism," the phenomenon did not begin with Senator McCarthy's February 1950 accusations that 205 communists worked in the State Department.

Since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1789, Congressional committees had looked into activities considered

subversive. During times of tremendous social change, the search for subversives was a way of finding scapegoats. In the 1920's, the fear of alien philosophies led to xenophobic deportations of immigrants. In the 1930's Congress set up a Committee to Investigate Communism to explain the social unrest caused by the Depression.

Conservatives denounced New Deal legislation by calling it communist-inspired. They accused Roosevelt's staff and cabinet members of being communists or dupes of the communists. So many accusations were heard that the House set up a Temporary Committee on Un-American Activities to investigate the charges, and subversion in government in general. Led by conservative Martin Dies, this Committee became a forum to damn New Deal projects by finding them "too leftist" for America. The Committee investigated other organizations, like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and compiled a list of 640 organizations cited as "communist-fronts."[72]

Tactics later perfected were first employed here: "The Committee was used as a platform for partisan interests, who, with few exceptions, were given free reign to make damaging accusations unsupported by corroborative evidence."[73] Those

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[72]Michael Wreszin, "The Dies Committee", Congress Investigates, pp. 287-320.

[73]Ibid., p. 296.

accused had no redress and often first learned of the charges by reading sensationalized accounts in the press. Although Roosevelt and other liberal groups were highly critical of the Committee, Congress awarded it permanent status in 1944. Thus, the post-war cold war rhetoric only fueled an already hot flame in a Congress practiced in hunting subversives.

Truman was a staunch anti-communist, and he was angered at the repeated accusations that he was soft on communism which the Republicans used in the 1946 Congressional campaign. In 1947, Truman attempted to neutralize some of the criticisms by establishing the Federal Employee Loyalty Review Program, authorizing the FBI to investigate the past and current political affiliations of any federal worker. If questionable affiliations turned up the worker could be dismissed. The Attorney General drew up an annual list of proscribed organizations by which employee loyalty could be judged. As in earlier situations, groups were listed by the Attorney General "without proof or evidence or an opportunity to be heard, and individuals were branded as disloyal and subversive solely by reason of their membership in such organizations."[74]

The 1948 and 1950 campaigns followed the same 1946 pattern, with a steady barrage of accusations of communist

[74]Cook, The Nightmare Decade, p. 63.

infiltration in government. By then, a "sizeable portion of the American electorate had become convinced that the Truman administration had been riddled with communists and their sympathizers";[75] it also seemed that communist groups were everywhere. To cope with all the presumed communists in America and to check them abroad, governmental structures were changed. Truman created and controlled a defense, intelligence, and military apparatus that was unprecedented in scale; military men were hired to fill posts formerly dominated by civilian diplomats; and special investigatory committees and security laws were established by Congress.[76]

As the committees investigating subversion were institutionalized in state and national legislatures, their judgments regarding organizations and individuals became legitimate and acceptable. It was a circular process, with one committee accepting the designation pinned on an organization or person by another committee. Thus, Attorney General Tom Clark quoted the 1948 California Fact-Finding Committee on

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[75] Ibid., p. 368.

[76] O. Edmund Clubb, The Witness and I (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1974). See chapters I and II for Clubb's account of the State Department's changes and the way the cold war affected the other branches.

Un-American Activities's statement that CDFEP was "a communist-front organization trying to clear the way for Soviet expansion by changing U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China" as justification for including it on his 1949 list of subversive groups.[77] It was then a logical step for the House Committee on Un-American Activities to list CDFEP in its 1951 compilation of subversive organizations. From 1948, any committee or board or publication could use these sources to brand anyone associated with CDFEP a communist. Repeating the designation often enough tarred the groups' reputations; by hearsay, if nothing else, a person or group could become "known" as a communist-front organization or a member of the communist party.

Very little recourse existed to protect or change the designation once it was attached. The California Committee included CDFEP in a long list of subversive groups, many of which were concerned with domestic policy, racial equality or labor's rights. The majority so listed "had not been the subject of public hearings before the committee and many had no connection with California."[78] Allegations were uncorro-

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[77] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities. Guide to Subversive Organizations.

[78] E. L. Barrett, "California's Regulation and Investigation of Subversive Activities," The States and Subversion, Walter Gellhorn, ed., (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1952:1-40),p. 17.

borated and no substantial evidence existed to prove them. Since the charges were public information, private anti-communist organizations and investigators could circulate them to employers, landlords, professional associations and businesses. Every aspect of a charged person's life was affected.

The seriousness of the charges could not be underestimated. Treason and espionage were serious offenses. And few, it seemed, were immune. In the period 1949-1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the top Foreign Service Officers in China were charged; Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury; Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were sentenced to die for espionage; 11 officers of the Communist Party were sentenced; former Secretary of State George Marshall was publicly humiliated in the Senate; the Institute of Pacific Relations, a highly respected scholarly organization, was subjected to two major investigations; illustrious citizens--Albert Einstein for one--were touted as communists; and on and on. If such prominent figures could fall with few defenders, what hope had ordinary citizens of progressive outlook with no political power?

CDFEP Responds

CDFEP began to identify the China Lobby by name in 1947.

From then on, the Spotlight carried short articles and news briefs about the lobbying activities of Nationalist officials and those who favored them, like Congressman Walter Judd. The third annual Far East conference in January 1949, coupled the call for U.S. withdrawal from China with demands that Congress investigate the activities of the China Lobby and the wealth that individual Nationalists were amassing from U.S. aid.

In April 1949, CDFEP published an eloquent response written by Ms. Russell, to its 'subversive' designation by the Attorney General:

> Since its founding in 1945, CDFEP has steadfastly advocated an American foreign policy that would be in accord with the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations...For 4 years it has continually warned of the dangers of a failure-doomed policy of military support of a moribund and corrupt government in China...Now that events have confirmed the bankruptcy of this policy and demonstrated the public service we performed in warning the American people, the Committee is listed as 'subversive"...Such a listing...is intended to wreck the good name that the organization has acquired for reliable and factual reporting. It is intended to intimidate members of the organization and brand its workers in the eyes of their friends... it is a flagrant and cowardly attack on any who disagree with current policies and exercise the American right of free speech to voice their opinion...The Committee protests against the listing... will continue to work unceasingly to publish the true facts on the situation in Asia and the effect of U.S. policy there...continue calling for changes in U.S. policies that keep people poor and oppressed.[79]

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[79] Far East Spotlight, April 1949.

The "subversive" listing was referred to ironically in CDFEP's critique of the State Department's "White Paper": "The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has been printing the same facts and received the wrath of reactionaries and a listing as subversive. Now, several years and $6 billion later, the State Department is forced to tell people the facts that, had they been widely known, could have saved lives and dollars."[80] CDFEP added: "...the 'White Paper' records little of American intervention in China from 1945-1949 that was not exposed and fought by the progressive movement at the time. But when progressives printed the facts, officials denied them."[81]

CDFEP spoke against the persecution of other organizations and publications. In February 1949, Spotlight editor Elsie Fairfax-Cholomely wrote a critical article on Alfred Kohlberg's campaign to discredit the Institute of Pacific Relations. Kohlberg, a trustee of the Institute and a stalwart in the China Lobby, had tried to get the IPR board to investigate internal communist infiltration since 1944. The board did investigate Kohlberg's charges in 1947 but could not sub-

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[80] Ibid., July-September 1949.

[81] Ibid.

stantiate them. Kohlberg continued his accusations in his own publication, Counterattack. Ms. Fairfax-Cholomely, formerly with IPR's international Secretariat, believed the charges would "make it harder for people to get the facts about Far Eastern policy."[82] She was also dismayed that Clayton Lane, then chief of the American Council of IPR, had told Kohlberg that combatting communism in Asia would be a task for IPR. To her, this meant that a scholarly center would turn into a handmaiden for U.S. foreign policy goals. One of Kohlberg's chief targets was Laurence Salisbury, who had used his editorship at IPR's Far Eastern Survey to criticize Chiang and the KMT for its corruption and incompetence;[83] Salisbury had also published articles favorable to the CCP's fighting ability and its reforms. Salisbury was one of the original CDFEP board members and stayed with the Committee until 1948.

CDFEP's fortunes were also tied to the investigations of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Senate established a special committee in the Spring of 1950 to investigate Sen. McCarthy's charges that Owen Lattimore, formerly an official

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[82] Ibid., February 1949.

[83] John Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations (Seattle: University Press, 1974).

with IPR, was the "top Soviet espionage agent in the United States."[84] After extensive hearings, the committee eventually exonerated Lattimore and denounced McCarthy for his irresponsible allegations. Great damage was done, however, to Lattimore, the IPR, and to everyone associated with the Institute. CDFEP responded to this situation by devoting most of an issue to a discussion of the underlying causes.[85] The cold war rhetoric produced a war-is-inevitable spirit that swept aside organizations which counseled reason and cooperation. Organizations or individuals who called for an objective analysis of Far Eastern policy, or criticized the American government's approaches had to be silenced, since they could educate and encourage the populace to reject the dangers of an imperialist policy. Frederick Field, one of the IPR and CDFEP figures called to testify offered this point of view:

> Under present circumstances, the entire weight of the government and of its various branches is being brought to bear against all thought, all political and cultural expression in all forms of organizations which oppose the policy of the Cold War. One cannot criticize the foreign policy of this government without being

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[84] Owen Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 3.

[85] Far East Spotlight, March-April 1950.

> officially castigated and publicly smeared...it is my opinion that all progressive-minded individuals must stand together in defense of the traditional American right to free expression and association...the Bill of Rights...the inalienable right and duty to advocate policies that will bring about a lasting peace.[86]

The second investigation of IPR started in March 1951, and finished in August 1952, with the publication of a report by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Internal Security, headed by a conservative Democrat, Pat McCarran of Nevada (the McCarran Committee).

CDFEP was damned in this inquiry. Informer Louis Budenz called 13 CDFEP officers or consultants members of the Communist Party, U.S.A.[87] Max Yergan, a former member of CDFEP, testified that CDFEP had been set up at the direction of the American Communist Party, acting through Frederick Field. CDFEP was supposed to carry out the Party's policies on China by encouraging recognition of the CCP and denigration of the Nationalists.[88]

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[86] Ibid.

[87] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Report on the Investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952. p. 147.

[88] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Internal Security. Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 14:4595-4612. 82nd Cong., 1-2 Sess. 1951-1952.

The McCarran Committee tried to prove communist infiltration and control of IPR by listing the names of those individuals who shared CDFEP and IPR association.[89] To the McCarran crew, membership in one communist organization tainted one's work elsewhere; membership in several communist-front organizations proved an interlocking control of active associations by the Communist Party. Of the 87 CDFEP individuals named, 25 had strong ties with CDFEP, but varying degrees of attachment to IPR, i.e., some had been trustees while others had written only an occasional article. Four individuals on the list had only marginal associations with both and six may have had only fleeting contact with either. But the brand of communist was touched to all in an attempt to discredit as many scholars, writers, and observers of the Far East as possible, and to ruin the reputations of them and the organizations they worked with.

Effects of the attacks on CDFEP were cumulative.[90] Following the listing as subversive in 1949, membership and attendance at events sponsored by the Committee began to fall

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[89] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Report on the Investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Exhibit 1355.

[90] From interviews with Maud Russell, Jim Nesi, Helen Foster Snow, and Howard Hyman.

off. This pattern accelerated throughout the next two years, and contributed to the dissolution of CDFEP in 1952.

The sweeping nature of the attacks, and their consequences, frightened many members. One CDFEP staffer recalled the fear of being charged with espionage because "you could get killed--look at the Rosenbergs."[91] Kohlberg and other paid anti-communists or investigators dogged the Committee's seminars and conferences, heckling speakers, and menacing audiences. The tactics used reminded many of those that Gestapo agents had practiced; CDFEP members feared that even more outrageous extremes were possible or being planned. For CDFEP it was a time to protect members and sponsors from allegations or subpoena; membership lists were hidden or destroyed and financial records were burned.

Activists who were personally named or called before committees made many different choices. Some just dropped out of sight or turned their energies to other matters. Those who lost their jobs or careers were forced to concentrate on finding other means of livelihood. Others quit because they were hounded by the FBI. Koji Ariyoshi, a consultant with CDFEP, was convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government.

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[91] Interview with Norma Hyman, December 13, 1979.

Some faced arrest or deportation: Israel Epstein, a stateless person, and Elsie Fairfax-Cholomley, a British subject, battled repeated harassment from immigration authorities before they eventually moved to Peking. By 1952, Frederick Field had already been jailed for contempt of Congress, and after release, he left for Mexico, fearing further trouble, since he had been often cited as a communist.[92]

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 further decimated CDFEP's ranks. It became extremely risky to take a public position against the war or to speak favorably about the PRC. One CDFEP speaker remembered the rabid atmosphere that prevailed once patriotic fervor and anti-leftist sentiment had been aroused. U.S.-PRC relations had been tenuous at best before the Korean conflict began; once Americans and Chinese soldiers had shed their blood in battle with one another, relations froze.

The masthead of the Spotlight reveals the fortunes and misfortunes of the Committee. At the beginning, the 1945 masthead had 16 names on its Board of Directors. By March 1946, a roster of nine consultants was added. By the summer of 1947, the board had grown to 26, with 14 consultants. An editor and

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[92]Interview with Susan Warren, January 5, 1980; interview with Hugh Deane, December 14, 1979.

a small editorial committee worked on the Spotlight, and an Executive Committee represented the Board. By mid-1949, the Executive Board had shrunk to 20, and the masthead carried no roster of board or consultants. Instead there was a list of "recent contributors," composed of authors of articles recently published. By October 1950, only the editorial committee and 'recent contributors' and 18 Executive Committee members were listed. Even Field's name was gone.

The overall impact of McCarthyism has been termed "incalculable. It left America less freee...made dissent suspect...made rational debate of major political issues impossible...imposed a strait jacket on foreign policy...this presence from the right has exercised an inhibiting influence on foreign policy ever since...."[93] Another prophetic assessment came from Owen Lattimore, whose reputation was salvaged by McCarthy:

> The sure way to destroy freedom of speech and the free expression of ideas and views is to attach to that freedom the penalty of abuse and vilification. If the people of this country can differ with the so-called China Lobby or with Senator McCarthy only at the risk of the abuse to which I have been subjected freedom will not long survive. If officials of one government cannot consult people of diverse views without exposing themselves to the kind of attack that Senator McCarthy has visited upon officers of the State Department, our government

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[93]Cook, The Nightmare Decade, p. 230.

> policy will necessarily be sterile. It is only from a diversity of views fully expressed and strongly advocated that sound policy is distilled.[94]

Ms. Russell continued to express and advocate her views. She and a handful of others continued to publish Far East Spotlight after 1952. The scope of the articles was limited, the format restricted, and the title pages carried no names. Angered by the Congressional investigations she and others had faced, Ms. Russell vowed to pursue her work. From 1952, she became a publisher of a new magazine, Far East Reporter, designed to produce occasional monographs on Far Eastern events. The Reporter was a valid source of news about the PRC throughout the barren years of the 1950's and 1960's. Ms. Russell traveled nearly 25,000 miles each year on speaking tours, talking at churches, colleges, union halls, and clubs, continuing to advocate recognition of the PRC and a sounder U.S. foreign policy in the Far East.

Conclusion

After a careful reading of the Spotlight and other documents, plus conversations with activists in CDFEP, it is possible to ascertain elements of a basic philosophy undergirding the Committee's works.

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[94]Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander, p. 89.

Overall, the Committee reflected a democratic philosophy, quite American in its practices. It evinced a faith in the power of citizens to control and guide the actions of their representatives. The phrase "consent of the governed" comes to mind when one reads CDFEP's exhortations to readers to take action, make their voices heard, and to change the behavior of officials in Washington. The liberal belief that people are rational, educable, and capable of choosing a reasonable course of action once they are given the facts runs through all of the CDFEP literature. CDFEP also promoted activism, expecting people to act to change an erroneous situation, to learn about or analyze events, and listen carefully to logical arguments. CDFEP certainly expected government officials to listen to their constituents, to heed complaints, and respond to them as the petitioners requested. CDFEP recommended that voters cast out those officials who did not comply with demands.

The philosophy was expressed in concrete examples. Carlson's speeches reflect these views as do Ms. Russell's regular letters to Spotlight readers. Both wanted Americans to be actively involved in public issues, take appropriate civil actions, write letters, and visit Congressmen. The campaigns and conferences of CDFEP produced resolutions which

were dispatched immediately to policy-makers. Throughout, an explicit confidence exists that policies will be changed once enough people speak out or take action.

One also senses a respect for America itself, a sort of nationalism that saw America as unique among nations. The cold war was opposed for two basic reasons: the support of unpopular regimes or dictatorships violated democratic principles and traditions of America, and increased the suffering of colonized peoples. The high cost of military aid and expenditures depleted those American resources that were needed for development. This nationalism characterizes most of Carlson's comments, but most Spotlight editorials carried a message that America's values forbade it to act in an imperialist manner. Instead, America should work for freedom from oppression in the world.

American forms of group politics were employed by CDFEP. Conferences were held to built coalitions, to get larger blocs of voters or activists aligned with a cause, to enhance persuasive power. Membership drives were held so that the Committee could build its strength and gain more recognition. CDFEP was seen as a channel for expressing people's views, i.e., it's better to join a group than to act alone. Once the China Lobby crystallized, CDFEP saw itself in com-

petition with it; members were urged to increase their activity, lest CDFEP be drowned by the greater power of the Lobby.

CDFEP participated in the political system according to established rules of action. It endorsed candidates for office and campaigned actively for them. It urged readers to register and vote. It pressed for dialogues between the public and their representatives. CDFEP was not anarchistic, anti-establishment, or alienated from the political arena--quite the contrary. It had a positive approach to political action, a belief in change and reform.

The tone of its publications was reasoned, erudite, cogent. Reportage and analyses were accurate in most instances. Re-reading the issues from a vantage point of 30 years, it is remarkable to see how accurately the writers predicted future events, e.g., the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, the problems that would haunt America once it accepted the Truman Doctrine, the turmoil caused by American intransigence about Formosa, and the economic costs of supporting dictatorial regimes in the Far East. CDFEP had a clear understanding of the political forces that were set in motion in the 1940's and a good assessment of their future impact.

The articles in the Spotlight seem to have been writ-

ten in the expectancy that their contents would reach decision-makers. Many of the founders were accustomed to being consulted and heeded, and that confidence is evident. Only a few could be considered propagandistic or bombastic; most were scholarly, well-documented pieces.

CDFEP certainly encouraged debate on Far Eastern policy matters. It collected and disseminated facts about its points of view; it drew from a wide range of sources; it sent speakers all over the country to talk to hundreds of groups about U.S. policy in the Orient; and it challenged the prevailing opinion, even when it jeopardized its own existence to do so.

Access to public officials can be inferred. Carlson, a personal emissary of Roosevelt, had access to the top levels of government decision-makers, as did Henry Wallace and other Progressive Party leaders, with whom CDFEP worked. The Snows certainly enjoyed this access and had been consulted by Roosevelt. The McCarran Committee reported considerable interchange between the State Department and IPR, so it is logical to assume that interchange involved CDFEP as well, since so many activists in the Committee were IPR associates or alumni. The accuracy of CDFEP's reporting and analyses demonstrate access to sound sources of information and planning. Some

Congressmen and other elected officials joined CDFEP's board or list of sponsors, e.g., California Congressman Hugh de Lacy, Henry Wallace, New York City Councilman Stanley Isaacs, among others. Had the allegations regarding communism not occurred it is likely that other officials would have worked with the Committee. However, once the subversive listing was made public, politicians found it too dangerous to associate with CDFEP. The allegations also prevented officials from appraising CDFEP's analyses as objective or valid.

These points could lead one to conclude that CDFEP acted like any other American interest group, i.e., it mobilized people around a set of goals, took actions to persuade others to accept these views, competed in a political sphere according to set rules, and eventually dissolved when the participation of its members dwindled.

How then should one assess the smears and allegations that CDFEP was a communist-front organization?

If one accepts the label as true, what does that mean? How does a communist-front organization act in America? How would CDFEP have expressed this orientation? One could logically expect a communist organization to present arguments from a Marxist perspective, using class analyses and ideological language. One could also expect to read calls for the

victory of the working class, an overthrow of decadent capitalists. Neither the Spotlight nor other documents of CDFEP express these views. The majority of articles, analyses and news briefs on China were not based on Marxist analyses. Words like imperialist, reactionary, and feudal were often used in accurate application. The usual lexicon of a leftist publication are missing. Indeed, compared to the ultra-left rhetoric of the 1960's, Far East Spotlight is an academic, tame read.

As mentioned earlier, CDFEP issued no call for the triumph of the CCP in China and did not promote the revolutionary socialist cause. There was joy in CDFEP in October 1949, joy that the suffering and warring were over, that a brutal regime had been overthrown, and that the future of China would be better than its past. There was also tremendous relief that America had not joined the battlefront, and that another world war had been averted.

Further, CDFEP's position was shared by many who had studied the situation in China. John Service and some of his colleagues were anti-communists who wanted the United States to relate to the CCP to prevent it from joining the Soviet camp.[95] Their suggestions were based on strategic factors, but were rejected as suspect by Hurley. Perhaps CDFEP's

[95]Kahn, Jr., The China Hands.

position represented the more common perspective, or conclusion, rather than an ideological one based on affinity with the CCP.

This is not to say that there were no communists in CDFEP. There undoubtedly were, but the McCarthy net was so wide, and caught so many fish of so many diverse stripes that it is hard to tell which were really red, or to determine the role they played in CDFEP. Being a member of a group and being influential are two different things; the mere presence of communists in an organization does not guarantee their dominance or the group's acceptance of their perceptions or recommendations. The CPUSA of that era was surely part of many progressive causes--the right of labor to organize and strike, civil liberties, racial integration, and anti-fascism.[96] Organizations fighting for those causes were united fronts, drawing people of disparate beliefs together. CPUSA members were peers, not dictators. They may have devoted more time or money to CDFEP's operations, or have volunteered more consistently, but it is hard to assess their impact in other activities at this time.

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[96] Al Richmond, A Long View From the Left: Memoirs of an American Revolutionary (N.Y.: Houghton Miflin, 1972) is a serious account of those years. Jessica Mitford's A Fine Old Conflict (N.Y.: Knopf, 1977) is much merrier.

Of CDFEP members, Frederick Field was most frequently cited as a communist. Yet the arguments in his articles or reviews in Far East Spotlight are ideologically circumspect. His primary purpose is to correct an error in United States policy in the interest of peace in the world, not to promote world-wide socialist revolution. In the McCarran testimony, Max Yergan said that Field set up CDFEP for the Communist Party. This testimony is refuted by Ms. Russell and Mrs. Snow[97] who say that individuals from different backgrounds and different experiences were invited to the first meetings, and encouraged to stay if they shared the same interest in the China question. Even Field's role could be seen in another light. He had been active in the academic circles associated with IPR, Amerasia, and other journals. Circulation and impact of these were limited. Therefore, why not become active in a group that could take public positions, be partisan, broaden the debate, bring in more people to learn about China and the Far East? CDFEP offered another vehicle for the expression of policy options, one that could mobilize a national constituency interested in setting policy. For those concerned with the threat of war or the misuse of American resources, a public organization seemed a better way to educate

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[97]Interviews with Maud Russell and Helen Foster Snow.

the citizenry.

If CDFEP stood unjustly accused of communist affiliations, enough people believed the charges to destroy the Committee. Its dissolution pleased the China Lobby backers, who did not want competition with their views. Asian expert Owen Lattimore, viewing the operations of the China Lobby, made dire, but accurate predictions about its power: people became afraid to challenge the Lobby; debate on China was sterilized; the Lobby gained a firm grip on Congress and the White House decision-makers; and citizens who opposed the Lobby were defamed.[98] As one critic of the Lobby wrote:

> It's doubtful whether any other foreign-financed lobby ever exercised such a persuasive influence on American foreign policy, or ever so successfully tortured that policy to serve the ends of a foreign potentate rather than the best interests of the American people.[99]

As later events will show, the McCarthy era did not kill all calls for recognition of the PRC. CDFEP and other organizations were disbanded and their people silenced--temporarily. But all the activists did not despair or give up their convictions, and the tremendous pressures they encountered did not cripple them forever.

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[98]Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander, p. 107.

[99]Cook, The Nightmare Decade, p. 241.

CHAPTER III

NEW SHOUTS ARE HEARD

Introduction

Between 1954 and 1968, groups and individuals who wanted the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC faced tremendous obstacles. Outright bans on all forms of contact between the two countries had been enacted from 1950 on, through the presidencies of Harry S Truman (1945-52) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (1952-60). Supporters of normalized relations had to find ways to confront, challenge, and break free of these restrictions. Further, the idea of normal relations with the PRC was attended by suspicion and fear, resulting from the McCarthy purges and the events of the Korean War. Advocacy of recognition was equated with sympathy with the Chinese communists; those who dared act or speak of recognition during the early 1950's were stifled and saw their careers or organizations wrecked. Thus, proponents of American relations with the PRC had to find the political courage to speak out for change, to fight accusations of disloyalty and "red-baiting," and to build new

institutions to express their wishes for policy changes.

This chapter will describe the efforts of several individuals and organizations that accepted these challenges. It will concentrate primarily on two groups--the Quakers and the National Council of Churches--and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the institution these groups and others helped create.

Background on the Policy of Nonrecognition

Fervid anti-communism, cold war rhetoric, Chinese troops joining the Korean conflict, and America's desire to move unfettered in the world, led the two presidents and their respective Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, to portray the PRC as an aggressive, threatening force in Asia and the world. These officials assumed that the Chinese Communists "were firmly in power, hostile to the United States, expansionistic, and solidly wedded to Moscow."[1] The PRC was "the junior partner of the USSR in Asia, the instrument that broadcast the voice of international communism in the Far East."[2] To Dulles in particular, the USSR and the PRC

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[1]Werner Levi, "American Foreign Policy Toward China," Journal of International Affairs 11 (2:1957: 150-159):151.

[2]John Gittings, "The Great Asian Conspiracy", in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden's America's Asia: Essays on Asian-American Relations (N.Y.: Random House, 1971), p. 110.

wanted to spread communism throughout the world; only the massive military might of the United States would deter them.

To check the growth of communism in Asia, the U.S. developed a policy of isolating and containing the PRC. The PRC was quickly encircled by American bases and by military defense treaties signed by the U.S. and neighbors of the PRC. Truman and Eisenhower negotiated such treaties with Japan (seen as the stabilizing force in Asia), the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, and the former Chinese Nationalists, now known as the Republic of China on Taiwan. These treaties were intended to defend the nations from direct military threat by the PRC, and also to thwart indigenous liberation movements which Dulles feared were subversive branches of the Chinese Communist Party.[3]

Diplomatically, the U.S. denied the legitimacy and existence of the PRC government. Instead, the U.S. expended great resources to support, defend, aid and arm the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalists on Taiwan. The Nationalists were recognized as the sole true government of all China, kept China's seat in the United Nations, and represented China in all international organizations.[4] The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Thomas Shoesmith, "The Taiwan Factor in U.S. Policy,"

pledged American military support to Taiwan, and the Formosa Resolution of 1955 permitted the President to deploy American troops to Taiwan whenever needed, thus preserving America's right to intervene in China. The KMT, assisted by the CIA, launched paramilitary operations inside the PRC, conducted reconnaissance flights and propaganda drops over the mainland, blockaded PRC ports, and occupied off-shore islands to intimidate ships trading with the PRC, according to Asian scholar Edward Friedman.[5] The PRC responded to these actions both diplomatically, by calling on the United States to cease its support of KMT ambitions, and militarily, by placing troops in defense of its coast. As a result, tension in the area remained high during these years.

Economically, the U.S. starved the PRC and fed Taiwan. Trade between the U.S. and the PRC ceased, and America demanded that her allies do the same. Consequently: "Since 1950, U.S. policy in trade with China...involved a virtually total

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League of Women Voters Taiwan and American Policy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971), pp. 24-30.

[5] Edward Friedman, "America's Real Interest in Taiwan," League of Women Voters Taiwan and American Policy, pp. 38-47. Friedman was quoting House hearings on security arrangements with Taiwan and other reports by unofficial investigators. Roger Hilsman also discusses collusion between the CIA and the Nationalists regarding a potential attack on the PRC. See his To Move A Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 311-312.

embargo on all economic contacts between ourselves and the mainland and the maintenance of as stringent controls as possible on trade between our allies and the mainland."[6] By contrast, Taiwan received billions in military and economic aid, loans, and credits--over $2.5 billion by the mid-1960's.[7] Eager to make Taiwan a viable alternative to Chinese socialism, the Nationalists and their allies encouraged massive investment and development on the island.

Other forms of contact with the PRC stopped. Scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges ceased. Journalists could not gather news. The State Department barred travel to the PRC by Americans and did not validate passports for trips to China. Correct information about the PRC was negligible, and led one writer to say that a "curtain of ignorance" about the PRC had descended on America.[8]

The only source of high-level contact between the two

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[6] Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 266.

[7] Neil Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan (N.Y.: Praeger, 1966), p. 46. This book describes the scope and content of aid programs and was commissioned by the Agency for International Development.

[8] Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964). Greene also described the distortions of coverage of China by the American media.

nations came through a series of erratically scheduled ambassadorial consultations first at Geneva, then at Warsaw. Conducted by the respective ambassadors to Poland, these talks provided "a workable channel for reducing miscalculation, clarifying intentions and explaining proposals."[9] Proposals for discussion included: the status of Taiwan, the U.S. trade embargo, exchanges of correspondents and cultural specialists, disarmament, control of nuclear weapons, and ways to ease tension between China and America. In the 130 meetings between 1955 and 1965, little was accomplished because both sides refused to compromise on the major matter, Taiwan. The PRC wanted the U.S. to withdraw from Taiwan and permit the Chinese to settle affairs on their own; the U.S. refused to negotiate any matter pertaining to Taiwan.

These matters took their toll on the PRC. Although internal economic growth progressed, China lost vital opportunities for further economic development as trade with the West faltered. Without access to international organizations, funds, privileges, and contracts, China had to depend primarily on her own resources.[10] The PRC was excluded from in-

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[9]Kenneth Young, "America's Dealings With Peking," Foreign Affairs (October, 1966: 77-89), p. 80.

[10]Sidney Klein, "Economic Development in Communist China: An Economic Evaluation," Journal of International Affairs 11 (2:1957): 111-121.

ternational discussions on world problems, and branded an "aggressor" nation, unfit for membership in the United Nations.[11] American strategy evidently was to harry the Chinese Communist Party until it could no longer govern China, as Dulles had pledged to do in 1951.[12]

Domestically, critics of American policy toward the PRC were thrown out of jobs and positions of influence. Within the State Department, Far Eastern specialists who preferred some form of relationship with the PRC were systematically humiliated and hounded out of government by repeated loyalty investigations. This led writer E. J. Kahn to remark poignantly that "by 1960, the China Hands had been blown like dead leaves all over the earth."[13] Instead of the bold, knowledgeable work of men like John S. Service, Foreign Service Officers became conformists, cautious, fearful of crossing Dulles

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[11] Quincy Wright, "The Status of Communist China," Journal of International Affairs 11 (2:1957):171-186.

[12] Dulles' exact words were: "The rule of the Chinese Communists is a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves and to our allies and the Chinese people to do all we can to contribute to that passing." Quoted in Roderick MacFarquhar's Sino-American Relations, 1949-71 (London: David & Charles, 1972), p. 141.

[13] Kahn, Jr., The China Hands, p. 160.

or criticizing his views.[14] Key to the Far East department in those days was Dean Rusk, who called the PRC "a colonial Russian government, a Slavic Manchukuo," definitely not a Chinese government.[15]

Regarding those individuals outside government, Ross Koen has said:

> It is thus apparent that one of the specific effects of the China Lobby point of view was the virtual destruction of the public and governmental reputations and influence of many of the foremost private Chinese specialists in the U.S.....also extended to the organizational framework within which these specialists functioned, and through which their specialized knowledge was channeled.[16]

The framework included research institutes, universities, Asian study groups, and the foundations that funded them. All were damaged by the charges levelled against supporters of relations with the PRC.

By 1955, part of the China Lobby had crystallized as the Committee of One Million.[17] Begun in 1953 to collect one

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Quoted in MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations, p.99.

[16] Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 131.

[17] Stanley Bachrach, The Committee of One Million (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1976) is a history of that organization.

million signatures against seating the PRC in the United Nations (which could have happened after the Korean armistice was signed), the Committee reconstituted itself in 1955, to keep the PRC out of the United Nations permanently.

From the beginning, the Committee concentrated its efforts on winning the endorsement of Congressmen, other elected officials, bureaucrats, and other influential people generally. Its first petition boasted 21 representatives and 28 senators, 12 governors, 18 journalists, 33 industrialists, and 20 former military officers.[18] Steered by Representative Walter Judd and Marvin Liebman, an astute public relations manager, the Committee obtained enthusiastic, bi-partisan support for its anti-PRC campaigns for years. It helped engineer annual Congressional resolutions against seating the PRC in the United Nations; it had access to the White House, high United Nations officials, and conservative politicians in other nations;[19] it carried the banner for the Republic of China and fought against any sentiment favorable to the PRC. By 1964, 345 Congressmen endorsed the Committee's efforts, and it seemed that the anti-PRC organization had a lock

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[18] Ibid., p. 66.

[19] Ibid., p. 147.

on Congress.[20]

The idea of diplomatic recognition of the PRC was thoroughly discredited by the Committee and by other officials. Recognition was tantamount to approval of communism, evidence of communist leanings. Numerous reasons not to recognize the PRC were advanced. For one, recognition would mean dishonor to the United States since it would have to sever its treaties with Taiwan, thereby losing face and credibility with allies. Recognition would enhance the power and prestige of the Chinese Communists; since America wanted to block communism, nonrecognition was a better tactic. Recognition became a privilege to be given to nations America liked, or wanted to support. Secretary of State Dulles, for instance, held that "diplomatic recognition is a privilege and not a right...an instrument of national policy which it is both its right and duty to use in the enlightened self-interest of the nation."[21]

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[20]Ibid., p. 192.

[21]Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States, and the United Nations (Michigan State University Press, 1961), p. 25. For another example of these views, see William Knowland "Why the United States Should Not Recognize Communist China," Journal of International Affairs 11 (2:1957):160-169.

These points were rarely challenged, except by international lawyers and experts in diplomacy. One study in 1960 systematically reviewed every reason bolstering the policy of nonrecognition, and concluded: "To the extent that recognition policy is to be governed by the self-interest of the U.S., we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by extending recognition to the People's Republic of China."[22] Recognition would diminish world tensions, improve communication, and lessen the danger of war. The PRC had persisted, against great odds, in spite of nonrecognition; therefore, that policy had outlived whatever value it had once had. International precedents favored recognition, and it was hypocritical of the U.S. to withhold recognition from China when it recognized other socialist nations, or governments it did not approve of, like military dictatorships. It would be better for the U.S. policy-makers to forget "the fiction that the pathetic government on Formosa is, in fact the government of the great Chinese nation" and accept "the completeness, the finality, the inevitability of Chiang's defeat" by recognizing the PRC.[23]

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[22]Robert Newman, Recognition of Communist China? (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 284.

[23]Ibid., p. 286.

The PRC wanted recognition. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai had hoped for recognition before the Korean War broke out. The PRC had committed troops there primarily to stop MacArthur's threatened advance into China.[24] Once the conflict was settled, the PRC made several overtures to the U.S. regarding peaceful relations, but was rebuffed. In 1954, John Foster Dulles insulted Chou En-lai at the Geneva meeting on Indochina by refusing to shake Chou's hand, since Dulles thought such an act meant recognition of the PRC.[25] In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, Chou reiterated his hope that the U.S. and the PRC would be able to settle their differences peacefully.[26] The Chinese also extended invitations for journalists to come to China, but the State Department refused to validate passports. And in 1957, Chou met with 41 Americans attending the World Peace Conference in China and repeated his hope for good relations.[27]

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[24] I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1952).

[25] MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations, p. 110.

[26] Ibid., 114.

[27] People's China, "Chou En-Lai Talks With American Visitors", October 6, 1957, pp. 4-12.

The CCP had their own terms for establishing relations. They insisted that the U.S. no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, end its support of the Nationalists, and cease its provocations of the PRC. Taiwan's status was a Chinese matter, to be settled by the Chinese without U.S. involvement. The PRC would not pledge a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem since the CCP regarded the Nationalists as heavily armed counterrevolutionaries. If the U.S. would accept these terms, relations could occur.

The Nationalists did not want separate status for Taiwan either. They believed that their rule extended over all China, and that the CCP should be ousted as illegitimate claimants to govern the nation. Taiwan was only a temporary refuge for the Nationalists, needed until the CCP was overthrown and the KMT restored to power.

Efforts to Change Policy

Supporters of recognition, in an atmosphere of antagonism, had to surmount barriers placed in every area of relations between the two nations. Yet, even against high odds, some intrepid individuals and organizations pursued friendly relations with the PRC during the 1950's.

Besides Maud Russell, William Hinton steadfastly campaigned for improved relations between the U.S. and the

PRC.[28] Hinton came to China as a conscientious objector in World War II, sponsored by the Church of the Brethren, a pacifist church. He stayed in China after the War to work on agricultural relief programs with the United Nations, and remained there through 1953. He moved to the village of Long Bow and spent three years collecting villagers' experiences of the revolution which were later incorporated into his book, Fanshen.[29] Hinton returned to the U.S. in 1953, and customs officials seized his passport and the notes he had collected, believing them illegal. The cartons of notes were later turned over to the Senate Internal Security Committee, which tried to accuse Hinton of espionage. Hinton was twice called before the Committee, in 1954 and 1956, and questioned extensively about his activities and his observations of the PRC. To the charges about his manuscript notes, Hinton tried to tell the Committee members that anyone who could amass that much material about the situation in the PRC was guilty of "espionage in reverse;" the Committee was not amused.

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[28] Interview with William Hinton, January 31, 1980.

[29] William Hinton, Fanshen (N.Y.: Vintage, 1966). Hinton had to sue the government to get his notes returned to him, so Fanshen was not published until 1966. Hinton also had to sue to recover his passport, which was lifted in 1953 and not returned until 1968.

Despite the harassment, Hinton became a popular speaker on China. Beginning in 1953, at the peak of the anti-communist reaction, Hinton traveled throughout the country, giving nearly 300 speeches in the next eighteen months. After 1954, he averaged fifty to sixty talks a year, until his prolonged absence from China diminished his ability to interpret events.

Invitations rippled from each talk. Initially, the Church of the Brethren booked his tour. Listeners in his audiences also extended invitations, and he gave talks to other church groups, unions, colleges, fraternal orders like Kiwanis and Rotary, and civic groups. Hinton's talks were frankly political; he explained the reasons for revolution in China, the manner of socialist transformation occurring, the strategies for land reform, education and so forth.

As he recalls, his speeches "disturbed the government a lot." The FBI followed him from place to place, recording his talks, or trying to intimidate his hosts and sponsors. Hinton believes that many of his sponsors said "to hell with the FBI, we want to hear about China." From his experiences with audiences, Hinton believes that Americans had a genuine, deep interest in events in China, and would have worked for recognition had not the FBI and government agencies suppressed

them. To him, nonrecognition was an unpopular policy foisted on the public, and reinforced by governmental bullying.

Few other sources of news about the PRC existed. Americans were forbidden to travel to China until 1958, when the Supreme Court overturned State Department restrictions on travel. Ms. Russell and Susan Warren, the last editor of FES, went to the PRC in 1959, and wrote and lectured after they returned.[30] Cedric Belfrage, the British co-editor of the radical American newspaper, The National Guardian, was deported from the U.S. for his political views in 1953. Belfrage went to China in 1959, and wrote a series of articles for the Guardian.[31] Other foreign journalists like Felix Greene and Wilfred Burchett also recorded their impressions in articles that appeared primarily in leftist publications. Until the Sino-Soviet split in 1962, the CPUSA was a source of books and information about the PRC. Following the split, the CPUSA adopted a pro-Soviet line, and became antagonistic to the PRC. The Progressive Labor Party (PL) adopted positions close to the PRC, and PL became a source of knowledge about China during the early

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[30] Interview with Susan Warren, January 5, 1980.

[31] James Aronson and Cedric Belfrage, Something to Guard (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1978).

1960's.[32]

The Religious Society of Friends

The Religious Society of Friends, or Quakers, have a long tradition of social activism for pacifist causes. Quakers wanted the PRC recognized and included in international organizations to improve the chances for world peace and cooperation.

Quakers are guided by moral and ethical principles in their political work.[33] As pacifists, they try to build human institutions that strengthen cooperation and reduce conflict; they are opposed to violent, military solutions to problems. "Speaking the truth to power" is a Quaker practice; each Quaker is bound by conscience to act morally, regardless of secular authority. Historically, Quakers have opposed religious persecution, slavery, and human exploitation, and have a tradition of political courage. An example of the political expression of these ideas can be found in Quaker publications:

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[32] Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals (N.Y.: Vintage, 1966), Chapter 5.

[33] Gerard Jonas's On Doing Good (N.Y.: Charles Scribners, 1971) is a history of the Quakers.

> We directly challenge the assumptions which have led our government to lay primary emphasis on military strength in its relations with other countries...We believe in the power of Christian love, in the reign of law, and in the effectiveness of out-going goodwill in resolving human problems...that there is an alternative to the military power struggle...that the aspirations of emerging people for self-government, equal dignity, and adequate food, health care, and education are of primary importance and should neither be sacrificed to military considerations nor subordinated to the politics of the Cold War.[34]

Tactically, Quakers work by consensus in making decisions. Debate, persuasion, and open discussion of opinions continues until all members agree on a position. Since this works best only with small groups, it limits the number of people who could directly work with Quakers. Therefore, Quakers habitually reach out to other organizations, individuals, and sources to carry on the work. Quakers may take a firm stand on an issue, design a project, or call attention to a problem first, then build coalitions to mobilize others to complete the task. Coalitions may agree on broad goals but are not confined to consensus the way true Quakers are.

Quakers have consistently worked for U.S. relations with the PRC since 1949. Before the PRC came into being, several Quakers had been active in popular front organizations in the U.S. that were concerned with China. The American

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[34]Statement of Principles of FCNL, printed in FCNL's Legislative Agenda, 1961-62, p. 3.

Friends of the Chinese People, CDFEP, and the American Committee to Aid Indusco all had Quaker members and officers. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Quakers sent ambulance corps to China, one of which tended Red soldiers in Yenan.

After 1949, most Quaker work for recognition was done through the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), the lobbying arm of the AFSC. AFSC began in 1917, to offer alternative service to young men who did not want to fight in World War I. It has a long history of progressive social activism in public welfare, health, civil liberties, and pacifist causes, including the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to AFSC in 1947.[35] AFSC has a national office in Philadelphia and 10 regional offices throughout the country. Authority over AFSC projects resides with a national Board of Directors, composed of Quakers who have long years of service to their respective Meetings, as Quaker congregations are called. Regions are administered by Executive Committees, drawn from Quakers and non-Quakers who are familiar with AFSC projects and goals. Staff of AFSC are pacifists, but do not have to be Quakers. Thus, in its work, AFSC combines religious and social ideals,

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[35]A history of AFSC is found in Marvin Weisbord's Some Form of Peace (N.Y.: Viking Press, 1968).

while building coalitions with like-minded activists. AFSC is tax-exempt and its lobbying program is done through FCNL. AFSC projects fall under four divisions: International Affairs, Peace Education, Community Relations and Finance. China-related issues are handled by the first two. The Friends Committee on National Legislation lobbies in Washington for all Quaker concerns, including U.S.-China relations.

The Friends Committee on National Legislation

The FCNL was launched in Washington in 1943. It grew out of Quaker consultations with government officials on problems arising in World War II. Quakers wanted conscientious objectors exempted from service, restrictions on the draft, and aid to refugees in Europe and Asia. They created FCNL to do full-time lobbying for these concerns, and for peaceful concerns later. The FCNL became the first registered lobbyist for Protestants in America, and preceded similar efforts by years.

FCNL's original tasks centered on informing Quakers about issues that "are or ought to be before Congress" and inspiring them to engage in designing, supporting, or rejecting legislation.[36] FCNL wanted to lobby, or "interview"

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[36]E. Raymond Wilson, Uphill for Peace (Richmond, Ind.:

Congressmen and administration officials, but did not see its role as a typical political lobbyist, promoting bills of narrow, specific advantage. Instead, FCNL expected to "work in the manner of Friends...interpreting to people in government over an extended period of time the moral and spiritual approach to the problems of government and law...to relate the principles and insights of religious faith to the decisions government makes."[37] Unlike lobbyists interested only in trade deals and contracts, FCNL took a long-range perspective, hoping for moral transformation of government practices.

FCNL has had ambitious agendas for its work. A review of its annual legislative agendas for the years 1950-1968 reveals an ever-lengthening list of problems. The pursuit of world peace has been paramount: FCNL has lobbied for arms control, disarmament, control of nuclear arsenals, and strong international agencies. Civil liberties, civil rights, protection of minorities, hunger, social services, and conservation have claimed FCNL's energies. It has consistently

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Friends United Press, 1975), p. 7. FCNL is not a lobbyist for the Quakers since no single group can speak for all Friends Meetings. FCNL is a separate committee, whose members are nominated by their meetings and from 10 Friends organizations. The board of FCNL meets every other year to decide on the priorities for lobbying.

[37] Wilson, Uphill for Peace, p. 18-19.

opposed American military intervention anywhere. From 1943-1975, 150 different FCNL witnesses testified before government hearings, and FCNL staff interviewed 500-1000 officials each year.[38]

The first Executive Secretary of FCNL was E. Raymond Wilson, who served from 1943-1962. Wilson has held many posts with the Quakers, and his long tenure in Washington allowed him to build up many personal friendships and acquaintances with concerned individuals all over the country. He participated in building many nongovernmental organizations of influence, e.g., the National Council of Churches. His work and contacts have been a valuable resource to FCNL. The paid FCNL staff is small, but is supplemented by volunteers, student interns, and Quakers assigned to do specific lobbying chores as "Friends in Washington". FCNL can stretch its small budget by these means.

Publications are another resource. FCNL produces a monthly Legislative Newsletter, sent to all Congressmen and 20,000 subscribers; Action Bulletins, which recommend actions on bills before Congress or proposed by the President; an annual voting record of representatives; and occasional FCNL research studies on major issues, like hunger or nationalism.

[38]Ibid., p. 24.

Staff members write letters, telegrams, editorials, and position papers; they make speeches, radio and television appearances; they make thousands of contacts each year by lobbying or talking to people.

FCNL on U.S.-China Policy

The Friends Committee's positions on U.S.-China relations sprang from pacifist sentiments. To FCNL, the People's Republic was real and in the world. International cooperation for world peace could not come about unless the PRC could join international organizations and negotiate on problems. The U.S. policy of exclusion and antagonism heightened the possibility of war and should be changed.

When the PRC was established in 1949, Wilson and the FCNL urged the U.S. to recognize it.[39] Wilson argued to State Department officials that the U.S. should extend diplomatic recognition regardless of whether the U.S. approved of the form of government or not. Wilson made several speeches on the topic that year, lobbied Congressmen he knew were involved with Asian policy, and used his personal friendship with Walter Judd to try to dampen Judd's resistance to recognition. Access to Congressmen on this issue was lost during the early 1950's,

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[39]Interview with E. Raymond Wilson, February 9, 1980.

as they feared backlash and accusations. Neither Wilson nor the FCNL was caught in McCarthy's charges, and FCNL fought the illegal tactics, loyalty trials, and the unconstitutional means committees used in their investigations.

FCNL opposed the Truman Doctrine and the tenets of the cold war. The Committee "utterly denied that any people must be our enemy" and sought to reverse "the trend toward a divided world...War is not inevitable. Peace can be achieved."[40] FCNL also rejected Dulles' fears that national liberation and anti-colonial struggles in the Far East were directed by communists. Asia "is in revolt against the ignorance, hunger, corruption, disease, and imperialism...to the extent that American policy appears to thwart the legitimate aspirations of Asian people, the U.S. will lose its influence plus the understanding and goodwill of all oriental peoples."[41] FCNL wanted U.S. Asian policy to be based on a repudiation of imperialism, support for democratic elements, and development of Asian economic capabilities.

From 1950 on, FCNL called for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations, on the principle of universal member-

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[40] FCNL Legislative Agenda, 1950, p. 2.

[41] FCNL Legislative Agenda, 1951, p. 7.

ship.[42] A seat for the PRC would not imply approval of the PRC. The Korean War, and the French-Indochina war forced FCNL to intensify its efforts to bring China into the United Nations. FCNL hoped that the nations involved would reach a political settlement easier if all nations of the regions could participate in deliberations.

FCNL opposed the Formosa Resolution of 1955 because it was "jammed through Congress in five days" and gave Eisenhower overwhelming powers to involve the U.S. in a war with China.[43] FCNL wanted Taiwan's status decided in the United Nations, with possible plebiscite held in Taiwan for the people to decide for themselves what course they should take.[44]

From 1958 on, FCNL voted to press for U.S. recognition of the PRC, representation of the PRC in the United Nations, resumption of trade between the two nations, validation of passports to travel to China, and broad exchange programs.[45]

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[42] Ibid., p. 8.

[43] Wilson, Uphill for Peace, p. 287.

[44] FCNL Legislative Agenda, 1958-1960.

[45] Ibid.

This position was reaffirmed annually, and was the basis for all FCNL's work on this policy question.

Like many others, FCNL hoped that the administration of John Kennedy would mean changes in U.S. policy toward the PRC. Kennedy was a cold warrior but sophisticated enough to realize that changes were needed. His actions, though, were contradictory. He chose as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, a zealous anti-communist, avid in his hatred of the Chinese Communist Party and their government. Rusk echoed the sentiments of Dulles, conservative Congressmen, the Committee of One Million, and the Chinese Nationalists.[46]

Simultaneously, Kennedy brought in liberal Democrats who were interested in seeing Asian policy changed. Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson were committed to building the United Nations. Chester Bowles came in, and urged Kennedy to reject the "myth" that Chiang Kai-shek was the head of all China: "This myth--rejected by our closest friends, the Canadians, and by a large number of Americans--is supported only by some three or four Asian governments, by our Department of State, and by some members of Congress."[47] In 1961,

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[46]James Thomson, "On the Making of U.S.-China Policy 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," China Quarterly 50 (April 1972): 220-247.

[47]Chester Bowles, "The China Problem Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs Quarterly (April, 1960:476-480): 478.

Averell Harriman became Assistant Secretary for Far East, and was instructed to modernize the division. He hired new Asian scholars like Allen Whiting, James Thomson, Jr., and Roger Hilsman. Hilsman became the leading advocate for a new policy toward the PRC.[48]

Kennedy tested the waters of change by attempting to recognize Mongolia in 1961. The Committee of One Million and other anti-PRC groups outfought those who were in favor of it, so Kennedy postponed further actions. The 1962 Sino-Soviet split offered another possibility since it refuted the notion that the PRC was a puppet of the Soviet Union. Although many in the State Department wanted to act, Rusk refused to, recommending that the Council on Foreign Relations make a study of the whole question, then report to State. By one account, Rusk "single-handedly obstructed recurrent attempts in the Kennedy administration to change China policy."[49] Another branded the Kennedy administration as "timid" and "lacking the courage" to change the "irrationality of China policy."[50]

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[48] David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (N.Y.: Random House, 1969), pp. 250-255.

[49] James Thomson, "Dragon Under Glass", Atlantic (December, 1967:55-62): 60.

[50] Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p. 237.

Hilsman, however, continued to try even after Kennedy's assassination. Still with State in the Johnson administration, Hilsman made a speech in December 1963, suggesting an "open door" to the possibility of improved relations with the PRC.[51] He stopped short of recommending full relations, and refused to sever ties with Taiwan. But he did regard the PRC as stable, not likely to fall, and in command of the mainland. Essentially, Hilsman openly proposed that the U.S. could live with two Chinas, the PRC and Taiwan. Nevertheless, neither Rusk nor Johnson was inspired to follow through, and the Kennedy liberals were soon eased out of the Johnson administration.

FCNL tried to take advantage of Kennedy's moves, timid though they may have been. FCNL called on Kennedy to bring China into arms control and disarmament talks, and encouraged other signs of detente. They also encouraged those officials who were becoming restive about China policy, and kept up their calls for new paths in China policy.

Indochina, particularly Laos and Vietnam, was the major danger to world peace and the problem that worried the Quakers most. Kennedy had decided that covert, counterinsurgency techniques were the most practical way to fight commu-

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[51] Discussed in MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations, pp. 201-203.

nists, and had dispatched American "advisers" to those regions, while simultaneously trying to negotiate some political settlements. FCNL was quite concerned about the advisers, and opposed sending any Americans on military missions, while urging binding negotiations, preferably involving the PRC.

Although he had pledged not to send American troops into Vietnam, President Johnson reversed this position, and poured thousands of soldiers into the war there during 1964 and 1965. The possibility of a protracted land war in Asia, involving American and Chinese troops, seemed inevitable. Both Johnson and Rusk, who stayed on as Secretary of State, justified the massive military intervention by saying it was necessary to stop the aggression and expansion of the PRC. China was the threat, the real enemy the U.S. fought by fighting the national independence movements in Indochina. Rusk and Johnson maintained this point of view throughout the Johnson presidency regardless of the criticism it aroused.[52]

Other nations did not share this view of China. By 1964, fifty nations had recognized the PRC. France did so in 1964, the first NATO member to do so since 1950. Other allies were chafing under the restrictions on trade and contacts,

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[52] Foster Rhea Dulles, American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China: 1949-1969 (N.Y.: Crowell Co., 1972), pp. 205-220.

and seemed likely to recognize China as well. International trade between the PRC and other countries surpassed $2 billion per year.[53] The U.S.'s tactic of demanding a two-thirds majority vote to consider a United Nations seat for China was eroding, and more and more nations openly supported a seat for the PRC. China was a revolutionary socialist state, believed that revolution was the only way some nations could move out of colonial status, aided revolutionary movements, but did not station troops outside her borders, invade other nations, or act in the way the U.S. portrayed her. Internationally, then, America was becoming isolated by her policy toward China. Even the American public was changing; a 1964 survey showed that 71% of the public favored negotiations with the PRC on mutual concerns.[54] China became a nuclear power in 1964, making international involvement more necessary.

Escalation of the Vietnam war and China's explosion of an atomic device in 1964 spurred FCNL to devote greater attention to U.S.-China policy. It seemed imperative to ad-

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[53] League of Women Voters, Taiwan and American Policy, p. 3.

[54] American Friends Service Committee Toward a New China Policy: Some Quaker Proposals (N.Y.: American Friends Service Committee, 1965), p. 10.

mit the PRC into international agencies and disarmament talks, and to prevent war between the U.S. and China. In 1965, Eugene Boardman, a Quaker and historian, came to Washington for a year's internship devoted entirely to altering China policy. He wanted to sample Congressional opinion on recognition of the PRC and seating in the United Nations, to make contact with those interested in trade with China, and to determine if government officials could be persuaded to change their views on China.[55]

In all, Boardman conducted 185 talks in his year in Washington: 157 with senators and representatives, nine with Congressional staff members, and 19 with administration officials and embassy personnel. Of the Congressmen he spoke to, ten senators and five representatives subsequently gave speeches advocating a liberalization of U.S. policy. Boardman found that "forty-five Congressmen were strong supporters of a change in policy, forty-five were mild supporters or unopposed to a change, eight privately approved but remained silent publicly, twenty-two were wavering, nineteen were hard-liners opposed to change, ten were preoccupied with domestic issues, and thirty-six grossly uninformed about the

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[55] Eugene Boardman, "Chronicle of a Friend in Washington", FCNL Newsletter, August, 1966.

policy."[56] Boardman concluded that "the nature of thinking on China was more favorable than negative...it was the right year for us to lobby."[57] Boardman successfully persuaded Representative Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee of Foreign Affairs to hold hearings on China policy. The hearings were held in December 1965, and were cogent and stimulating in their review of U.S. China policy.[58]

The Zablocki hearings inspired Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, to schedule similar discussions in the spring of 1966. Fulbright had been an early and pungent critic of the Vietnam war and the Johnson administration. As the scale and costs of the war rose, Fulbright became convinced that the Johnson administration was misleading Congress and the public about the war, and had misguided reasons for involvement. A steadily growing chorus of anti-war protesters shared Ful-

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Eugene Boardman to author, August 27, 1980; and United States, Congress, House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Hearings: United States Policy Toward Asia, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965.

bright's views. Stung by Fulbright's accusations, Johnson excluded him from policy consultations.[59] Fulbright then stubbornly insisted on the constitutional prerogatives of Senate participation, and decided to make the hearings on Southeast Asia policy as wide-ranging and well-publicized as possible. Fulbright was joined by Senators Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern, Frank Church, Joseph Clark, Stephen Young, Wayne Morse and Edward Kennedy, all vocal critics of the war. The Fulbright hearings proved to be a pivotal point in U.S.-China policy.[60] The Committee concluded that the U.S.-China policy of the 1950's no longer sufficed. Trade and other contacts with the PRC were desirable. The PRC should be granted a seat in the United Nations and other international organizations, since it had proved itself a stable government. "Containment without isolation" was offered as a new approach. The U.S. should pursue normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC, provided Taiwan was appropriately protected.[61] The hearings were received favorably by the

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[59] Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p. 621.

[60] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966.

[61] Ibid.

press, Congress, and the public, and offered the Johnson administration open space for changes.

American Friends Service Committee on U.S.-China Policy

To activists in the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), America's growing involvement in Indochina was linked to China. Fear that the long-standing hostility toward the PRC would erupt into war motivated AFSC's activities.

AFSC's Board of Directors set up a study group in 1964 to develop alternatives to the Johnson-Rusk policy on China. The national officers wanted to discard cold war perspectives in favor of options suitable to the 1960's; they saw foreign policy moving from nuclear supremacy and massive relatiation toward detente, with international negotiations.

The study group met from September 1964 until February 1965, when it published its findings in a book, Toward A New China Policy: Some Quaker Proposals.[62] Lewis Hoskins, convener of the panel, recalls it "as an attempt to stir up public opinion against the official policy,"[63] and the Quakers distri-

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[62] American Friends Service Committee, Toward a New China Policy. The panel included Eugene Boardman, Rhoads Murphy and Stuart Meacham. Boardman circulated this book to Fulbright and his committee, and helped prepare material for the hearings.

[63] Lewis Hoskins to author, January 29, 1980.

buted the book widely. Hoskins and the panelists suggested that the U.S. stop the Nationalists from harassing and provoking the PRC; recognize the PRC as the sole government of China and resume trade and exchanges; stop trying to keep the PRC out of the United Nations; start negotiating on major problems; and acknowledge Taiwan as a part of China, not a permanent protectorate of the U.S. Cognizant of the contradictory positions taken on Taiwan by the U.S., the PRC and the Nationalists, the panel recommended that all three negotiate the matter. This guaranteed U.S. involvement in the matter, and rejected the solution desired by the PRC. The AFSC study group concluded that action on these initiatives would elicit a positive response from PRC leaders. By mobilizing Quakers and others in the AFSC network, they hoped to build grassroots support for change.

Other AFSC staff members were also working on China policy. In the summer of 1964, Cecil Thomas, secretary of the West Coast AFSC Peace Education Division, met with Stephen Thiermann, then AFSC regional secretary for San Francisco, and two San Francisco businessmen, John Levy and Russell Jorgensen.[64] Thomas, a Quaker since 1941, had long been active in international efforts for peace and had been conducting a

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[64]Interview with Stephen Thiermann, January 9, 1980.

series of seminars on the economics of disarmament for businessmen since 1963. At the meeting, they decided that improved relations with the PRC were needed for world peace; nonrecognition needlessly estranged the Chinese and increased risks of trouble.

They decided to arrange a West Coast conference on China policy as the best strategy to open debate on China policy. Thomas was the organizer. The conference drew 2000 people, from universities, civic groups, churches, and unions, to Berkeley in December 1964. The participants spent two days discussing the history of U.S.-China relations, the current situation in China and Indochina, and suggestions for changes.

Surprised but pleased with the large response, Thomas decided to organize a national conference for the following year. Tapping the obvious interest of western organizations, Thomas set up regional symposia on China policy, held around the country from January to June 1965. Planners included professors, students, anti-war groups, businessmen known to Thomas, Quakers, and others.

The "first significant national conference on American-Chinese relations since the Communists came to the mainland," entitled "The U.S. and China," was held in Washington

in June 1965.[65] It was co-sponsored by the AFSC, the League of Women Voters, and Georgetown and American Universities. The long list of endorsers included the Americans for Democratic Action, SANE, the National Council of Churches, the United Auto Workers, the Church of the Brethren, and other civic associations. Fifty organizations distributed thousands of leaflets announcing the conference, and the universities hooked up a radio feed to 300 college stations. Senators Peter Dominick of Colorado and George McGovern sent personal letters of invitation to all Congressmen and their staffs. The Voice of America taped the conference for later broadcast to the PRC. Edgar Snow sent greetings, including the views of Chou En-lai that normalization would occur once the Taiwan question was settled.[66]

Cecil Thomas saw the conference as a way to increase understanding of the complex U.S.-China policy. Thirty speakers debated the pros and cons of every aspect of U.S.-China relations. Speakers had different views and included Marshall Green of the State Department, Nationalist officials from

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[65] Information on AFSC conferences in this section gathered from conference reports kept in the AFSC Archives, AFSC Headquarters, Philadelphia, Pa.

[66] Edgar Snow to Cecil Thomas, June 4, 1965, AFSC Archives.

Taiwan, academics like Robert Scalapino of the University of California and John K. Fairbank of Harvard. All told, the conference attracted more than 800 people, from 40 states, 30 universities, and 50 organizations. Sixty-five Congressmen or their staff attended. Tapes, films, and talks of the speakers were distributed later on a national basis.

Thomas decided the time was ripe to create a national organization geared to reassess and promote debate on China policy. He wanted official policy-makers brought into it, as well as individuals who had shown their interest at the conferences. Thomas wrote: "...a national committee would need to have a forward thrust in the direction of a new China policy even if it did not immediately say what that policy should be...it should be willing to voice serious misgivings about present policy and suggest lines of approach for a new policy."[67] A national committee would be a locus for debate on policy, and a way of initiating contacts between the U.S. and the PRC. Joined by Thiermann, Boardman, Scalapino, and several other Quakers, Thomas began plans for what later became the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, discussed later in this chapter.

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[67] Cecil Thomas to Stuart Meacham, June 2, 1965, AFSC Archives.

AFSC also scheduled more conferences on U.S.-China policy, and Thomas drew resources from them. A Pacific Northwest Regional conference in January 1966, brought 650 participants, and a similar turnout in the Midwest Regional in April 1966. Each represented a coalition of several groups eager to act. By the time the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations started, Thomas knew that thousands of people were interested in changing U.S. policy toward the PRC. The interest stimulated greater enthusiasm, particularly since the National Committee could completely devote its energies to China policy.

The National Council of Churches on China Policy

In contrast to the Quakers, a small religious sect, the National Council of Churches is a large, umbrella structure, encompassing the parishioners of 30 Protestant denominations, and forty million Christians. It was founded in 1950 as the corporate arm of its member churches, and sponsors hundreds of programs all over the world.

The Protestant churches have been deeply involved in China since the 1840's, when missionaries were sent there to preach Christian gospel. By 1950, the Protestant churches had nearly one million believers in China, and the Roman

Catholic Church had won three million adherents.[68] The Western churches operated 20 hospitals, 200 middle schools, and 13 colleges that had graduated more than 30,000 Chinese students. For many Americans, the missionaries were the chief source of information about China. China was the largest Asian mission for the churches.

The missions to China were evangelical. Missionaries went to China to convert the "heathen" Chinese to Christianity. Activities and services there, including teaching, curricula, and healing, were done in the name of Christ.[69] Indigenous Chinese religions were negated and Christian theology was substituted. Attachment to China was passionate, and the core of the missionaries' life.

Protestant missionaries knew by 1948 that Mao Tse-tung would triumph in the civil war, leaving their future uncertain. Marxist ideology detested religious proselytizing, and the Chinese communists saw the Western churches as examples of Western imperialism. At the same time, the CCP, desirous of keeping a united front against the KMT, cooperated with

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[68] Francis Jones, "The Churches of China," 1958 China Consultation, (N.Y.: National Council of Churches, 1958), pp. 6-12.

[69] Paul Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), Chapter I.

Chinese Christians. Gradually Chinese Christians aligned themselves with CCP reforms, and severed official connections with parent churches in the West. After 1949, the CCP gradually began to nationalize church property and institutions, and to resume responsibility for the services they had offered.[70] Land owned by the churches was distributed to the people. Churches, as separate institutions, would not be funded by the Chinese state, and they could not obtain outside financing, since the U.S. had terminated the export of monies to the PRC during the Korean War. All foreign church missions in China were closed by 1951.

Church leaders and activists working for changes in U.S.-China policy were motivated most by the desire to maintain contact with Chinese Christians. Recognizing the PRC was a way to open contacts with these Christians as well as a proper way of responding to the people's overthrow of the KMT regime. At the same time, the churches had an interest in keeping their presence on Taiwan and Hong Kong, and had transferred missions lost in the PRC to Hong Kong and Taiwan. This involvement in Taiwan seemed to favor U.S. presence there.

Anti-communism was part of the National Council of Churches' fabric; it had proclaimed itself anti-communist and

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[70]Jones, "The Churches of China."

anti-atheist at its inception in 1950. However, progressive elements were also present in the Council. One of the most outspoken was the Methodist Federation for Social Action, the radical, anti-capitalist caucus of the Methodist church. The Federation had called upon the U.S. to recognize the PRC in 1949 and 1951, at its annual conference; Rev. Jack MacMichael, head of the Federation, was active with the CDFEP.[71] The Reverend John MacKay, head of the Presbyterian General Council, visited the PRC in 1950 and spoke in favor of recognition on his return.[72] MacKay, McMichael, and Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, another former member of CDFEP, battled numerous investigatory committees opposed to their stands.[73]

Prior to the creation of the National Council of Churches, the Foreign Mission Conference of North America, a consortium of Protestant churches, had governed missionary efforts in Asia. Under the National Council, this task was

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[71] George McClain, "A History of the Methodist Federation", Radical Religion (May, 1980).

[72] Far East Spotlight, August 1950.

[73] Bishop Oxnam was a distinguished cleric, an officer of the World Council of Churches and a frequent appointee of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. His book, I Protest (N.Y.: Harper, 1954), is a compelling attack on the unconstitutional practices of Congressional investigations of political activities.

transferred to the Division of Overseas Missions (DOM). A separate China Committee inside the DOM covered affairs in China. The China Committee was the primary source of information about China for the National Council and its member churches. The Committee performed educational functions for parishioners, published a small magazine, China Notes, regularly, and offered conferences and seminars on China.

Some members of the China Committee had been missionaries in China. By and large, most of them believed that the Chinese people had suffered greatly under the KMT, but they feared the atheistic philosophy of the CCP.[74] Wallace Merwin, the head of the China Committee, has been described as a former missionary who considered the CCP a repressive, totalitarian party which was not likely to democratize China.[75]

As head of the China Committee, Wallace Merwin attempted to find ways of determining the conditions for religious people in the PRC after 1951.[76] He repeatedly wrote to religious officials in nations that had recognized the PRC,

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[74]Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats, p. 293.

[75]Ibid., p. 302.

[76]Correspondence of Wallace Merwin, 1951-1961, National Council of Churches Archives, Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

trying to build channels of communication through them to Chinese Christians. He tried--unsuccessfully--to arrange visits between his contacts and Chinese Christians. Discouraged by these unfruitful channels, Merwin wrote a memo to the others in the China Committee, urging action to create a more substantial and more functional structure in the National Council. As time passed, Merwin feared that the Chinese Christians were being forgotten, and would be "lost" to the Americans unless U.S. policy toward China was changed.[77] To prevent this, Merwin pressed the China Committee members to expand their educational outreach. Sparked by Merwin's urgings, the China Committee began bi-annual China Consultations in 1958. These consultations were forums to debate U.S.-PRC policy. They involved top leaders of the member churches in discussions about policy, and about events inside the PRC.

Changes in U.S.-China policy were proposed at the Fifth World Order Study Conference held in Cleveland in November 1958. There, some 515 delegates from 30 constituencies attended discussions on the world's problems. Six study commissions had worked since 1957 to prepare papers as guides to debates on the cold war, nationalism, technology, inter-

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[77]Wallace Merwin to China Committee, March 18, 1961, Merwin Correspondence, National Council of Churches Archives.

national organizations, and other topics. Although the Conference brought in delegates from the Council churches, it was not part of the National Council. The conferees were free to break new ground, take advanced positions, stimulate new ideas; the National Council and member churches were free to accept or disavow resolutions made there.[78] In terms of the PRC, the Conference voted unanimously to offer a new approach.

With reference to China, Christians should urge:

> reconsideration by our government of its policy in regard to Communist China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan and Korea should be safeguarded, steps should be taken toward the inclusion of Communist China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government.[79]

Nonrecognition, according to the delegates, excluded China from the international community, fostered ignorance of Chinese development, hindered disarmament, and hampered adequate functioning of international organizations. The U.S. would benefit from exchanges and trade with the PRC as well. Worried that the tensions over the off-shore islands would explode into war, the conferees wanted these changes made to

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[78] David Hunter to author, July 29, 1980; John Bennett to author, July 27, 1980.

[79] Report from the Fifth World Order Study Conference, November, 1958, National Council of Churches Archives.

preserve hopes of peace.

The resolution raised a storm in the churches and in the press. The General Board of the National Council quickly disavowed it, saying the conferees spoke for themselves, not the Council.[80] The Committee of One Million just as quickly polled member churches and reported that 87% of the 7,500 parishioners questioned opposed the resolution.[81] But the damage could not be disavowed; one Council officer estimated that the resolution cost the Council $200,000 per year in lost contributions.[82]

The resolution heartened those who wanted changes made, and the China Committee continued to press through the next few years. They received another boost with Roger Hilsman's 1963 speech, which looked to Merwin like a "trial balloon."[83] He thought the administration was trying to test re-

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[80] Letter from Eugene Carson Blake to the New York Times, December 7, 1958, on behalf of the National Council of Churches. National Council of Churches Archives.

[81] Robert Hunter and Forrest Davis, The New Red China Lobby (revised, with Philip Luce, ed., Whittier, Ca.: Conservative Action, 1966), p. 136.

[82] David Hunter to Frank Kehl, March 25, 1968.

[83] Merwin correspondence, 1961-65, National Council of Churches Archives.

ceptivity to a change in China Policy, so he persuaded the National Council to set up a special China Study Group of Far Eastern policy experts and church board members. The Study Group prepared policy options, assessed impacts of changes, and proposed positions the National Council could take. Although the Group had no power to act, it did circulate ideas for changes throughout the leadership of the Council's churches.

The Vietnam War was also a spur for action by the National Council. Alarmed at the intensity of U.S. involvement there, and the mounting protests and resistance from the American public, the member churches began to take open stands against the war. China policy was part of their deliberations. While regarding the Chinese as aggressive and belligerent toward some Asian nations, the National Council did not want the war to spread into an open conflict between the U.S. and the PRC. In February 1966, the National Council adopted a "Policy Statement on China," approved by the Board of Directors of all member congregations.[84] The Council recommended that President Johnson set up a commission of experts, who would discuss aspects of the relations between the

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[84]National Council of Churches, "Policy Statement on China" (N.Y.: International Affairs Committee, 1966).

U.S. and the PRC, and schedule "intensive public discussions."[85] ("Teach-ins" were frequently used by anti-war critics at the time, so this format may have looked promising.) The administration should drop all barriers to trade and other exchanges, and should study ways that diplomatic recognition could be extended or broached with the Chinese. The U.S. should devise a way to seat the PRC in the United Nations while retaining a seat for Taiwan. The Council did want to protect its interest in Taiwan, and did not agree with the PRC position. The resolution of the Board was not binding, but served to present the unified thinking of the representatives to the churches.

As a follow-up to the National Board's statement, the China Committee authorized the creation of a China Project, directed by Reverend Donald MacInniss.[86] The project started in the summer of 1966, and was supported by seventeen Mission Boards in the Council. One of the goals was to restore communication with Chinese Christians. Other goals were: providing up-to-date information about events in China, useful since

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Information on these activities from interview with Donald MacInniss, July 9, 1980.

the Cultural Revolution was beginning; educational programs for churches and church committees that were working on relations with China; and dissemination of literature, books, discussion guides, and a monthly China Bulletin magazine, all available to churches planning programs on China or Asian policy. This educational program emphasized the estranged relations between the U.S. and the PRC and supported ending that. Monthly panel discussions on China, taught by Asian scholars, State Department officials, or experts in aspects of international relations, were held in New York and open to the public. These panels were one of the few regular sources of discussions about developments in China and U.S. policy. MacInniss lectured often at church conventions, conferences on Asia, board meetings and other special events. Occasionally, he would arrange briefings in Washington with administration staff or State Department officers to relay the feelings of the religious community regarding normalization.

Churches within and outside the National Council also took strong stands regarding normalization with the PRC during 1965-1966.[87] Generally, their positions were linked to their opposition to the Vietnam War. The National Interreligious Conference on Peace, an interdenominational group, called for

[87]From statements compiled by FCNL, August 1966.

United Nations' seating of the PRC, relaxation of trade barriers, and acknowledgement that the PRC governed China while the Nationalists governed Taiwan. The Methodist Board of Missions and the Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns called for improved trade and exchanges, withdrawal of American opposition to United Nations seating for the PRC, and United Nations oversight of Taiwan's status. The Church of the Brethren wanted the PRC admitted to the United Nations and wanted the U.S. to normalize relations with China; the status of Taiwan would be negotiated by the U.S., the PRC, and the Nationalists. The Unitarian Universalist Association wanted the U.S. to take initiatives toward establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC and to withdraw obstacles to a seat for the PRC in the United Nations.

Overall, the churches encouraged and approved of relations with the PRC, and wanted the U.S. to end the tactics it had been using--trade restrictions, special voting procedures in the United Nations, hostility--to cripple interactions with China. Positions taken by these churches were made public and circulated to the press, to Congress, to the State Department and administration staff. At the same time, the churches preferred that the U.S. keep some ties with Taiwan, or to have the island's status separated from the PRC. Some churches

supported Taiwanese Christians who were organizing political opposition to the KMT regime or espousing independence for Taiwan.[88] It was difficult for the churches to accept the position that Taiwan's status would be settled by the Chinese themselves.

The National Council strengthened its 1966 statement by one issued in 1968, called Imperatives of Peace and Power.[89] Highly critical of American involvement in Indochina, and of the militaristic nature of U.S. foreign policy, the Council called upon the U.S. to avoid provoking the PRC, either through threats or bombing campaigns close to her borders. Such U.S. actions endangered world peace. Further, the U.S. should:

> acknowledge that China has legitimate interests in Asia and accept the fact that China will exert a significant influence in the region...the U.S., instead of trying to isolate the PRC, should take positive steps to bring it, if possible, into the international community...the U.S. should take the initiative, unilaterally if necessary, for developing contacts...trade in non-strategic items... an honorable formula for seating the PRC in the United Nations....[90]

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[88] Interviews with MacInniss, with Franklin Woo, February 1, 1980 and Frank Kehl, June 20, 1980.

[89] National Council of Churches, Imperatives of Peace and Power, (N.Y.: National Council of Churches, 1968).

[90] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

This statement appeared after much more organizing had taken place, particularly through the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations. Donald MacInniss, David Hunter of the Council, and John Bennett of the Union Theological Seminary were among those religious leaders who joined Cecil Thomas in founding the National Committee.

Other Activists

Other individuals and ad hoc organizations contributed to the shouts for changes in American policy in Asia. Disarmament expert Betty Lall wanted the PRC to be a party to all international groups considering arms control.[91] She had been a critic of containment and isolation since 1964, when China became a nuclear power. As staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Disarmament from 1955 to 1961, she had tried to keep Congressional attention focused on China's potential as a nuclear power and the futility of American disregard.

Lall joined the Kennedy administration in 1961 as an arms control expert. It is her impression that her superiors in the arms control agency did not want China mentioned; paragraphs in her speeches or reports urging that the United

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[91] Interview with Betty Lall, February 27, 1980.

Nations and the U.S. include the PRC in disarmament talks were cut out by her chiefs. After she left the administration in 1963, Lall was convinced that the public was ahead of Washington officials in regard to China policy. Working with the National Committee for Peace Research (one of whose members was Cecil Thomas), Lall drafted a statement of several changes needed in U.S. policy toward China. She sent it to the members of the Asian Studies Association to survey the opinions of these Asian scholars. Some 200 signed, agreeing with its recommendations. Originally, Senator Eugene McCarthy had promised to publicize her findings, but, by the time her results had been tabulated, Senator Fulbright had already scheduled his extensive hearings on U.S. policy, so McCarthy felt his help would be redundant. Lall gave the survey to the press, where it received broad coverage, while FCNL distributed it to every Congressman, Congressional staff, and appropriate government agencies.

The statement was directed to "the executive branch, the Congress, and the public" and asked them to: acknowledge the PRC as an international reality; enter into negotiations regarding diplomatic relations; stop blocking admission to the United Nations; resume trade and other exchanges; and renounce the use of force in dealings with one another.[92]

[92] New York Times, March 21, 1966, p. 1.

While branding the PRC as "hostile and anti-American," the statement nevertheless called upon the administration to take the first steps in changing relations. In the survey, Taiwan was given separate status, and its future would be negotiated between the U.S. and the PRC, and a third party, probably an international organization. Both the U.S. and the PRC were urged to settle the future of the island peacefully. Until that issue had been settled, the U.S. should keep its ties with Taiwan, while negotiating new ties with the PRC. As with other statements of the time, this one supported U.S. involvement in the future of Taiwan. However, it did represent a breakthrough, since it was the first time Asian scholars had taken a stand for change.

Lall later joined Cecil Thomas in creating the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The Association for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy

Still another concerned group was the Association for Reappraisal of Far Eastern Policy (ARFEP), born in 1965 in the midst of student outrage at the Vietnam War.[93] Seeking to learn the causes of the conflict, and the politics of the Asian nations involved, organizers also hoped to find ways of

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[93]William Sloane Coffin, Once to Every Man (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 213-215.

ending U.S. involvement in Asia for good. The Reverend William Sloane Coffin, one of the founders of ARFEP, wanted the U.S. to learn how to live with the PRC without conflict and the threat of war. Coffin and the late Allard Lowenstein, a founder and chief organizer, decided to establish ARFEP on campuses, where anti-war dissent was already high. Yale became the center, and Lowenstein quickly organized 30 chapters across the country.

The goals of ARFEP were simple: 1) a negotiated settlement in Vietnam and an immediate ceasefire; 2) an American announcement that it was ready to begin negotiations on diplomatic recognition of the PRC; 3) cessation of American efforts to keep China out of the United Nations; 4) the U.S. should offer to join with China in negotiations of all problems of mutual concern, like control of nuclear weapons and trade.[94] As author John Hersey put it: "American policy was so wrong that we had to look at new ways to think about China, Vietnam and the East altogether...ARFEP was of a piece with our anti-war efforts...we took courage in our anger about the war," regardless of criticism from the right.[95]

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[94] ARFEP position papers and articles in files of John Hersey, New Haven, Connecticut.

[95] Interview with John Hersey, January 17, 1980.

Most of ARFEP's energies went into educating people about the Far East, U.S. policies there, and the reasons for conflict. ARFEP held teach-ins, seminars, hearings on Asian policy at campuses, and one major conference in the fall of 1965. ARFEP also took out ads in national papers like the New York Times which denounced U.S. policy in Vietnam, and in the United Nations, where the U.S. blocked PRC admission. Letters and petitions were sent to Johnson, to Congress, and to other officials involved in Asian policy. As the anti-war effort grew, students concentrated their attention more on Vietnam, and ARFEP dissolved. Roger Baldwain of the American Civil Liberties Union, Professor John K. Fairbank, and Socialist Party leader Norman Thomas, all members of ARFEP's Board of Directors, joined Cecil Thomas in the National Committee.

Business Interests

Some businessmen were eager to recognize China since improved relations would mean trade and jobs. In 1954, FES had devoted an entire issue to trade prospects, and a majority of the union leaders and executives FES spoke with hoped for an end to the embargo imposed by Truman during the Korean War.[96]

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[96]Far East Report, "China Trade Facts," June, 1954.

Alexander Eckstein, an expert on the Far East, was one of those researchers tapped by the Council of Foreign Relations to write the books on China that Rusk had commissioned. His findings, published in 1966, outlined the impact of trade restrictions; Eckstein gradually began to form a group of interested business leaders which became the nucleus of the future National Council on U.S.-China Trade.[97]

China Books and Periodicals, a West Coast-based importing company, was the first corporation to trade with the PRC. Its owner, Henry Noyes, founded the business in 1960 after receiving licenses from Guozi Shodian, the PRC's national bookstore, and the Treasury Department. Noyes imported texts, magazines, and periodicals from the PRC and distributed them around the U.S. As the sole source of PRC literature and official documents, Noyes supplied colleges, research institutes, libraries, and government offices. It was not easy: Noyes had to keep a list of requests and inventory available for U.S. inspection; he had to ship funds to blocked PRC accounts, since no assets could be transferred there; and he had to register as an agent of Guozi Shodian since the U.S. government considered all PRC publications to be Marxist propaganda. Had Noyes violated any of these provisions, he

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[97]Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade.

could have faced 10 years in jail and a $10,000 fine. Undaunted, Noyes persisted, and feels his books, which reached a curious but deprived audience, rendered a vital service to scholars and officials who had no other access to Chinese publications.[98]

Public Opinion

Segments of the public were ready to join these activists in re-examining U.S. policy toward China, especially as the Vietnam War cost more treasury and more lives. A. T. Steele, a journalist commissioned to study public opinion about the PRC for the Council on Foreign Relations, concluded that the mid-1960's was an excellent time for changes in U.S.-China policy.[99] The advances of the PRC and the strife in Indochina had rendered "containment and isolation" not only obsolete but also dangerous. Some form of contact and relationship had to be made. Steele interviewed hundreds of Americans, and found support for relations with China. The citizens he talked to feared the PRC as a possible future enemy, but felt contacts would reduce tensions. Citizens favored trade relations, exchanges, trips and consultations

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[98]Henry Noyes to author, January 20, 1980.

[99]A. T. Steele, The American People and China (N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1966).

on international issues more readily than they favored diplomatic relations.[100] Taiwan was considered separate from the PRC and the majority thought the U.S. should keep its commitments to Taiwan as well as recognizing the PRC.[101] Steele found that many State Department officials, members of Congress, and businessmen favored relations with the PRC, but were too intimidated by the right or by the KMT lobby to publicly say so.[102] They preferred the executive to take the initiative--and no president wanted to do so.

Steele prposed several remedies: an "exhaustive public debate on China, sponsored by Congress"; candor in recognizing the need for changes; a realistic discussion about Taiwan and its relation to U.S. vital interests; better publications to eliminate distorted perceptions about the PRC; and clear, insistent pressure by those who wanted changes.[103]

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[100] Ibid., p. 82. The survey cited by Steele revealed that 73% wanted communication with China; 65% wanted to exchange correspondents; 57%, exchange of ambassadors; 71% negotiation on problems; 43% for trade; 31% for PRC in the United Nations. Some 30% of those sampled did not know that China had a communist government and 40% did not know who the Nationalists were.

[101] Ibid., p. 57-65.

[102] Ibid., p. 80.

[103] Ibid., p. 251.

Academics

The mid-1960's was a frustrating period for Far Eastern scholars. Many progressive professors had lost their jobs during McCarthyism, and the political cold war orthodoxy of Dulles and Rusk permitted little criticism from those who continued to work. Professional associations, like the Association for Asian Studies, had become more apolitical than critical of government, and the field of Chinese studies was still suspect.

But a new crop of Far Eastern and Chinese scholars, born in the Asian study centers established with National Defense Education Act funds, was emerging and demanding the academic's traditional role in policy-making. These younger scholars had not been touched by McCarthyism and were not cowed by an establishment many of them believed immoral or corrupt. They were, to varying degrees, enraged or appalled by U.S. government policies in Indochina and the Far East.

Shut out of consultations with government officials, these younger scholars began to create local organizations to present views and information on East Asia, China, and Indochina that differed from official policy and explanations. As the Vietnam War escalated, and directly touched campuses, the need for accurate information grew. Some academics, pro-

fessors and students, began to vigorously criticize official policy and to recommend alternatives. The perceptions and positions of Rusk were rooted in the 1950's, and the new generations of scholars were aware that those policies were proving to be full of error, miscalculation, biases, and trouble. If one believed that the PRC was the enemy behind the Vietminh, then war with China looked logical; if one knew that the Vietminh represented a coalition of Vietnamese nationalists, some communist and others not, then the struggle of the Vietminh was not automatically linked with China, and a wider war was not inevitable. There was no unanimity on alternatives, but many scholars felt alternatives needed to be debated openly and respectfully.

Thus, when Cecil Thomas broached the idea of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, many academic experts from East Asian institutes eagerly joined. Among the founders were: A. Doak Barnett, then at Columbia; Robert Scalapino, of the University of California; John K. Fairbank of Harvard; Alexander Eckstein and Rhoads Murphy (who had worked with Quakers on China policy) of the University of Michigan; Mary Wright of Yale; and George Taylor of the University of Washington.

East Asian scholars were also instrumental in estab-

lishing the Committee on Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China. This Committee was set up in 1966 by the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies to promote, and prepare for, scholarly exchanges with China.[104]

The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

As the previous sections show, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was a coalition of diverse individuals, all joined together to work for changes in U.S.-China policy. The National Committee became an institution through which alternatives for change could be debated and discussed.[105] Since the State Department and the Johnson administration prevented open discussions on China policy, a national organization outside government seemed a likely way to rally opinion.

The most active early staffers were Thomas, Robert and Pamela Mang, and Eleanor Bacon, all Quakers. They were joined by Professor Scalapino, who helped recruit academic figures, while Thomas and others assiduously pulled together a group of influentials from major religious, racial, ethnic

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[104]Committee on Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., Brochure, 1979.

[105]Interview with Robert Oxnam, February 8, 1980.

backgrounds, from business and labor, and from different geographical regions.[106] Lists of prospective members were compiled, membership solicited, and most who were invited quickly accepted. West Coast labor leader Jack Gomperts, retired Foreign Service Officer O. Edmund Clubb, Roger Hilsman and James Thomson of Kennedy's State Department staff, black leaders A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin, and Anna Straus of the League of Women Voters joined, in addition to those figures already mentioned.

Since staff and monies were limited, Thomas decided to concentrate Committee efforts on reaching, and persuading, influential figures to express opinions for a new change in China policy. He hoped they would, in turn, use whatever political power they had to press government officials to heed new demands. The broad purpose was educational, as the by-laws show:

> The purpose of this Committee...is exclusively educational...namely, to enhance knowledge and understanding in the United States with respect to the policies toward each other of, and the relations among the United States, the Republic of China and Communist China, by presenting a full and fair exposition of all the pertinent facts through...public discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or similar programs, and encouraging qualified

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[106] Robert Scalapino to author, August 22, 1980.

> organizations and individuals to engage in non-partisan analysis, research and study...for public dissemination.[107]

Lobbying was prohibited, and the Committee incorporators pledged not to use any monies to lobby for legislation or propaganda, or for political campaigns.[108] Until the National Committee received its own tax-exempt status, funds were channeled through the National Council of Churches.[109] The Committee began its work with a total grant of $275,000 for three years, donated by the Rockefeller Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Sloan Foundation.[110]

The National Committee decided to take a non-partisan, non-political stance for many reasons.[111] Founders saw the need for a broadly based educational effort to teach Americans about China policy, its history and restraints, and the

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[107] National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "Articles of Incorporation and By-laws", March, 1968, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Archives, New York, New York.

[108] Ibid.

[109] David Hunter to author, July 12, 1980.

[110] Interview with Arlene Posner, June 24, 1980.

[111] From interviews with Betty Lall; Arlene Posner; William Delano, August 14, 1980; and Scalapino to author.

impacts and developments that would occur with changes. Founders also wanted to bring the China question out of the polemics of the Cold War, and to present it as any other policy issue needing re-evaluation. According to William Delano, "For too long, China had aroused polarization of thinking, an extreme right view and an extreme left view. The National Committee wanted to mobilize and encourage responsible debate on the question, eliminating the extremes... keeping a balanced view permitted debate in a responsible, mature way."[112] The nature of previous lobbying on China, especially the unprincipled tactics of the China Lobby, had soured many people on lobbying for China; a non-partisan stand would neutralize resistance to discussing China policy. Educational programs and discussion would eventually help policy-makers assess impacts of China policy in a more realistic, flexible, contemporary way.

The founding of the National Committee was announced on June 10, 1966, to widespread and generally favorable response. News accounts were plentiful. Government officials also praised the Committee's birth. Vice President Hubert Humphrey wrote Professor Scalapino, the Committee's chairman, on June 21, saying he recognized the need for the Committee

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[112]Interview with William Delano.

and would "welcome any thoughts or ideas" on China and Asian policy the Committee had.[113] Humphrey had addressed West Point graduates the day before, and had called for an "open door" on China policy, although he had stopped short of proposing specific steps the administration would take.[114] New York Times columnist Max Frankel suggested that administration overtures were linked to a feeling that "critics of American policy are gaining ground in Congress, on campus, among church groups and chambers of commerce...Those who, in government, favor change believe they now have their best chance in years if they can demonstrate enough public support" to win Johnson's backing.[115]

On August 26, 1966, Robert Mang met with Paul Kriesberg, of the State Department's China desk, to outline the goals of the Committee. According to Mang's account, Kriesberg responded "very warmly" to the group's plans, and offered good suggestions for bibliographies, media sources, data kits on the PRC, and names of individuals who might be in-

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[113] Hubert Humphrey to Robert Scalapino, June 21, 1966, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Archives.

[114] New York Times, June 9, 1966, A10.

[115] Ibid.

interested.[116] Kriesberg told Mang that Rusk and Assistant Secretary William Bundy favored the idea of the Committee, but wanted it to be impartial and non-partisan. Kriesberg suggested the Committee recruit more conservatives, but Mang balked at Kriesberg's suggestion of Walter Judd, the leader of the Committee of One Million.[117] In October, Scalapino, Mang, and Thomas met with Senators George McGovern, Jacob Javits, William Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, Thomas Kuchel, and State Department officials to discuss the work of the Committee.[118] Contact with government officials went well, and no agency tried to "interfere, intervene or place obstacles in the National Committee's path."[119]

The interest in China policy generated by the televised Fulbright hearings and anti-war protests, plus the publicity given the Committee's creation meant the Committee's

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[116] Robert Mang to Cecil Thomas, Carl Stover, Robert Gilmore and Robert Scalapino, August 26, 1966, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Archives.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Robert Scalapino in letter to members, October 21, 1966, National Committee Archives. Author's attempts to determine Cecil Thomas' role in the Fulbright hearings failed.

[119] Scalapino to author.

small staff was nearly deluged by requests for programs and assistance from groups all over the nation.[120] Staff members began to organize seminars for groups, write educational materials for teachers and professors, and draft experts from the Committee to write books and pamphlets on China for distribution. During the next two years, the Committee arranged scores of seminars and group discussions on current events in China, trade patterns, American policy and laws governing relationships with China, and other aspects of policy. Seminars were offered to labor leaders, businessmen, young executives, congressional staffs, heads of non-profit organizations, foundation officials, journalists and church leaders. Members of the Committee often spoke at these seminars; government officials often gave private briefings to these leadership groups as well. According to Scalapino, these seminars served several purposes:

> ...high level discussion in public meetings concerning U.S.-China relations became feasible, and the old atmosphere of acrimony somewhat diminished; ...the climate of opinion moved toward communication with China, although opinion differed on precisely what mode communication should take. There was increasing interaction at an informal level be-

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[120] Interview with Posner, and review of annual reports of the National Committee, 1966-1968, National Committee Archives.

> tween scholars, the business community, civic leaders and government regarding the issue of China.[121]

In essence, the Committee began to organize an ever-growing number of critics of official policy, thereby slowly isolating or surrounding recalcitrant officials with a circle of influential people favoring a different policy. At the same time, the National Committee became a reasoned, sound alternative to the Committee of One Million, wooing influentials away from those ranks as events made change imperative. By the end of 1968, the Committee had consolidated its reputation. It had 200 members, and was regarded as an excellent source of information on China policy by policy-makers and leaders of organizations. It had also developed a public education program, through the seminars and conferences operated by its field staff at ten universities and through the educational materials it made available to civic groups.

Groups From the Left

In retrospect, radical or "new left" groups addressed China policy relatively late, compared with other organizations discussed in this chapter.

The students for a Democratic Society (SDS), one of

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[121] Scalapino to author.

the major leftist groups in the 1960's was preoccupied with domestic economic issues at the beginning of the decade, and did not consider China an important issue until anti-war sentiment prevailed. However, some SDS members had an abiding interest in the PRC and were eager to have it included in SDS's work. SDS members and other radicals were excited by the tumult wrought by youths in China's Cultural Revolution, and copies of the Red Book, Mao's quotations, were fervently waved at American campuses in 1965 and 1966.

In 1967, SDS's Radical Education Project, students at Columbia's East Asian Institute, students and faculty at Yale, and former Peace Corps volunteers staged a large conference at Riverside Church in New York City.[122] Organizers billed the conference as the first major conference sympathetic to the PRC, and attacked the two-China policy proposed by some officials as a solution to U.S.-PRC tensions. Instead, the 500 people at the conference endorsed the PRC's position, i.e., that Taiwan and its future should be settled by the Chinese without U.S. interference.

Two accomplishments came from the conference. First, a nucleus of China-interested people joined together and eventually formed the Committee for Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS),

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[122]Interview with Frank Kehl, June 20, 1980 and Mark Sher, June 21, 1980.

the radical branch of the Association for Asian Studies.[123] The Committee was formed in 1968 by students and instructors who condemned the Association's reluctance to oppose the Vietnam War, and U.S. policies in Indochina. CCAS wanted to end the exploitation of scholarly research by the CIA, by the Defense Department and other agencies that used the findings in covert activities. Secondly, a group of conferees started a China-American Friendship Association in the Northeast that showed films from the PRC, gave talks about China's socialist development, and published a small magazine on China. This group helped smooth the way for the U.S.-China Friendship Association, an organization active in the 1970's. These groups had positions similar to those offered by the Committee for a New China Policy, headed by Daniel Tretiak, and formed in 1968.[124] His Committee called upon the U.S. to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China; end military and economic aid to Taiwan; refrain from intervention in affairs of the PRC by renouncing any attempt to influence the future

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[123]Interviews with Frank Kehl, August 22, 1980 and Robert Oxnam. Also, John Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations (University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 133-136.

[124]Testimony of Daniel Tretiak in Hearings: United States Relations with the People's Republic of China, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, pp. 549-552.

of Taiwan; admit the PRC into the United Nations; and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.

Responses to the Demands

Both political parties took some account of the demands for change in China policy in their 1968 platforms. The Democrats, influenced by Johnson's rigid Vietnam policy, hedged, refusing to make more than small changes. The Democrats did promise to cooperate with China and encourage economic, social and cultural exchanges even though China "frightened other Asian nations by its support of subversive efforts ...its militant rhetoric...the barbaric behavior of the Red Guards."[125] The Republicans were blunter: until China promised not to "endanger"other states by force, Republicans could not favor recognition or a seat in the United Nations.[126]

However, the Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, was ready to take some steps for change. Before he was nominated, Nixon had written that the United States had to "come to grips with the reality of China," to bring China into the family of nations.[127] Open dealings with the PRC would be better than

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[125]Edward Knappman, The Elections of 1968 (N.Y.: Facts on File, 1969), p. 254.

[126]Ibid., p. 240.

[127]Richard Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam", Foreign Affairs Quarterly, (October, 1967: 111-125): 118.

isolation tactics, since they would give the United States "an opportunity to change Communist China, to turn it away from external revolutions and inward toward the solution of its domestic problems."[128] On the campaign trail as a candidate, Nixon prophetically remarked: "The dialogue with Communist China must come, I think, during the two terms of the next President."[129] After he won the presidency in November, five China experts who were also members of the National Committee sent him a telegram outlining steps he could take to improve U.S.-China relations: negotiate a settlement in Vietnam, and involve the PRC in an overall solution there; arrange confidential talks with Chinese officials; modify restrictions on trade and eliminate travel bans; diminish provocative statements about the PRC; persuade the KMT to broaden its political base and evacuate off-shore islands; and cease attempts to block United Nations admission of the PRC.[130] These gentlemen

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[128] Ibid.

[129] Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, Nixon on the Issues (N.Y.: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1969), p. 58.

[130] A. Doak Barnett, Jerome Cohen, John K. Fairbank, James Thomson and Edwin Reischauer sent the memo, according to the authors of Red China and Its American Friends (Washington: American Council on World Freedom, 1971), pp. 85-89.

also spoke prophetically.

Conclusion

As this chapter shows, there was a great deal of action on U.S.-China policy during the 1960's, most of it critical of existing government attitudes. Thousands of people attended the many conferences, seminars, teach-ins, workshops, demonstrations, speeches, and hearings held by the groups examined in this study and others. If an anti-PRC consensus on U.S.-China policy had once existed, it was shattered by these activities.

The leaders of nongovernmental organizations we have examined believed they had to take initiatives because high-ranking officials were shackled to policies formed in the past. Nonrecognition, or antagonism toward the PRC, threatened world peace; some form of contact and accommodation with the PRC was a more realistic policy, given developments in the world and in the U.S. The groups described in this chapter proved themselves more aware of the need for changes, more flexible, and more adaptable to newer circumstances than did high-level appointees.

Anti-communism and cold war ideology left their mark, even though many proponents died during these years. Anti-communism created fear, caution, and timidity which had to be

overcome; it handcuffed thinking and acting for many people. Groups had to preface their actions by proclaiming their anti-communism. Even so, many in this study moved against this ideology, once events proved it unreliable to deal with the situation in the 1960's.

Recognition of the PRC meant different things to different people. Organizations in this time period had to deal with Taiwan in some fashion, and suggested solutions for Taiwan accompanied their positions on recognition. Two-China policies, one-China and one-Taiwan policies, plebiscites, supervision by the United Nations, and unity with the PRC were among the ideas advanced by these groups.

The orthodoxy of Dean Rusk and Lyndon Johnson held firm until the end of Johnson's administration. Neither accepted alternatives although both were increasingly isolated and heavily criticized at the end of Johnson's tenure. Critics had to create parallel organizations in hopes of persuading the next set of policy-makers. The president-elect, Richard Nixon, had said he was ready for changes, and the momentum for change seemed unstoppable.

Members of the groups in this study were motivated by noble intentions. Most were interested in world peace, an end to the Indochina war, disarmament, and international co-

operation. Few seemed to be interested primarily in financial rewards, personal aggrandizement, or similar narrow pursuits. Most seemed genuinely interested in promoting an American policy toward China that was benign and cooperative; their criticisms of current American policy stemmed from their own interpretation of America's best interests.

All of the groups carried on similar activities. Conferences, educational workshops, debates, and public meetings were favorite methods to reach audiences. When all the activities of the groups are combined, we can see that Americans at all levels were reached. Only the FCNL performed lobbying, as it is usually defined. The other groups worked with grass-roots organizations, or with leaders of various strata.

The combination of efforts broke with the consensus of the past. Actions in the 1960's set the stage for new moves, and created the environment that nurtured further steps. Progress toward sound relations with the PRC would not be the accomplishment of one president and his staff; instead it was augmented by the labors of hundreds of individuals who worked with organizations like those in this study.

CHAPTER IV

ARGUING THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT

Introduction

As President, Richard Nixon was able to make his own prophecy come true. He entered office in January 1969, "convinced that a new policy toward the People's Republic of China was an essential component of a new foreign policy."[1] His administration "had an obligation to establish contact, to define our positions, and perhaps move on to a greater understanding," between the two countries.[2] From his inauguration through February 1972, when he and Chou En-lai signed the Shanghai Communique, a joint accord outlining terms for dip-

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[1] Richard Nixon, "Foreign Policy Address to the Congress: 1972", U.S. Foreign Policy of the 1970's (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973:24-29), p. 26. Detente with the Soviet Union was also part of the Nixon foreign policy. Nixon was prepared to negotiate with the Soviets on common problems, e.g., arms limitation, and on specific causes of world tension without denying the existence of incompatible interests. Detente was seen as a means to control expansion of the Soviet Union wile preventing armed conflicts that could lead to world war. See Henry Kissinger's White House Years, pp. 125-135.

[2] Ibid.

lomatic relations between the two countries, Nixon succeeded in turning American policy toward recognition of the PRC. A steady series of cumulative alterations in America's dealings with the PRC led to the Communique, which guided interactions until January 1979, when recognition occurred.

In this chapter, we will look at the activities of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S.-China Peoples Friendship Association (USCPFA), founded in 1971, the two groups most active during this time. Both encouraged and reinforced the positive steps taken by the Nixon administration and urged completion of the task. The National Committee remained nonpartisan, but the USCPFA vigorously argued the terms for recognition that the Chinese preferred and that were ultimately for the most part accepted.

First Changes

By the end of 1969, Nixon had taken small but significant steps toward a rapprochement with the Chinese. William Rogers, Nixon's first Secretary of State, announced in April 1969, that the administration "would be willing to take the initiative to establish more normal relations with Communist China."[3] In July, the State Department validated passports

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[3] Foster Rhea Dulles, American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (N.Y.: Crowell Co., 1972), p. 240.

for travel to the PRC and later announced that subsidiary firms of U.S. corporations could trade non-strategic items with China. The Warsaw Talks, moribund because of China's antagonism toward American policy in Indochina, were scheduled to revive in 1970.

Many Americans applauded these steps. Certain key Congressmen offered a great deal of help. Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, in a March speech, called for better trade relations between the two countries.[4] Oregon's Senator Mark Hatfield, called that Nationalists' posture as rulers of all China "an absurd fiction."[5] A September resolution by the Senate declared that recognition of the PRC by the U.S. would not imply "U.S. approval of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government"--thus negating one of Dulles' cherished beliefs.[6] In November 1969, 39 Representatives and eight Senators sent Nixon a letter expressing "full support and agreement" with his moves toward China.[7]

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[4]Congressional Quarterly, Inc. National Diplomacy: 1965-1970 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1970), p. 39.

[5]Ibid., p. 38.

[6]Ibid., p. 40.

[7]Ibid., p. 41.

Approval came from nongovernmental organizations as well. The League of Women Voters, which had studied U.S.-China Policy for three years, announced in favor of negotiations on recognizing the PRC, admitting the PRC to the United Nations, and ending the trade embargo.[8] The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, with Cecil Thomas as executive secretary, moved to consolidate support for a new policy toward the PRC. The Committee organized a national convocation in March 1969, that drew 2,500 individuals, representing 50 major corporations, 24 universities, 40 nations, and scores of American civic associations.[9] The heard 34 speakers debate the issues related to normalization. The conference was chaired by Edwin Reischauer, former ambassador to Japan, and A. Doak Barnett, a China expert and chairman of the National Committee. Both thought that the high level of interest shown indicated "the growing belief in the United States that the issues and problems involved in America's China policy deserve far greater attention and discussion than they have received

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[8]Dulles, American Foreign Policy, p. 243.

[9]National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "Program Survey, 1968-1969," National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Archives, New York City.

in the past."[10] The planners hoped the discussion about impacts and alternatives would crystallize into suggestions they could offer Nixon as he set foreign policy goals for his term.

Senator Edward Kennedy gave the major address at the conference. Calling the policies of isolation and containment futile, Kennedy argued that the U.S. should "make it clear that we regard China as a legitimate power on the mainland, entitled to full participation as an equal member of the world community."[11] The U.S. should: reconvene the Warsaw Talks; involve the PRC in arms control negotiations; withdraw its opposition to United Nations admission of the PRC; withdraw American troops from Taiwan; discuss relations with the PRC while guaranteeing the Nationalists protection from forcible takeover by the PRC. Kennedy wanted ties with the PRC and relations with the Nationalists.

Other speakers supporting changes were: John D. Rockefeller, who wanted "the fear and rigidity of the past" re-

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[10] A. Doak Barnett and Edwin Reischauer, The U.S. and China: The Next Decade (N.Y.: Praeger, 1970), preface.

[11] Ibid., p. 150.

placed by a new perspective;[12] Harrison Salisbury, the correspondent, who hoped new contacts would ease world tensions;[13] John K. Fairbank, who told Nixon to accept a measure of defeat in Vietnam and reconsider U.S. policy in Asia;[14] James Thomson, who wanted Nixon to reject all spurious reasons for delay and follow the lead shown by the public, politicians and others at the conference;[15] and Senator Jacob Javits, who urged a thaw in U.S.-China relations since China was not a threat to the U.S. and should be integrated into the world community.[16] Overall, the speakers urged Nixon to break with past policies, and to take positive steps toward the PRC. The conference, and the other work it was doing, earned the National Committee the reputation of being the most ambitious and well-informed organization concerned with U.S.-China policy.[17]

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[12] Ibid., p. 192.

[13] Ibid., p. 213.

[14] Ibid., p. 206.

[15] Ibid., p. 221.

[16] Ibid., p. 157.

[17] The Committee's membership list in 1969 represented a cross-section of American elites, who were selected for

In 1970, Nixon further eased trade and travel restrictions and reiterated his desire for improved relations with the PRC. More importantly, he and Henry Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, embarked on a secret endeavor to arrange a visit to China by Nixon. The U.S. had suggested such high-level talks to the Chinese in the February 1970 Warsaw meeting. The Chinese accepted, and plans were made in elaborate secrecy, involving clandestine trips to Paris and China, and covert aid primarily from President Yahya Kahn of Pakistan, but also from former President Georges Pompidou of France, and President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania.[18]

The right and the pro-Nationalists could not muster enough support to stop events. The Committee of One Million's roster had dwindled dramatically after the 1968 elections.[19]

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their interest in China policy, their willingness to volunteer, and their access to leaders and funds. The Committee's public education and leadership seminars had grown, as had their publications and field staffs. Later, the Committee served as a reservoir of talent that administrations drew upon to appoint staff interested in working for new directions in China policy. Cyrus Vance, George Bush, W. Michael Blumenthal, Leonard Woodcock, Michel Oksenberg, and Richard Solomon are a few of the members who played government roles in the 1970's China policy.

[18]Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 523-550; Nixon, RN, pp. 545-580.

[19]Bachrach, The Committee of One Million, pp. 263-266.

Its head public relations man, Marvin Liebman, resigned, leaving the Committee unable to launch an effective counter-campaign. Committee publications appeared sporadically, and were defensive in tone. The "China Lobby" was "moribund... a victim of old age and lack of interest,"[20] its loudest and most powerful spokesmen dead. A handful of Senators and Congressmen, led by Barry Goldwater and James Buckley, still railed against change, but most representatives who spoke out for changes received little criticism from constituents.[21] Nixon's reputation as an anti-Communist protected him from much criticism from the right.

The most significant breakthroughs happened in 1971. In April, Chou En-lai invited the American ping-pong team, which had been competing in Tokyo, to visit the PRC after the tournament was over. They did, and the media dubbed the visit evidence of "ping-pong diplomacy." Two American scientists who had visited Hanoi were invited to the PRC in May and thirteen Asian scholars from CCAS spent three weeks in June touring China. As the first group of American scholars to go to China, the CCAS delegation had extensive talks with Chou En-lai

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[20] New York Times, April 26, 1970, p. 1.

[21] Ibid.

about China's perceptions of world problems, the future of relations between the U.S. and China, and the war in Vietnam.[22] William Hinton, having finally retrieved his passport from the State Department, accepted Chou En-lai's long-standing invitation to return to the PRC. He stayed seven months, touring, talking, and meeting with leading cadres, including Premier Chou.[23]

President Nixon announced in July that his trip to China would occur in the Spring of 1972. He and the Chinese were going to hold "talks on normalization of relations between the two countries and also an exchange of views on questions of concern to the two sides," though not at the expense of allies nor to exploit the Sino-Soviet split.[24] Response was favorable. In the interim between his July announcement and his February trip, several American delegations flew to China. Prominent journalists, anti-war activists, and a

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[22]Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, China! Inside the People's Republic (N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1971). The Appendix has text of Chou En-lai's talk with the delegates who were mostly anti-war activists based in Hong Kong.

[23]Interview with William Hinton, January 31, 1980.

[24]Kissinger, White House Years, p. 760.

special delegation from the Black Panthers went to China before Nixon did.[25] After they returned, most spoke, lectured, and published articles or books on their findings; curiosity about China was whetted as Americans heard about events and life in a nation hidden from them for so long.

On the Secrecy of the Plans

Nixon demanded near-total secrecy in preparing for the trip to China. In part, the Chinese needed secrecy. The PRC had been staunch allies and supporters of the Vietnamese and had repeatedly criticized the "imperialist" actions of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Chou had also pledged to fight the U.S. should American troops invade China through Vietnam. An opening to the U.S. might have been misread by Vietnam, although Chou did not compromise China's support of the Vietnamese and insisted that the U.S. withdraw from Vietnam before U.S.-China relations would be truly fruitful.[26] Lin Piao and others in the CCP might have sabotaged rapprochement had they learned of it.[27] The Chinese people also would have been in-

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[25]Much to the delight of Huey Newton, who eluded the FBI to go. See his Revolutionary Suicide (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 1972).

[26]Sino-U.S. Joint Communique (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p. 4, presents the Chinese side.

[27]Kissinger, White House Years, p. 697, and interview with Shao Tsu-ping, September 13, 1980.

credulous, since they had carried on an anti-imperialist education campaign for years, directed against U.S. actions in Vietnam.

Nixon and Kissinger had foreign policy objectives for maintaining secrecy as well. In regard to the Soviet Union, they may have preferred to keep the Soviets pleased with steps toward detente instead of arousing their suspicions about a "deal" with China. Kissinger hoped that relations between the U.S. and the PRC could be presented to the world as a fait accompli, thereby isolating the North Vietnamese and perhaps forcing them to accept terms less than desirable to them.[28]

Domestic considerations played a part for Nixon as well. Congress was becoming more skeptical about Nixon's commitment to end the war in Vietnam, particularly after the Cambodian invasion of May 1970. Congressional threats to cut off war funds were frequently heard, and critics like Senator William Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee were unrelenting. Nixon did not tell Congressional leaders about the overtures to China; he held short briefings with Republican leaders and a bipartisan delegation after his July announcement but told them little and asked them not to question

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[28]Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1087.

him more.[29] Majority leader Mansfield praised the opening, but Fulbright could not be dissuaded from his criticisms of the war or from his investigations into the roots of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Nixon may have kept developments secret because he did not trust Congress, or because he wanted to deflect their anti-war attacks, and divert their attention elsewhere. Nixon spent seven months preparing for the trip; the media coverage the trip obtained and the hopes or promise it raised may have calmed anti-war fervor in the public as well.

Still, an element of drama may have been one reason for secrecy, since other discussions in the U.S. promised a fertile environment for changes. For one, the National Committee and the League of Women Voters held a conference on Taiwan in March 1971. The experts who testified concluded that the U.S. had "only marginal economic and military interest in Taiwan, and should withdraw its troops from there."[30] They disagreed about how to abrogate the defense treaty between the two nations, but concurred that the rationale for

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[29]William Safire, Before the Fall (N.Y.:Doubleday, 1975), p. 414.

[30]League of Women Voters, Taiwan and American Policy (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971), p. 13.

the treaty had been outlived. As another example, a May 1971 poll showed that public support for recognition of the PRC was 55%, with 45% approving a United Nations seat for China.[31]

Congress had also been debating U.S.-China policy. From 1966 to 1970, Congress had frequently debated U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, and China policy was considered in tandem with that. In 1970, the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held hearings on U.S.-China policy, and several experts reviewed the outcomes on trade, exchanges, the status of Taiwan, and other matters, should normalization occur.[32] The House was learning about and planning for changes.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held lengthy hearings in 1971 to consider resolutions to repeal the Formosa Resolution, to urge the U.S. to recognize the PRC, and to support admitting the PRC into the United Nations.[33] Senator

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[31] Washington Post, May 31, 1971, p. 31.

[32] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. U.S.-China Relations: A Strategy for the Future 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970.

[33] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Relations With China, 91 Cong., 2nd Sess., 1971.

McGovern called upon the Senate to reject the cold war view that China was an aggressive nation and a threat to the U.S. Senator Kennedy called for admission of China to the U.N. as the sole government of China. Senator Church sponsored the resolution to repeal the Formosa Resolution, which the Congress approved. Following the 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers, Fulbright chaired special hearings to discuss the now-public documents detailing U.S. policy toward China in the 1940's.[34] John S. Service, one of the China Hands purged from the State Department, testified about the evolution of the containment policy, and the opportunities for good relations Mao Tse-tung had offered American policy makers.[35]

In essence, then, many of the factors and terms Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger were negotiating in secret were being debated publicly by civic organizations and congressmen, and the conclusions everyone reached were similar.

Why Nixon Could Act

Several elements combined to make Nixon's move pro-

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[34]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings: Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Mainland China, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1971.

[35]Ibid., Testimony of John S. Service, pp. 2-20.

pitious. U.S. perceptions of the Chinese engendered by cold war rhetoric had proved untrue; China supported revolutionary movements but did not send troops outside her borders. The unfolding Sino-Soviet split arose from profound ideological differences, and China was not a puppet of the Soviet Union. The U.S. had sued for peace in Vietnam, and its inability to defeat the Vietnamese called into question the alliances it had made with other Asian nations, since segments of the American public were appalled by the consequences of such strategy. As Ross Terrill wrote: "U.S. power to trouble China has declined. The U.S. will to trouble China with energetic military activity far from America's shores has sagged because many Americans have lost confidence in the morality as well as the efficiency of that activity."[36]

The Chinese were eager for diplomatic relations with many nations as a way of offsetting the isolation brought about by the Cultural Revolution, when their ambassadors were recalled. The Chinese also wanted contacts with other nations as a way of forestalling the advances of the Soviet Union, which they perceive as expansionist and dangerous to world

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[36] Ross Terrill, 800,000,000:The Real China (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 151.

peace.[37] Beginning in the late 1960's, China renewed contacts with other countries and had been recognized by more than 110 nations by 1970. Only a handful of nations kept diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Momentum to give the PRC a seat in the United Nations, probably accompanied by a move to expel the Nationalists, was growing.

From the beginning, the Chinese had welcomed the idea of relations with the U.S. although they could not accept the terms the Americans imposed on Taiwan. The Chinese "wanted to be free of the military harness that the U.S. has thrown around East Asia since the Korean War,"[38] and wanted to reduce the threat of American invasion from Vietnam. Mao Tse-tung, in a talk with Edgar Snow, indicated his belief that he could work with Richard Nixon, whom Mao saw as the representative of the ruling class; if Nixon were to make a move, the move would be accepted by that class, and was not likely to be reversed by a future administration.[39] Mao believed the U.S. would have to make overtures to China, since America had been

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[37]William Hinton, "U.S.-China Relations: Foreign Policy in a New World Context," in China and Us (March-May, 1979):8.

[38]Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China, p. 164.

[39]Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution(New York: Random House, 1971), p. 21.

defeated in Vietnam. Defeat meant a reconsideration of Asian policy was due. Although unsure as to what real accomplishments could be made, Mao expected some good to come from Nixon's visit.

Nixon's announcement of the secret negotiations on relations with the PRC broke the back of resistance against its admission to the United Nations. The PRC won a seat there in October 1971, and the Nationalists were expelled. No NATO ally supported the United States effort to cling to dual representation.[40] Success in the United Nations and with the U.S. sparked a flurry of activities by nations eager to do business with the Chinese. The Canton Trade Fair that year brought 10,000 businessmen from fifty nations to China on business.[41] Japan, both Koreas, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma, and India were some of the nations once tied to U.S. treaties or influence who were seeking new relations with the PRC, and who made overtures to the Chinese.[42]

The future of Taiwan was still the chief obstacle to

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[40]Kissinger, White House Years, p. 784.

[41]Maud Russell, "The Why of Nixon's Visit to China," Far East Report, (July, 1972:1-8):7.

[42]Ibid.

smooth relations. Nixon would not retreat from military and economic ties to Taiwan.[43] He was joined by some China scholars, officials in government, professors, experts, and others who devised different schemes to keep some form of relations with Taiwan while recognizing the PRC.

China's position was immutable. As Chou En-lai told the CCAS group, the PRC held to six points: 1) the PRC is the sole legitimate government of the Chines people; 2) Taiwan is a province of China, an inalienable part of China's territory; 3) Taiwan's status is clear, not unsettled, not to be determined by any international organization; 4) the PRC will not accept any version of the 2-China policy, or the 1-China, 1-Taiwan plan; 5) the Taiwanese independence movement is to be opposed, since the people on Taiwan are Chinese and the independence movement is foreign-inspired; and 6) the U.S. has to withdraw forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.[44]

Other American organizations reinforced the progress Nixon was making. In addition to the work the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was doing, the other organiza-

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[43]Nixon, RN, p. 571.

[44]Ray Whitehead, who accompanied the CCAS delegation, discussed Chou En-lai's terms in his report on the trip, published in China Notes, a National Council of Churches magazine, Summer, 1971, p. 2.

tions in this study were supporting the official steps the Nixon administration was taking. The National Council of Churches continued its support of the advances Nixon was making, and kept up its educational programs. FCNL continued to lobby for more changes in China policy, and approved progress as it was made.[45] The Quakers had seconded Cecil Thomas to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, which they saw as a focus for China policy work, and had turned much of their staff and resources into a final effort to end the Vietnam war.

AFSC broadened its work as steps were made. AFSC's International Affairs Division, through the Quaker United Nations Office in New York and Geneva, produced policy studies on the international aspects of U.S.-China relations.[46] The United Nations Office also sponsored two conferences in 1969 and 1970, for United Nations personnel, embassy staffs, foreign service officers, and nongovernmental organizations, on removing obstacles to the seating of the PRC delegation. The conferences were designed to promote opinion favorable to

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[45]Interview with E. Raymond Wilson, February 9, 1980. FCNL did not lobby for relations after the Shanghai Communique was signed in 1972, since FCNL saw the accord as accomplishing the first steps in formal relations.

[46]Interview with Stephen Thiermann, January 9, 1980.

seating the PRC within member nations. Following the ping-pong team's visit, AFSC issued another book, U.S.-China Policy: A Fresh Start, which called for seating the PRC in the United Nations, abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, withdrawal of U.S. forces in Taiwan, and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China.[47] Shortly after this book was published, a Quaker delegation was invited to China, and the delegation later reiterated their positions in a book about their trip, Experiment Without Precedent.[48]

In sum, it can be seen that significant portions of the American political system--the public, academic circles, Congress, and nongovernmental organizations--were ready for relations with the PRC before Nixon went to China. They disagreed on the terms, but wanted some form of diplomatic contacts.

The U.S.-China Peoples Friendship Association

By the time the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association (USCPFA) got started in mid-1971, it looked as though

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[47]American Friends Service Committee, U.S.-China Policy: A Fresh Start (N.Y.: American Friends Service Committee, 1970).

[48]American Friends Service Committee, Experiment Without Precedent (N.Y.:American Friends Service Committee, 1972).

diplomatic relations with China were imminent. USCPFA's obvious tasks were to reinforce progress, build ties with the Chinese people, educate the American public about the PRC and American policy toward the PRC and Taiwan.

The idea of a "friendship association" with the PRC was not uniquely American. The Chinese had not enjoyed diplomatic relations with many nations at the beginning of their existence, and had been deliberately excluded from organizations, such as the United Nations, that enhanced international contacts. In addition, factual knowledge about the PRC was scanty, or, as in America, was distorted for political purposes. Therefore, citizens of most nations with relations with the PRC, or citizens who wanted their nation to initiate diplomatic relations with the PRC had reason to form "friendship associations." These associations were handled by the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (YOUXIE), a division of the PRC Foreign Ministry. Friendship associations took different forms in different nations; some were quasi-official bodies funded by the government; others received some public funding while others existed as private membership organizations. In any case, an Association interprets and explains China's policies and positions accurately, without endorsing them. YOUXIE prefers that all

associations be open to anyone friendly to China, not just the left; "China needs everybody," as Wang Bing-nan, the head of YOUXIE put it, during a recent visit to the U.S.[49]

The first American association was started in San Francisco, in the Spring of 1971.[50] The second branch was established in Los Angeles shortly thereafter. One of the founders of the West Coast chapters was Frank Pestana, an attorney who had traveled to the PRC in 1959 as the guest of a high PRC official who had been Pestana's roommate in college. Pestana had spent the following years lecturing about the PRC throughout California. The individuals he had come to know on these speaking tours formed the founding group of the Los Angeles chapter. They were joined by young Asian scholars, members of the Revolutionary Union, and others interested in China.

Susan Warren, writer and former editor of CDFEP's Far East Spotlight, organized a New York Friendship Association in August 1971, shortly after the San Francisco group was started. She was joined by Mei Tse-chiang one of the

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[49]Wang Bing-nan, Address to New York USCPFA members, New York City, September 8, 1979. Although described as a people-to-people organization, the Association might better be called government agency-to-people organization.

[50]Interview with Bernie Lusher, November 4, 1980.

leaders of the overseas Chinese community in New York, and by former CDFEP activists including Hugh Deane, Maud Russell and Ira Gollobin. Individuals with a long-time interest in China were also part of the organizing committee, and among these were Helen and Sam Rosen, Charles Coe and others. Young activists from left or progressive groups, like the Young Lords, SDS, CCAS, the Revolutionary Union, and former Peace Corps workers also joined. Other individuals were attracted by word-of-mouth by the founders, or, as interest in China grew, by the reputation of the New York chapter.[51]

The USCPFA grew rapidly, and became a mass organization. By the late 1970's, it had 110 chapters in America and a membership close to 11,000.

Motivations to create, or join a chapter of the USCPFA were as mixed as the composition of the membership. Those sympathetic to socialism saw China as a model for the world and wanted to educate Americans about socialism as an alternative to capitalism. Others wanted the USCPFA to serve as a base for organizing a political party of the left. Former missionaries, former servicemen, and others who had lived or worked in China wanted to renew old friendships that had been

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[51]Interview with Susan Warren, January 5, 1980; interview with Charles Coe, December 24, 1979.

cut by prolonged estrangement. Anti-war activists wanted good relations with China to prevent conflicts like the one in Vietnam. China scholars wanted to learn more about the PRC, and hoped to be able to study there in the future. Traders and businessmen hoped for commercial contacts. Others were simply curious about China and what life there was like. The majority felt that relations between the two countries had to improve and that the American policy of nonrecognition was wrong. By building friendly relations between the peoples of the two nations, USCPFA founders hoped to build a grass-roots base of Americans who knew about, and favored, relations with the PRC.

Other chapters sprang up around the country. The Philadelphia chapter was started by young CCAS scholars; Margaret Stanley, a nurse from the AFSC ambulance corps in Yenan; and Ida Pruitt, a former missionary worker who had been active with INDUSCO. The Connecticut Valley chapter was started by Helen Foster Snow, Preston Schoyer of Yale, and an executive director of the National Committee, Laurence Salisbury, formerly with IPR and CDFEP and John Hersey.[52] Koji Ariyoshi, who had been tried during the 1950's for violations of the Smith Act, founded the USCPFA chapter in Honolulu, and

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[52]Interview with Helen Foster Snow, January 18, 1980.

served on the National Steering Committee until his death in 1978.[53]

Activists and organizers of the chapters received visas and invitations to visit the PRC. By early 1972, four delegations from chapters across the country had traveled to China. They met with cadres, toured communes and factories, and saw developments there. The activists spent weeks after their return lecturing and showing slides to curious audiences who besieged them with questions. Interest in these talks increased membership and new chapters were formed. For people who had previously lived in China, the new trip was a chance to make vivid contrasts; for young activists, China looked to be a good model for development of poorer nations. The activists could speak from first-hand experience.

For the USCPFA, these efforts grew into a tremendously large-scale public education program. Activists who had gone to China talked to Americans who had not, and the contact was face-to-face, generally at a grass-roots level. One study of USCPFA contacts showed that 1½ million people had been contacted by USCPFA activities--lectures, slide shows, exhibitions, celebrations, publications, and tours--in one year.[54]

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[53]Interview with Hugh Deane, October 7, 1980.

[54]Interview with Peter Schmidt, December 24, 1979.

Averaged out, the number of people who have been reached by USCPFA is remarkable, particularly since so little information had been available in the previous two decades.

The initial people-to-people exchanges generated by the trips were supplemented by the state-to-state arrangements covered in the Sino-U.S. Joint Accord which Nixon and Chou En-lai signed during Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972.[55] The Accord, most often refered to as the Shanghai Communique, formed the official basis for Sino-U.S. relations until normalization occurred in January 1979. The USCPFA drew upon the terms of this agreement in all of its educational work.

The Shanghai Communique

The Sino-U.S. Accord has three sections: one section presents China's perspectives on foreign affairs and Asia; one section presents American views on those matters; and a third section outlines the views the two nations share and their hopes for eventual relations. This unique format was designed by Premier Chou, as a way of showing parallel thoughts and interests in common while reserving space to express sharp differences of opinion.[56]

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[55] Sino-U.S. Joint Communique.

[56] Kissinger, White House Years, p. 780.

The two nations pledged to conduct their relations on the principles of noninterference in internal affairs of other countries, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence, instead of using force. Both agreed that normalizing relations would benefit everyone, especially since both wanted to diminish the threat of war. They agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts of any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony...Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states."[57]

The section on Taiwan was crucial. The Chinese reiterated their demands that all U.S. forces and military installations in Taiwan be withdrawn; and that Taiwan's future be settled by the Chinese since the island is part of China and rightfully governed by the PRC, the sole legal government of China. The American side stated: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position."[58] The U.S. expressed an interest in the "peaceful settlement of the

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[57] Sino-U.S. Joint Communique, p. 5.

[58] Ibid.

Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves" while pledging that American forces and military installations would "ultimately" be withdrawn from Taiwan, and "progressively" reduced as tension in the area diminished.[59]

Kissinger had earlier given Chou En-lai assurances that Nixon "would not encourage a two-China solution or a one-China, one-Taiwan solution or encourage other countries to replace our military position on the island."[60] He stressed American interest in "peaceful" resolution of Taiwan's status, but Chou said it was a matter for the Chinese to settle without any American involvement. Kissinger concluded that the Chinese were primarily interested in U.S.-China relations, with Taiwan "left to a future outcome that would evolve from circumstances in the relationship."[61] Kissinger felt that the positions on Taiwan were so "ambiguous" that both sides could claim victory, and could live with them until the settlement finally evolved.[62]

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[59]Ibid., p. 6

[60]Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1073.

[61]Ibid., p. 1076.

[62]Ibid., p. 782.

The Communique was heralded as a significant step in improving relations. Under terms of the agreement, exchanges in all fields were encouraged, and further negotiations on normalizing relations were awaited.

Although Kissinger may have been content with the ambiguity of the section on Taiwan, it confused others. How strong was America's interest in "peaceful" resolution of the question? Did that mean the U.S. could continue to sell arms to Taiwan as defensive weapons, to guarantee protection from a superior PRC military? Wasn't it a form of racism to believe that the Chinese living on the mainland would brutalize the Chinese living on Taiwan? Did the promise to "ultimately" withdraw troops signal the abrogation of the defense treaty? What would happen to commercial ties with Taiwan under the terms of the Communique? Would they be nationalized once reunification occurred? Did the U.S. buy time by postponing relations to a future date, perhaps hoping that the PRC would moderate its stand on Taiwan, or be willing to accept relations on terms more favorable to American commercial interests? How could the two opposing positions regarding Taiwan be reconciled, given the gap between them? For those individuals who wanted to subvert U.S. relations with the PRC, the ambiguity of the language offered plenty of room for maneuver.

Activities After the Shanghai Communique

Shortly after the Communique was signed, the Chinese ping-pong team expressed an interest in visiting the U.S., as part of the exchanges pledged in the agreement. The secrecy surrounding the Nixon-Kissinger trips had prevented official exchange institutions from being built in time, so the role of host fell to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the only national organization equipped to handle such a job.[63]

The National Committee's involvement had been serendipitously arranged by Graham Steenhoven, a member of the National Committee and head of the U.S. Table Tennis Association. Steenhoven was a close friend of Alexander Eckstein, then Chairman of the Committee's Board. When Steenhoven learned of the Chinese team's interest in a visit, he telephoned Eckstein to see if the Committee would host the tour. Eckstein agreed to do so, and cast around for funds. The Department of State offered some funds to defray the high costs, and became involved in planning the tour. State wanted to "make sure that no legal regulations were violated or national interest disturbed by a favorable response to the visit," and wanted to help Committee members, since "the issues and dan-

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[63] Interview with Arlene Posner, June 24, 1980; interview with Rosalind Daly, July 9, 1980; Robert Scalapino to author, August 22, 1980.

gers involved were too important to be dealt with by laymen, even if some of them were academics and others experienced in foreign affairs, possibly even former government employees."[64]

Successfully acting as host for this tour assured involvement with later tours and exchanges. The National Committee became host to several cultural, sports, and educational exchanges between the U.S. and China, and has received government funds to do so. Although Committee members consider the organization a private group, separate from government, it now cooperates with the State Department in arranging exchanges, and receives nearly a third of its budget from government agencies.[65] The Communique propelled the Committee into a role it had not foreseen at its inception.

For the USCPFA, the Communique offered different opportunities. Activists felt it was the first step toward normalization, but were unclear as to how the terms would be implemented. The war in Indochina was still being waged, and the U.S. had not stopped sending aid to the Taiwan government

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[64]Ruth Eckstein to author, September 2, 1980.

[65]Since the National Committee began to receive government funds in 1972, its activities after that date will not be included in this chapter.

nor instructed American firms to change the patterns of investment there. Since the chapters were autonomous, little coordination and no nationally agreed upon positions existed. Yet, chapters were organizing in the wake of the public interest engendered by the extensive media coverage of Nixon's visit. While activists could discuss the Communique, and give the reasons for China's views, it was clear that better efforts were needed.

Building a national organization occupied the members over the next eighteen months. At the end of 1972, 21 chapters met, discussed experiences and plans, and elected a provisional national steering committee. The establishment of liaison offices between America and the PRC in May 1973, raised hopes that recognition would quickly follow. These hopes were dashed by the investigations linked to the Watergate affair. The USCPFA tried to keep interest in relations high during this lull, by public education and tours to China.

The National USCPFA was formed in the fall of 1974, when 400 people from 33 chapters met in Los Angeles. The structure adopted favored decentralization, with locals given the autonomy necessary to tailor programs according to respective community needs. The membership would set programs and policies at an annual convention. A National Steering Commit-

tee would coordinate resources and act as the voice for U.S.-China Friendship at a national level. The Committee was elected each year by the convention, and had representatives from the regions. William Hinton was elected the first chairman.

A national USCPFA publication, New China, was approved; it was planned to be a popular, educational magazine about China. Several campaigns for improved relations were approved: outreach, which would coordinate the educational aspects of the Association while recruiting workers and minorities into the membership; an Olympics committee, to obtain PRC entry into the Games; and normalization, to speed implementation of the Shanghai Communique and to battle those factions opposed to recognition of the PRC.

The USCPFA Statement of Principles was hammered out at this convention. The goal of the USCPFA was to build friendship "based on mutual understanding between the people" of the two countries. The USCPFA urged "full diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations" with China according to the terms set forth in the Communique. The Statement agreed that U.S. recognition of, and military presence in Taiwan was an obstacle to relations, and said: "Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the resolution of the Taiwan question is an internal affair of

China. We recognize that the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China."[66] U.S. military forces had to withdraw from Taiwan and from Indochina. Anyone who agreed with the statement, and who wanted to improve relations with China, could join the Association.

As the Statement of Principles indicates, the USCPFA intended to campaign for normalization on terms that excluded U.S. diplomatic involvement in Taiwan. Members agreed that U.S. interests in the long run would be better served by severing diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC as the only government in China. The Chinese had stated that fruitful relations would only occur when U.S. recognition of Taiwan had ceased, and the USCPFA accepted these terms.

The goal of achieving normalization, and the pledge to work for this, were reaffirmed at the annual national conventions of the USCPFA. The members wanted the USCPFA to "walk on two legs" in the campaign for diplomatic relations with the PRC: "to inform, educate and mobilize the American people and at the same time to get involved in the political sphere--including entering ad hoc coalitions with groups sharing our

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[66]U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, "Statement of Principles," adopted September 1974, mimeo.

views of normalization."[67] Tactically, the USCPFA had limited resources to carry out both tasks. The USCPFA was a tax-exempt educational organization that relied upon membership dues to finance activities, and it depended upon hundreds of volunteers instead of a paid professional staff. These two factors precluded lobbying of the usual sort, although members in chapters around the country did carry on dialogues with elected officials, provided them with information about China, and encouraged political figures who were interested in learning more about China and the need for normal relations.

Young activists in the Association, many of whom had experienced bitter confrontations with officials in civil rights and anti-war protests, objected to working with elected figures.[68] They distrusted and suspected political officials, believing that most had lied to the public about the war and Watergate. Officials were "unreformable" bourgeoisie who followed policies separate from the mass of the public. Certain of these activities accepted the "Bombard-the-Headquarters-Overthrow-the-Bourgeoisie" slogans of the Red Guards. There-

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[67]"Philadelphia Convention Report," China and Us, 6 (January-February 1977): 1.

[68]Interview with Kathy Chamberlain, August 12, 1980; interview with Hugh Deane, December 14, 1979; interview with Frank Kehl, June 20, 1980.

fore, the best way to force a complete and lasting change in policy was to mobilize the masses to call for normalization. These activists preferred to work on educational programs and challenged efforts to include, or lobby, elected officials. Consequently, the committees set up to plan programs for normalization work that operated on the local, regional, and national level were beset by internal disagreements over projects and the allocation of resources. These struggles sapped the energy of the volunteer workers, and interfered with the Association's ability to develop a unified comprehensive strategy on normalization activities.

The uneven nature of USCPFA's work on normalization was hampered by the uncertain direction of U.S. policy-makers. When Gerald Ford became president in 1974, after Nixon had resigned in disgrace, activists hoped that normalization would finally occur. Ford failed to act. He did speak for normalization, and he visited China in December 1975, where he "reaffirmed the determination of the United States to complete normalization."[69] No declaration, no communique, no advances came from this visit, and many declared it a failure.[70] Ford

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[69]New York Times, December 8, 1975, p. A14.

[70]Critics felt that Ford and Kissinger missed an excellent chance to complete normalization. They were Republicans, the war was settled, and the Chinese leadership the same

later reduced U.S. troops on Taiwan by half, and in April 1976, sent a telegram to Hua Guo-feng, the newly designated Premier, stating American determination to complete normalization on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

The USCPFA rallied demonstrations at the time of Ford's visit to China, and sponsored talks about the implications of diplomatic relations. The committees had agreed that normalization would be a topic at the end of each presentation; some committees had also commemorated the signing of the Shanghai Communique that February.

Without diplomatic relations with the PRC, American contacts and investments in Taiwan soared. As Professor Paul Lin, of McGill University wrote in 1975:

> Since 1973, through the use of long-term, low-interest credits, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have nearly doubled, going from $45.2 million two years ago to $80 million for this fiscal year. Taiwan has also purchased several American submarines, destroyers, and fleet support ships...American trade with Taiwan has increased from $1.5 billion in 1971, shortly before Nixon's visit, to $3.7 billion last year...American investment on Taiwan has expanded, with new projects by such corporations as Ford Motor and Union Carbide. The Export-Import Bank recently gave the island a loan for the construction of two nuclear power plants, and several American companies are exploring for oil in the Taiwan Straits...

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as it had been with Nixon's opening. See Thomas Hughes's testimony before the House Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy, October 1976, p. 158.

> Since the signing of the Shanghai Communique, the United States has also allowed the Chiang regime to set up five new consulates...The amount of U.S. investment is immense, nearly $500 million by 1974 ...private and public loans to Taiwan [from 1972-1975] total $2.5 billion...Taiwan is the most favored of the manufacturing and assembly centers that U.S. corporate enterprise has established abroad to take advantage of cheap labor, a ban on strikes, tax advantages, profit remittance rights, and other conditions.[71]

Corporations, banks, and the Nationalists began to lobby Congress and the executive to keep Taiwan available for their investments. Businessmen on Taiwan did not want normalization if it would jeopardize their commercial relations. Corporate executives had thought the PRC would offer trade advantages, but had cooled to the idea after the Chinese reduced trade when normalization did not occur.

Many who desired normalization were puzzled and angered by the growing contradiction in American policy toward China. One of the most outspoken critics was Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who spoke to Congress about the build-up of Taiwan:

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[71]Paul Lin, "One China: The Way Ahead," New China (Fall, 1975): 34. To solicit this help, the Nationalist government created a Pacific Cultural Foundation, which sponsored junkets to Taiwan for journalists, businessmen, Asian experts, and Congressional figures. Taiwan also hired a former California Senator, the late George Murphy, as a paid lobbyist. See Russell Howe and Sarah Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Foreign Groups Mold America's Foreign Policy (N.Y.:Doubleday, 1977), p. 56.

> All this hardly adds up to carrying out the obvious intent of the Shanghai Communique which anticipated our military disengagement from Taiwan and the Chinese civil war....It is in this nation's interest to bring our military posture in the Taiwan area into accord with the Nixon-Chou agreement of 1972....We cannot strengthen our ties with a claimant government of China in Taiwan and, at the same time, expect to advance a new relationship with the government of the People's Republic of China. The Shanghai Communique was designed as a transitional arrangement; it did not predicate an indefinite ambivalence in our China policy....As for our defense treaty with Taiwan, it seems to me that it is properly seen as a relic of the past....We must match our commitments to our contemporary interests.[72]

Hinton, disappointed at the laxity of government officials and concerned about the emphasis on Taiwan, pressed for more substantial work on normalization.[73] In December 1975, he organized a conference on normalization for the East Coast chapters. Pamphlets, educational kits, posters, and other materials explaining normalization were designed and distributed at the conference. Four other regional conferences were held over the next six months, to improve the uneven work the locals had been doing on the question, and to provide them with materials and information they could use in their presentations to community groups.

The USCPFA sponsored a national conference on normali-

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[72]Quoted in "Mike Mansfield's Stand," New China (Summer 1977):10.

[73]William Hinton to Hugh Deane, March 14, 1976. Hinton did not run for re-election in 1976, and was named to the

zation in December, 1976.[74] It was co-sponsored by FCNL, AFSC, CCAS, the Methodist Federation for Social Action, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, among others. Some had actively worked for U.S.-China policy, others had not. Nearly 400 delegates attended, and discussed the urgency of relations with the PRC. The USCPFA agreed with the PRC position regarding Taiwan, and encouraged other organizations to explain these positions to their members, and to transmit their feelings to president-elect Carter and to Congress. The conferees adopted a statement that made the following points:

> Our deliberations have led us to the conviction that the time has come to renew the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and move rapidly towards the normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. The United States must accept and immediately implement the implications (of the Shanghai Communique), namely the withdrawal of all military forces and installations from Taiwan, the abrogation of the mutual defense treaty with the government of Taiwan, and the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from that government....We urge President Carter, upon assuming office, to take prompt and substantial action toward normalization...we shall carry on widespread educational efforts to achieve this goal at an early date.[75]

Honorary Steering Committee. Frank Pestana was elected Chairman and served until 1979.

[74]Ralph Rapaport, "Report to the National Steering Committee," USCPFA, September 23, 1976. mimeo.

[75]U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, "Conference Statement of National Leadership Conference on U.S.-China Relations," December 11, 1976. mimeo.

To counter sentiment about Taiwan's future ties with the U.S., USCPFA chapters prepared a fact sheet on Taiwan, to provide audiences with information about its status and life there. The fact sheet noted that Taiwan had been a part of China longer than the U.S. had existed, and that the government on Taiwan had been created by, and kept in power by the U.S. government: "Despite talk of Taiwan's being an economic miracle and a democratic ally, the Chiang regime is an oppressive dictatorship....For the vast majority on Taiwan, the Chiang regime has meant wages of 10-40¢ an hour, no-strike laws, and government-controlled unions."[76] The fact sheet explained China's position that Taiwan was an internal question for the Chinese, and predicted that life after reunification would be better for the residents of Taiwan than their status under the Chiang regime. The Association also printed a pamphlet, Taiwan: Roadblock to Friendship, reprints of articles by Paul Lin and John S. Service on U.S.-Taiwan ties, and leaflets on conditions for normalization. All were nationally distributed through the local chapters.

The Carter Administration's Policy

The direction of the Carter foreign policy regarding

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[76]New York City U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, "Normalization Fact Sheet," August 3, 1977. mimeo.

China was not immediately clear. Although he reiterated America's commitment to normalization of relations with China,[77] Carter stressed the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan matter, in such a manner as to make it seem a precondition. Relations with China had a low priority for Carter.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made an exploratory trip to China in August 1977. Vance had presented the administration's views (as he saw them) to the Asia Society in a June speech. Friendly relations with China were considered a "central part" of America's foreign policy, and the U.S. would be guided by the Shanghai Communique as it moved to normalize relations.[78] The Vance trip, like the Ford trip, produced nothing concrete. Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping called the trip a step backwards, saying that Vance had proposed keeping a diplomatic liaison office with Taiwan after relations with the PRC had been achieved.[79] The Chinese refused to consider such a step.

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[77] New York Times, March 18, 1977, p. A4. Carter had pledged to defend the freedom of the Taiwan people during his campaign, and seemed to favor some form of 2-China policy instead of the terms of the Shanghai Communique.

[78] Ibid., June 29, 1977, p. 1.

[79] Ibid., September 6, 1977, p. 1.

The USCPFA was also extremely disappointed by the failure of the Carter administration to complete normalization. Members attending the annual convention that September voted to establish a Center for U.S.-China Relations in Washington.[80] The Center would monitor debates in Congress, follow legislation or other activities related to China, and be a resource of information for local and regional normalization workers. The National Normalization Committee met in November to map strategies that would improve the work at the grass-roots level and supplement the actions planned for the Center.[81] The National, noting the upcoming exchanges the USCPFA was sponsoring with China--a month-long tour by the Chinese soccer team, and a three-month long tour of paintings done by peasants from Hushien county--decided to use these events as focal points for normalization activities. Posters, slide shows, leaflets, and other information would be distributed to everyone attending these events.

Activities in public education and normalization were helped by the extensive tours program the USCPFA mounted in

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[80]Interview with Elaine Budd, September 9, 1980, and Dega Schambri, September 10, 1980. The Center did not open until May 1978, and suffered from the same dissension that marked other normalization work. Resources were too limited to accomplish extensive lobbying or educational work, according to Budd, who headed the Center.

[81]Interview with Dega Schambri.

1977. Prior to 1977, the Association had been booking frequent tours to China, mostly for volunteer workers with the Association or for specialists who were interested in studying one aspect of Chinese socialism or Chinese society. In 1977, the Association was given 2,000 visas for travelers that year; the number has increased since then. The Association was favored in this regard, and became one of the few organizations with large tour bookings to the PRC. The Association took hefty mark-ups on each fare, which were used to fund programs like the Washington Center. The Association extracted a pledge from each traveler booked on its tours to do educational work and to press for normalization on return; since China is an exciting place to visit, most returnees were happy to do so, at least for a short time.

By early 1978, it was obvious that the Carter administration had not produced a satisfactory explanation to delay normalization further. Objective conditions for normalization looked bright. The United States' trade with the PRC had jumped to more than $1 billion in 1977, and the ambitious plans to modernize China promised more commercial activity.[82] American firms had been talking with PRC officials about hotels and other tourist facilities, off-shore oil exploration, agricultural machinery, and communications equipment. Japan had

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[82]New York Times, December 15, 1978, p. 1.

worked out arrangements to keep its commercial relations with Taiwan intact after it recognized the PRC, and it seemed likely that the U.S. could negotiate a similar accord, if it broke diplomatic and military ties to Taiwan.

But, as Washington columnist David Broder wrote: "a vacuum in high-level public discussion in China policy" existed in the Carter administration: Leonard Woodcock, head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, had not met with Carter when he returned to America on a trip in 1977; the PRC had not appointed a new chief of their Liaison Office in Washington; and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had stifled cabinet officials who wanted to speak on PRC relations.[83]

To spur some action, the USCPFA made a major effort to turn out demonstrators at the February rallies celebrating the Shanghai Communique. Joined by the major overseas Chinese organizations, the USCPFA took out ads in the largest newspapers with national distribution, calling upon the Carter administration to normalize relations with the PRC at once.[84] The ads noted that the U.S. was the only world power to re-

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[83] David Broder, "Kennedy: A Skillful Prod on China," Washington Post, February 2, 1978, p. 19.

[84] New York Times, February 28, 1978, p. 5.

tain diplomatic ties with Taiwan and U.S.-PRC relations would bring benefits to both nations. The ads quoted Senator Edward Kennedy and other high officials, including Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott, who had said that normalization, "even at the expense of severing diplomatic ties with friends," should occur quickly.[85] The ads urged readers to write Congressmen, Vance, and Carter demanding action on normalization.

Signals that the administration had finally decided to act came in May 1978, when Brzezinski and a party of American officials went to China. They met with Chairman Hua Guo-feng, Vice Premier Teng, and Foreign Minister Huang Hua. In a speech, Brzezinski said that U.S. friendship with China was "based on shared concerns and is derived from a long-term strategic view....We recognize and share China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global and regional hegemony."[86] Brzezinski also said that the shared views "clearly outweighed" the differences, and announced that the U.S. had made up its mind to overcome any obstacles remaining in the path of full relations. Final deliberations on normalization were begun on this trip.[87]

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[85] Ibid.

[86] "Dr. Brzezinski in Peking," Beijing Review, (May 26, 1978): 5.

[87] Ibid.

Distrust of Soviet intentions was the common undercurrent in the speeches of the Chinese leaders and in Brzezinski's statements as well. That was not unusual for the Chinese, since a negative appraisal of Soviet intentions has been a cornerstone of recent Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese had decided in 1972 that the Soviet Union was moving aggressively in the world, particularly in the Third World, and would eventually collide with the U.S.[88] Leading PRC cadres have used every opportunity to speak about the dangers of Soviet actions since then, and have worked to improve their ties with every nation and international organization as a way of building alliances to prevent Soviet advances.

Brzezinski's comments seemed to represent a change in American policy toward the Soviet Union. Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford had seen detente as an effective way of checking Soviet actions. Soviet moves in Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and its sponsorship of Cuban troops dispatched to some of these regions, may have forced Carter to reconsider detente's value as a restraining tactic. Completing normalization of relations with China could demonstrate this shift in perception.[89]

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[88]Hinton, "U.S.-China Relations: Foreign Policy in a New World Context."

[89]For a broader discussion of this topic, see Playing

Carter announced the fulfillment of efforts on December 15, 1978. The United States and the PRC would establish relations on January 1, 1979. The U.S. would sever diplomatic ties with the Republic of China as of that date, and announce a termination of the mutual defense treaty. Commercial, cultural, and other relations short of official diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan would be permitted. While reserving an interest in the peaceful settlement of Taiwan, the U.S. acknowledged that Taiwan's future was a matter for the Chinese to decide among themselves.[90]

USCPFA activists were among the many who rejoiced at the news. The efforts of some had spanned three decades and the accomplishment was sweet. Although not completely certain as to exactly how their efforts had brought about the final announcement, most felt the Association had played a positive

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the China Card: Implications for United States-Soviet-Chinese Relations, a Report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington 1979, and Robert Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978). Congress had also been debating this issue. See the hearings on United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977, and House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China: Practical Implications, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 1977.

[90]"U.S. Statement on Normalization," U.S.-China Review, January 1979, p. 9.

role in this worthy struggle.

Conclusions

The USCPFA is the largest group studied in this dissertation. The 10,000 members it attracted eventually included citizens from different regional, economic, and ethnic backgrounds. The early members came from the left, from progressive groups, and from anti-establishment organizations. As interest in China grew, USCPFA attracted many people who were sympathetic to or simply curious about China. The USCPFA became a mass organization, in contrast to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, which recruited elites.

The USCPFA's activities were conducted by volunteers from 1971-1977, when a small staff was hired at the national level. Volunteers organized the chapters, did their own fundraising, and contributed their own time and finances to sustain the work. Some of the founders have been unflagging in their efforts to achieve normalization. Many people devoted so much time and energy to a matter of foreign policy when so few material rewards were forthcoming.

Public education was a major accomplishment of the USCPFA. Hundreds of volunteers taught and talked to Americans about China, and this activity was a constant task performed by USCPFA members. USCPFA slide shows, courses, trips, pub-

lications and exchanges with the PRC did bring a new perspective on China to thousands of Americans. USCPFA did provide a positive environment for normalization to be accepted.

Local initiative and interest in China was demonstrated by the rapid growth in the number of USCPFA chapters. Local chapters and members retain the power over USCPFA policies through annual conventions but a national staff has begun to exercise greater direction over volunteer activities. Overall, the USCPFA has kept an interest in grass-roots organizing to demonstrate a broad wish for improved relations with the PRC.

USCPFA took advantage of the progress toward normalization in the 1970's by approving the likeliest terms of normalization and working for them. The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations had faced different circumstances in the 1960's, and had adopted a more cautious, non-partisan position in order to advance debate on the issue. The USCPFA decided to campaign for specific terms as a way of countering those individuals and groups who wanted the U.S. to maintain a presence in Taiwan. The USCPFA supported the options the PRC held since it was unlikely that normalization would ever occur unless the U.S. broke relations with the Nationalists. The USCPFA position proved to be the realistic one, but it

earned the organization a reputation in some quarters of being pro-PRC, and pro-Left.

The interval arguments about the objects of normalization efforts hampered the work USCPFA committees could do on this question. Some committees were divided between those who favored communications with elected officials and those who opposed it, and these disputes hindered completion of planned activities. The volunteer composition of the USCPFA worked against some normalization efforts as well. Membership in the committees changed, new members needed education themselves, and follow-through was not always consistent.

The stand on Taiwan led some USCPFA activists to believe they could not work with other organizations who favored some form of official ties between the U.S. and the Nationalists. This hindered cooperative endeavors that could have been arranged, e.g., joint co-sponsorship of exchanges with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Too, USCPFA members found it difficult to educate people about the PRC's rationale for its positions, and the need for the U.S. to sever ties with Taiwan because the other viewpoint was widely promulgated by officials, some Asian experts, others in Congress and business circles.

The talks, tours, and exchanges the USCPFA and the

National Committee on U.S.-China Relations sponsored with the PRC were positive examples of the good relations that normalization would bring. The organizations were a presence that favored normal relations, and so served to neutralize any potential resurgence of anti-PRC sentiments. The PRC revealed its commitment to improved relations by dispatching thousands of visas to the USCPFA, scheduling educational trips for activists, and carefully planning itineraries and exchanges with both organizations.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Relationships to Hypotheses

As the three preceding chapters demonstrate, thousands of Americans who were associated with the organizations studied worked to have the U.S. recognize the PRC during the years 1945-1979. In regard to the first hypothesis of this study, it can be said that, in general, the organizations performed the functions outlined by Rosenau: vetoing or supporting policy alternatives; articulating choices for the public; consulting and advising officials on issues and impacts; and engaging consideration of issues by the public and other opinion-makers.[1]

Education of the Public

Of the four functions, all the organizations devoted considerable time, energy, and resources to teaching the public about U.S.-China policy, outlining the choices that could be made, suggesting the benefits of recognition and good re-

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[1]Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy, pp. 17-21.

lations, and delineating the obstacles that blocked normalization.

The individuals who were active placed great faith in the ability of the public to choose a sound policy once it received adequate information. Members felt obligated to impart their opinions to the public, hoping that the public would press for changes. By and large, the activists believed that the public had the right to choose or change policy, and that officials were ultimately responsible to the public. If officials proved unheeding or intransigent, activists were obligated to mobilize the public to press demands.

The issue of U.S.-China relations begged for education. Little reliable information about the PRC and the CCP had penetrated the American political system since 1948. Distortions and myths prevailed over objective assessment. CDFEP tried to inform, and warn, the public about the dimensions of cold war policies, and the damage anti-communist crusades would do to civil liberties and political freedom in the U.S. Groups working in the 1960's had to correct the faulty image of the PRC disseminated in the U.S., demonstrate the value of changed relations, and present the implications of world war, should U.S. antagonism toward the PRC overwhelm reason. The USCPFA had the experiences and resources to educate the public about

contemporary life in the PRC, its policies and intentions, and its willingness for good relations. Educational activities of all the organizations were designed to solve some of the problems the official policy of nonrecognition had created. These activities were a positive contribution to public debate, and met a definite need.

All of the organizations, to varying degrees, opposed officially sanctioned positions that were repeatedly reinforced by some leaders, the media, and strong counter-organizations. This monolith made education difficult to achieve. Although their own resources were somewhat limited, the groups in this study employed various techniques to reach the public. Conferences, often including other leadership groups, were a favorite method, as were briefings, seminars, lectures, trips, demonstrations, publications, and consultations with experts and scholars. The USCPFA, CDFEP, and the Quakers employed these methods on a large-scale, grass-roots level. The China Program of the National Council of Churches concentrated on its member churches while the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations geared its outreach to elites.

Legal restrictions played some part in promoting educational endeavors over other activities. All the groups except CDFEP had tax-exempt status, which stopped them from

using traditional lobbying techniques, since no more than ten percent of the budget could be set aside for lobbying. The FCNL is the only group that used its funds for lobbying. One wonders how much potential political activity in foreign affairs is bridled by restrictions governing tax exemptions. However, the budgets of the organizations were so small they could hardly mount a productive lobbying effort anyway.

Vetoing or Supporting Alternatives

All the organizations presented alternatives and vetoed then-current policies, although their freedom to carry out this function was hampered by the circumstances and problems each had to confront at a given time.

CDFEP expressed the progressive sentiment of the New Deal-united front era at a time when a cold war, anti-communist ideology was blossoming. CDFEP advocated recognition of the PRC when the progressive base for this policy was being eroded by attacks. Ideologues of the anti-communist forces suppressed CDFEP, denying it resources and sullying its credibility. A full battery of governmental intimidation soon destroyed CDFEP. Therefore, although CDFEP's positions were reasoned and logical, it was forcibly prevented from circulating its opinions.

The National Committee was also restricted in its freedom to act. It emerged at a time when the rationale of the

cold war was under attack; the anti-PRC views of the China Lobby and the Committee of One Million were being questioned but were still powerful. The National Committee included many major figures in Asian and Chinese studies, former high-ranking government employees, businessmen and union officials interested in trade with China, civic and church leaders. Its constituency made it the nucleus of a new consensus, opposed to the policies of past administrations and seeking new relations with the PRC.[2]

Tactically speaking, the National Committee took a nonpartisan position to overcome the resistance and fear that had been generated in previous debates on China policy. It also sought to alter the polarization in attitudes about China policy that had been created. A balanced approach protected the members while permitting freer expression on the issue than had been allowed. Had the National Committee espoused a stronger pro-recognition position, the antagonism that CDFEP

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[2]Historian Warren Cohen found that only a relative handful of individuals were influential in making policy about China from 1900-1950. Given the anti-China attitude of the McCarthy period and the 1950's, the number of experts or influential people did not increase tremendously. Therefore, the composition of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations probably tapped members from the existing centers of knowledge about China. See Cohen's The Chinese Connection (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1968), Introduction.

encountered may have reawakened. Even so, the National Committee represented progress since it called for new action on a policy that had gone unchallenged for fifteen years.

The USCPFA, on the other hand, had more freedom than its predecessors, and moved in a less restrictive, less cautious environment. It was active at a time when detente was favored over cold war tenets. The USCPFA could discuss all the implications of U.S.-China relations, present PRC positions, and send Americans to China to see for themselves what China was like. The level of debate on U.S.-China policy had advanced so far by the 1970's that the USCPFA could take a partisan stance on the terms of diplomatic relations without fear of official suppression.

Positions on Taiwan were historically related. CDFEP could call for recognition of the PRC as a new nation whose legitimacy and promise the U.S. should acknowledge. The KMT occupation of Taiwan seemed temporary and U.S. involvement there became significant only after the Korean War began. Taiwan was not a major problem in CDFEP's analysis. However, by the 1960's, all the organizations had to reckon with Taiwan as part of their discussions of U.S.-China relations. They took different views on Taiwan but had to consider its role in Sino-American relations. By the time the USCPFA was formed,

the value of U.S.-PRC relations seemed more important than the value official relations with Taiwan may have once had. USCPFA could take an advanced position on Taiwan because the terms required by the PRC now commanded greater regard in the U.S. even though the PRC position had not changed over the intervening years.

Although the experiences of these organizations generally support Rosenau's theses, they also illuminate some faults in his description of the function just considered. First, Rosenau implies that all groups will be given a fair hearing and treated amiably. He assumes that a free marketplace of ideas exists when foreign policy options are formulated, and that consensus can perhaps be found.[3] Instead, we find that certain groups, like CDFEP, were deliberately prevented from expressing their views and were persecuted for holding them. Consensus through choice did not really exist, but collusion was purchased by intimidation, purges of opponents, and governmental suppression. Fair treatment was given only to those who conformed. The fair hearings and amiable treatment Rosenau posits seem hardly to have existed. Rosenau does describe a "negative consensus,"

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[3]Rosenau, National Leadership, pp. 18-19. Also his Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chapters 3, 5, and 7.

which is the means leadership groups use to block or exclude consideration of some alternatives, but this term as he defines it is too mild to cover the kind of suppression groups like CDFEP encountered.[4]

Secondly, abiding opposition to anti-communism, and to nonrecognition was present in the 1950's and continued throughout the decades under study here. Had groups been permitted free expression of their opinions through time, it is possible that greater resistance to these policies would have been expressed.

Lastly, Rosenau's proposals are static, as though group functions can be divorced from time, history, and change. In fact, groups arise in an historical context, address an issue, then wane; newer groups or leaders emerge, learn from the experiences of their predecessors, present a modified position, then are either replaced or adapt with changes in policy. For instance, CDFEP operated in a benign environment from 1945 to 1948; progressive ideas were promoted or permitted expression by leaders in government, other associations, and elsewhere. From 1949 to 1952, the environment became hostile, and CDFEP eventually dissolved. Later groups who addressed the issue of recognizing the PRC had to take CDFEP's experiences into account while formulating their

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[4]Rosenau, National Leadership, p. 25.

own positions. Past recriminations and hostile factors still in the environment cut into their freedom to act or state a position. Once the groups in the 1960's had taken a stand, those in the 1970's found it much easier and simpler to act. Progress on the issue of recognizing the PRC had been gradual, cumulative, and overlapping, based on the combined efforts of several groups over time. Rosenau projects a seemingly linear relationship between functions and actions; instead it appears that evolutionary or dialectical relationships exist.

Consultation With Public Officials

Rosenau is also too quick to assume that groups gain ready access to officials. In this study, only two of the groups, FCNL and the National Committee, enjoyed substantial consultations with elected officials. FCNL was established for this purpose and the membership of the National Committee almost guaranteed its access.

The National Committee seems to fit Rosenau's model of a leadership group better than the other organizations do.[5] It specifically recruited experts, leaders, and top executives as members, thus insuring its credibility and esteem. Elected officials or appointees were oftimes friends or colleagues of Committee members, and were amenable to granting briefings,

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[5]Ibid., pp. 27-35.

attending seminars, or speaking at conferences, and these factors enhanced the Committee's reputation as a locus for sound debates on policy. The Committee grew to include those individuals who shift into and out of policy-making posts, thus drawing the Committee closer to decision-making circles. Finally, as Chapter III shows, the founders of the Committee sought to build a consensus among leaders that U.S.-China policy required review and change.

The other organizations encouraged letter-writing campaigns, placed newspaper advertisements, held public demonstrations to call upon officials to act, submitted petitions to officials, and invited Congressmen to endorse their positions, but they did not have the access to officials that members of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations had.

Therefore, there does not seem to be any uniformity in the way groups relate to, or consult with public officials. Consultation with officials is not automatically a part of their repertoire of activities, nor a resource all possess.

Officials can encourage or discourage such approaches. CDFEP's progressive posture frightened many politicians in the late 1940's and 1950's, so CDFEP was excluded from discussions. By the mid-1960's so many Congressmen and disaffected administration officials had called for changes themselves that acti-

vists took heart, and were inspired to work harder.

Consultation then, depends on circumstances groups themselves do not control, and the privilege is not easily won. Officials have power to include and exclude depending upon their preferences, and groups cannot always mediate between the public and officials.

Presenting the Issues

Overall, efforts to change policy were directed more toward the public instead of toward other opinion-makers or decision-makers, as had been hypothesized. The coalition that produced the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations did aim much of its efforts to opinion-makers. The other organizations focused much of their work on educating the general public, and their members, although they combined this with contacts with leaders and other opinion-makers. Many individuals in the formative nuclei of CDFEP, the National Council of Churches' China Project, and the USCPFA were experienced opinion-submitters, and familiar with ways to reach other leaders or opinion-makers, but chose to work to change attitudes within the public. Generally, it seems that the individuals felt more certain that policy changes of a lasting nature would occur if the public could see the value of improved relations, and urge officials to make them.

The resources the groups managed to acquire were limited. CDFEP and the early USCPFA had to rely on donations and dues to fund their activities. The best resource they had was the free labor of volunteers. AFSC, FCNL, and the China Program of the National Council were sponsored by their parent organizations; their budgets were low, but they did have a consistent full-time staff. The National Committee had a substantial budget, a full-time staff, and a membership selected in part for its willingness to devote funds and contacts to Committee projects. After 1977, the USCPFA budget boomed with revenues from tours. Even so, the organizations seldom received national attention from the media. All had their own publications, which were disseminated as widely as limited resources would permit, but sustained communication of views came most frequently from face-to-face encounters with interested citizens or officials.

From the interviews, correspondence and historical accounts consulted in this study, I have learned that the activists were largely undeterred by the obstacles they faced. Activists, organizers, and founders who created or worked with the organizations studied here were quite confident that their efforts would contribute to normal state-to-state relations with the PRC. Most believed they had to take

the initiative themselves, since many officials were sluggish, timid, or tied to nonrecognition policies. Activists regarded officials as equals, as representatives, or public servants who should do what the public wanted them to do. They believed the U.S. policy of nonrecognition was against American interests and told that to the public and the officials. Members believed they could analyze policy matters as capably as government staffers could; many, particularly those from the 1960's, believed they had more sense than government officials. Activists were motivated by noble ideas--peace in the world, international cooperation, international interdependence, and democratic principles--not by the promise of material rewards.

PRC Contacts As Resources

In regard to the second hypothesis, direct contacts and relations with citizens of the PRC proved to be significant resources to the USCPFA and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, but not to the other organizations in this study. The contacts with the PRC were important to the USCPFA all along, and grew in importance to the National Committee as the Committee became more involved with official exchanges.

The PRC invited USCPFA activists and founders to China

in 1971, and have continued to do so since then. The information and perceptions from these tours gave USCPFA's presentations credibility. USCPFA's educational activities were greatly expanded after 1976, when thousands of Americans made the trip to China; the additional revenue was a welcome resource to the USCPFA.

After 1971, the National Committee also sponsored trips and exchanges of experts and specialists, who held high-level meetings with PRC cadres in different fields. Information from these tours was valuable to those who later held office, e.g., Cyrus Vance led a National Committee delegation to China in 1975 and talked with Vice Premier Teng.[6] These tours were substitutes, of a sort, for official discussions.

The Quakers and the NCC group had limited contact with the PRC. Activists took personal trips to China, but contacts were not broadened until January 1979.

Direct contacts with citizens of the PRC were important to many activists in all of the organizations. Personal experience in China, especially in pre-liberation days, has had a lasting impact on those individuals who lived there or

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[6]John Knowles, China Diary (N.Y.: Rockefeller Foundation, 1976).

worked there. Attachment to China may have been sentimental, as it was for some activists who spent their childhood in China. It was also a political experience for the many soldiers, missionary workers, and writers who worked there. Their enthusiasm in working for good relations between the U.S. and China was heightened after many returned to China and compared the new accomplishments with the misery of the old China they had known. Very few of the activists in these organizations are Chinese or Chinese-Americans, which makes their dedication more remarkable; most activists were motivated by an identification with an American policy that had to be changed rather than by a concern for China as ethnic Chinese.

The Chinese carefully nurtured their contacts and friendships with Americans who promoted diplomatic relations. Once it was possible, the PRC quickly invited old "China Hands" to re-visit. Individuals who had played a prominent role, e.g., Edgar Snow, Maud Russell, and William Hinton, were favored with special itineraries and interviews with leading cadres. So were the new generation of pro-recognition advocates like the CCAS delegation. The Chinese took pro-recognition work seriously and provided encouragement by commending the advocates and welcoming them in China. The Chinese did whatever they

could to build cooperative relations with individuals and organizations in the U.S. in the absence of formal state-to-state relations.

Relationships to Policy-making

What does studying the behavior of leadership groups tell us about the connections between the circulation of policy options and the decisions made by authorities? Rosenau believes it is difficult to assess the impact interest groups have on foreign policy. After looking for linkages, he concluded:

> One cannot manipulate the variables that would reveal which groups or persons in American society exercise influence over the formulation of foreign policy. Rather, the most one can do is to examine the behavior which appears to be a function of the opinion-policy relationship, and then to deduce from that behavior those factors which seem to have been responsible for the influence in question.[7]

Proper deduction depends upon correctly choosing responsible factors. This is a difficult task since myriad factors are involved, emphases or perceptions change over time, environmental factors shift, and reliable or adequate information is not always available to the outside observer.

In regard to Sino-American relations, much that has

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[7]Rosenau, Public Opinion, p. 11. See, too, Bernard Cohen's The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, Chapter I for a discussion about the difficulties in ascertaining influence.

already been written points to certain factors as being more prominent than others, e.g., security arrangements, potential joint military cooperation, corporate sales and trade developments during China's modernization drive, and reassessments of America's positions in Asia. Much information that explains the significance of these factors in normalization is not public, so their rank, or their relative importance in the decision cannot be determined. Against a background of these factors, it is not easy to assess the role prorecognition groups played, nor to trace the linkages with decision-makers. With these limitations in mind though, it is possible to make some observations about the effect on U.S.-China policy these organizations had.

CDFEP is representative of those organizations that were active in the debate surrounding the formulation of American policy in China and the cold war in general. Recognition of the PRC was a possibility until the outbreak of the Korean War, and public opinion would have supported recognition until then.[8] Had CDFEP not been hobbled by official investigations and anti-communist accusations, it may have been able to play a more instrumental role in mobilizing favorable opinion to recognize the PRC during the cru-

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[8]Borg and Heinrich's The Uncertain Years is a collection of essays dealing with the debates over policy regarding recognition at that time.

cial months from September 1949 to June 1950. However, CDFEP was robbed of whatever power it may have had to effect policy and it gradually disintegrated.

Based on the findings in this study, the groups in the 1960's--the FCNL, the AFSC, the National Council of Churches, the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and others described in Chapter III--were of more consequence than CDFEP. American involvement in Indochina and the threat of war with China spurred vigorous action on China policy by many of these groups, since the conflict exposed the dangers of adversarial relations with the PRC.[9] From 1964-1969, these organizations represented thousands of citizens who opposed U.S. policy and wanted it changed.

The organizations rallied diverse groups who shared their discontent with existing policy and who transmitted demands for changes to Congress and the executive branch. Evidence in Chapter III showed that lobbying performed by Eugene Boardman and FCNL helped initiate Congressional hearings on U.S. policy toward the PRC (See pp. 121-123). Quakers and

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[9]D. F. Fleming, America's Role in Asia (N.Y.: Funk and Wagnall, 1969), pp. 94-96. V.O. Key believes that events, such as a war, rouse public activity on issues, and play a substantial role in molding public opinion. See V.O. Key, "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy," Virginia Quarterly Review 37 (Autumn 1961):481-494.

other activists supplied Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee with policy alternatives and reports that showed ways relations with the PRC could be improved. The subsequent hearings challenged the anti-PRC stance promulgated in Congress by the Committee for One Million, evincing changes that were nascent in Congress. The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations also met with significant Congressmen and State Department figures from 1966 on, proposing new perspectives and calling for less antagonistic relations with the PRC.[10] The steps toward normalization taken by the Nixon administration seem to validate the organizations' assessment of the need for change; the public support and approval they offered Nixon strengthened his capacity to act.

Groups in the 1970's built on the accomplishment started earlier. As Chapter IV demonstrated, the groups were a positive presence calling for fruitful Sino-American relations. They established a network of rewarding contacts with PRC cadres, energetically campaigned for new relations,

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[10]See Chapter III, pp. 156-157. The information about these meetings suggests that some members of the Johnson-Rusk administration may have shared the beliefs of the National Committee members, or may have wanted to manipulate the Committee in some fashion. Were more information publicly available, a bureaucratic politics model, rather than an interest group model, might be useful to explain the interactions involved.

and opposed anti-PRC sentiments. Thousands of Americans learned about the real China through their efforts, and they helped prepare the public to accept relations with the PRC. Membership is one indication of the favorable public response: in eight years, USCPFA chapters multiplied from three to 110, while the National Committee's select membership grew from 80 to 500.

However, there was a long delay between the breakthroughs of the mid-1960's and recognition, which occurred in 1979. The Shanghai Communique in 1972 was an announcement that Sino-American policy had changed; in one sense the Communique can be seen as the culmination of the debate that preoccupied the discussion of the 1960's. What then of the hiatus between 1972 and 1979? What role did the groups play during those seven years?

One possible interpretation comes from Manfred Landecker, who holds that the foreign policy decisions of a president are subject to multiple inputs and multiple demands which are often conflicting.[11] Thus, once a new direction in Sino-American relations occurred, the executive encountered many circumstances that influenced the formulation of a comprehensive policy toward the PRC. It becomes difficult to

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[11]Landecker, The President and Public Opinion, preface.

assess the given impact of each variable since it is hard to assign a specific weight or value to each contributing element. Prorecognition groups were one force but other events apparently "outweighed" them since recognition was delayed so long. Evidently, these circumstances included the lengthy investigations of the Nixon administration caused by the Watergate affair; President Ford's unwillingness to complete normalization for fear of a right-wing back-lash; extended American involvement in Indochina through the early 1970's; evolutionary developments in American relations and assessments of the Soviet Union; and the lengthy debate over official or unofficial ties with Taiwan which involved many in Congress, business, the military, and elsewhere. Conclusive decisions about these matters were apparently not made until late 1978, when recognition was announced.

From Landecker's point of view, groups present and evaluate options on fragments of total U.S. foreign policy questions. The decision to establish relations with the PRC was tied up with U.S. policies in Asia and toward the Soviet Union, U.S. desire to gain trade and commercial benefits, and other advantages relations with China might bring. Prorecognition groups concentrated on Sino-American relations; although members may have had opinions about all of the above-named factors, they were limited to working for U.S.-China

relations as such. While official-policy makers take many factors and relationships into consideration while developing an overall policy, groups are, by definition, restricted in their scope of activity.

Another interpretation on the efficacy of groups has been made by Henry Kissinger. He believes that advisers and outside groups are most needed in the transition period between urgent crises that trigger changes and the creation of long-range strategies and goals.[12] Groups are more likely to be consulted or heeded when policy is in flux and officials have not yet devised new courses of action. Once policy is made, it is tested by events; officials oversee this evolution, and groups are not as involved in the evaluation of policies until major problems arise. CDFEP flourished in the years 1946-1948, when policy toward China was fluid; the organizations of the 1960's responded to the crises inherent in the Vietnam War. Although CDFEP did not survive, the energetic activities of the latter groups may have helped produce the resolve necessary to change U.S. policy toward the PRC.

Too, once the Shanghai Communique was signed, and quasi-official contacts begun, the matter of eventual recognition of the PRC could have become enmeshed in bureaucratic

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[12]Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 702-704.

politics, and subjected to the wrangling and uncertainties that characterize that process.[13] The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations was close to this process, since it worked with the State Department in planning, operating, and hosting several exchanges and tours for opinion-makers. From this point of view, the organizations can be seen as a persuasive force for diplomatic relations, which rallied public support behind the issue while building unofficial contacts with PRC cadres.

In sum, this study shows that leadership groups did help create an environment conducive to changes in U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. To do so, the organizations took the initiative since many top officials clung to old policies. The analyses and alternatives proposed by the organizations were viable and realistic, and the educational work they did contributed to public acceptance of American recognition of the PRC. Although the organizations actively participated in the pivotal debate over China policy in the 1960's and early 1970's, their input at other times was lessened by various factors, including official sanctions and internal disagreements over methods. The organizations maintained a constant pressure favoring new relations with the PRC but represented only one factor in the final decision

[13]Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.

to recognize the Chinese government. I conclude then that these organizations played a valuable, if somewhat limited, role in the process that led to diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China.

Suggestions for Further Research

In working on this topic, I found other interesting questions which are worthy of further study.

First, many Americans who worked for recognition of the PRC did so in spite of personal hardship and travail. Many were victims of the McCarthy investigations and related inquiries, but persisted in their political work for years. Political persistence in the face of tremendous obstacles, and the faith such individuals exhibit while working for a goal, should be explored in depth.

Chinese-Americans, and Chinese people who are living in the U.S. formed their own associations here which considered Sino-American relations, among other matters. A study of their attitudes toward recognition, and the activities they engaged in regarding this issue, would yield helpful information about another aspect of this question.

The uncertain future of U.S. corporate investment in Taiwan, should the U.S. recognize the PRC, was a major problem that was debated by individuals interested in Sino-American relations. The role played by multi-national

corporations in the discussions, negotiations, and debates about recognition needs more exposure. Perhaps an examination of the National Council on U.S.-China Trade might reveal some of the processes through which multi-nationals grappled with the situation regarding commercial ties with Taiwan, while opening new trade agreements with the PRC.

YOUXIE, the Chinese ministry responsible for friendship with other nations, is an unusual institution and a good subject for further study. One could look at the purposes and goals of YOUXIE, and how it built and solidified its ties with citizens of other nations without interfering in the internal affairs of those nations. YOUXIE has had close ties with friendship groups in the U.S., Great Britain, France, Japan, and Sweden, and a comparative review of the activities of these groups regarding relations with the PRC and their respective governments would be interesting.

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Individuals who were interviewed, or with whom I corresponded in this study were selected because they were officers, founders, activists, or leaders of the organizations included here. Many were contacted because they hold positions in the organizations described in this dissertation, or because they had been involved in the establishment of an organization, been a former board member, staff member, leader, or activist. Individuals who were interviewed or written often referred the author to other individuals who had been important to an organization, while the names of others were compiled from the archives, records, correspondence, and publications of the organizations. Some individuals had overlapping memberships or positions with two or more organizations over the thirty years, and information about their respective activities in other organizations was obtained in interviews or correspondence.

Generally, everyone contacted was asked the following questions. In some instances, these questions were supple-

mented by requests for specific information pertinent only to the activities of a certain individual, a certain activity of an organization, or a particular historical event.

I would like to thank everyone who responded to my questions. All were quite helpful and most generous with their time and comments.

1. Could you give me your name and tell me how you became involved in working for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C.

2. Could you tell me about those organizations that you knew of which were working on this issue during the 1940's and 1950's.

3. How would you assess the impact of the McCarthy era on these groups? On active individuals? On those people who might have continued to work on this issue?

4. Were there any groups that you knew of, or were part of, that worked on this issue in the 1960's?

5. For the group in which you are currently a member, could you tell me about its history, i.e., how it came to be, how it was formed, what its original goals were, what it intended to do, and how it sought to do it.

6. How did the organizers and activists respond to the environmental pressures against them, like "red-baiters," the China Lobby, the Committee of One Million, the KMT, etc.

7. Do you know of any contacts between your organization and the People's Republic of China? If so, how would you assess the value of direct contact with people or officials of the People's Republic? Did it help you personally? Did it help your organization? How? What specific examples could you give?

8. Could you tell me about the activities for normalization of diplomatic relations that were undertaken by your organization. What were the goals of such actions? To whom were they directed? Why did you choose to direct your actions to that audience? Did your organization lobby governmental officials directly? Why?

9. If you had to choose, would you say that the bulk of your organization's work was directed toward the general public, toward organizations, toward leaders of organizations, toward local officials, toward national officials? Why?

10. Could you tell me what areas of significant work you believe your organization performed?

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